MF Syndicator Bingo

Originally posted this earlier this year in the Tides Equities thread and made some quick edits based on comments.  Happened upon the earlier version tonight making the rounds online and had a good laugh.  Thought with GVA's current implosion it was as good a time as any to make an official thread on this.

Will let the community decide when to officially call a firm's BINGO ball as it were, but expect GVA is on its last legs based on the news making the rounds online.  Will also share links to articles / news as it occurs as a means to track the pending implosion of many of these firms in one, centralized location.

With that said, doubt we see any distress out of S2 anytime soon - if at all.  So don't expect BINGO to be that easy.  My best guess for now is we see something along the lines of column I fall first, but imagine column G is also a contender.  Actually, looking at this again - lots of real possibilities.

Call your shot.  Will stick with Column I for now on my end.

MF Syndicator Bingo Card

 

Are rockstar’s other deals toast?

How can they still owe money on the foreclosure? Did you lend them the money personally instead of taking a lien on the property?

I am genuinely curious. I recently saw a group take out millions above the loan amount on personal loans not tied to the property. Now the property is headed for foreclosure and the borrower is still going to be liable for the personal loans.

 

They "why" is that Pat Carroll is a fucking psycho, and institutions would not give the firm any more money while he was involved.  Their equity is a lot less retail than you think (mostly Investcorp, AIG, and Pru).  He cashed out and took his money and is now an instagram personality.  The firm itself is still very much in existence and still has a very capable asset management, operations, and back office team... hence why RMR bought them.  They're also actively hiring for investment roles.   

 

Was there new news on gva this week?
I heard they stopped paying on most of their deals but I have only see a few of them hit the articles in the past few weeks.

 

Okay - so same info that has been out there for a while.
It is interesting that they claim they bought it for a 3.4 cap. I think that deal was bought for a 2 cap on trailing numbers.
It is a decent property and location but management is terrible and they were way over levered. Is this one of the ones they turned over to rpm?

 

Did anyone see the clo payment data for December?
Does it show what is happening with these loans?

 
Most Helpful

They are backed by Berkshire Residential, and have been on a lending spree since 2019. They have issued 11 (I think)  CLOs between 2019-2023, with mostly bottom tier sponsor ship, younger inexperience guys looking for high leverage, with the assumption they can just pull these loans out of the trusts, take them back and lean on Berkshire to operate them.

I don't think they realized how many of their loans are actually in jeopardy, and how overvalued they got these things to. They are the epitome of extend and pretend, and have modified a ton of their loans to help them get through maturities in 2024 forcing paydowns and additional guarantees from sponsors. Those guarantees are essentially useless, since MF1 is expecting them to be credit enhancements to the loans, but the sponsor guaranteeing them will go BK before anything comes to fruition. MF1 could be noted as one of the catalysts who spurred the sunbelt craze, giving all these inexperienced and shady sponsors billions to buy at top of market prices. I would say that the average DYs on most of MF1s loans are 4 (or sub 4) and at the 80+ (90+ really) leverage points, with a lot of sneaky money behind them.

They are by far the most in trouble IMO, and will be one of the pandemic darlings not making it out of this.  

 

rumor has it that MF1 has started selling the notes on its worst deals below par. Has anyone heard the same?

 

The million dollar question followed by my cynical conspiracy theory. How much capacity does really Berkshire have to take all this over? MF1 talks a biiiig game. 
 

MF1 issued many loans that shouldn’t have been made. Were they greedy? Or was this all a plan to wipe out the equity of inexperienced syndicator buyers when they take all their collateral back at their bases and make a gd killing?

 

Yet they just reported fourth quarter earnings this morning and there's no reaction before the market opens.  The disconnect between fundamentals and the story here should be a case study in the future.  Have to laugh at management highlighting their 3.5M share buyback yet failing to mention their 13.8M share issuance during the year.  How does math work again?  Pretty sure (3.5) + 13.8 = 13.3M more shares outstanding.

 

Their delinquencies are through the roof!


From the wsj article

( On average, buildings with Arbor CLO loans only made enough money to cover around 60% of debt payments as of the latest reporting date in 2023, absent hedges, according to CRED iQ data.

The spokesman for Arbor said hedges, interest rate reserves and guarantees are a “critical part of Arbor’s lending practices.” )

.6x coverage! It doesn’t take long to blow through those reserves. Why isn’t the market hammering them? They are clearly going under.

 

Any other updates? Came across a strange syndication called Wealth Elevator and it seems like their so-called retirement fund for investors has lost around 50% of investor capital. Keys handed back to the bank.

 

Quite a few can be crossed off (Western Wealth, Laguna Pointe, GVA) and yes, there are dozens more not on the bingo card. There are about 5 more than will surely be crossed out at some pointe but haven't given back keys anywhere yet and then of course there's Rise48, the largest ponzi scheme the real estate industry has seen in the last 10? years.

 

As the creator of the thread, I will defer to you but forced sales with 100% of the equity wiped out is the same as handing back the keys in my book. Many more coming from both of those groups. 

I heard Greg Campbell is back at TruAmerica but the below link it probably indicative of the company's status:

https://laguna-point.com/executive-team

 
AllThingsMulti

As the creator of the thread, I will defer to you but forced sales with 100% of the equity wiped out is the same as handing back the keys in my book. Many more coming from both of those groups. 

I heard Greg Campbell is back at TruAmerica but the below link it probably indicative of the company's status:

https://laguna-point.com/executive-team

Greg isn’t back at TruAmerica, he’s at Benedict Canyon Equities. Same principal but it’s his other firm

 

Who got it worse? Windmass or their investors, creditors, and tenants?

Who is taking over?

 

ZMR has been awfully quite, anyone got news on them?

Nitya also, seems like we heard about his huge CMBS default, then went quite..?

Rise is interesting since they are still buying, so kind of makes more sense than Tides... Rise bought high, but also buying low I guess could make money there, where as Tides just bought high and just sell low... 

I would cross of western wealth, they are trying to unload their portfolio to everyone at the lender basis and then bank on economics on the back end. 

 

ZMR was mostly family offices and institutions so I imagine that they have been completing the capital calls which without a doubt they've needed because those deals were terribly capitalized to begin with. It's a matter of time before these are handed back or at least ZMR is removed as GP.

Tides had a killer run for 5 years but continued to roll it over into riskier bets. Out to market now with Tides on University which they may have a little equity remaining there.

Rise bought high and continues to buy high, just a little less high and creatively structuring deals in a way that even deals purchased today will lose investor capital.

 

Yes the Tides on University deal is a forced sale by the lender (Brightspire), since they defaulted on it and it matures this month. Tides was in the market January looking for pref on it and couldn't secure, they are in it for roughly $36M and the broker is saying the guidance is $31M. Lenders last dollar is $27M and we can't even get to that, not sure how they think they are selling a 1970s property that has only 350 SF studios and 450 SF 1-1s in crappy AZ for that price lol. Thing is also littered with bad debt and it's ludacris that even on their T12s with RPM managing they are producing fraudulent #s since they are booking concessions in the LTL row. Rents are falling, and giving out months of concessions. And if that wasn't bad enough, when they were out in market with the pref request the T12 they shared had below the line #s, the capex spend here is astronomical, this property needs to be condemned. Best part of all, in the packet of 30 properties they went to market for pref (of which they got none) this was the best preformer since it was the only one that technically didn't have a negative NOI, except for it did since they book everything below the line per usual. 

 

We got shown a ZMR portfolio a few weeks ago. Their equity partner wanted out within the next 2-3 months so they’re offering a recap at significantly discounted values to their purchase price.

 

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