Are the heydays of Private Equity over?

There was an immense boom in PE since 2008. Now with higher interest rates, the industries prospects look much bleaker. Do you think PE will still be as rewarding as it was over the last big boom cycle or do you think we will see a much more moderate asset class in the future?

 
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A couple colleagues of mine used to work for one of the early PE pioneers, household name, etc. He used to tell them in the late 90s and early 2000s that the heyday of PE was long gone and you’d never see deals / returns like they did back in the day. Fast forward, and we had one of the best runs in history in the 2010s as low interest rates and the tech explosion minted countless new billionaires.

Sure, the industry is more mature now, and there’s currently an imbalance between capital availability and dealflow, but it seems unlikely that “buying companies” as a business model is going anywhere. 
 

Cycles happen, and 2017-2020 vintages are probably not in a great place right now, but  undeployed 2022-2024 vintages could potentially be in for a very strong swing on the back end. 
 

LP capital may dry up for mediocre funds that were kept alive during the bull run, and some players will no doubt exit, but then rates will come down, or someone will get creative with structures, or a new industry will develop, etc. and you’ll see things take off again. 

 

Based on the fundraising trajectory of various large caps, I would say MF and wannabe MFs are hurting just as badly if not more. There will always be real alpha in the small cap market from being able to professionalize mom/pop type businesses. 

 

This is something that's always confused me about MF PE. By the time a business is that size, you have entered most markets that make sense, raised prices where you could, and are definitely running a professional central function (finance/accounting/etc.). So where is the value add? I suppose you could always do more of all of the above, but that seems hardly more value generative than what a MM PE firm would do.

 

Mom and pop PE - LMM - has become fairly institutionalized. Some funds hurting bad in this space from overpaying wildly L3yrs and loading them with floating debt.

It's also a hard business model from the fund perspective. You have to do a lot of deals and work your people to the bone with smaller total quantum of $ fund size also meaning lower compensation. This means Large LPs are not able to deploy meaningful amount of capital here either.

Sure you can make a few bucks here, but better off just doing a search fund and doing this vs. fund vehicle. Or better yet, lever up a small cap public market portfolio.

 

I think there are a few dynamics at play here and that go forward for PE is undoubtedly tougher. So to take the other side:
1) Key is if this is truly a regime change of higher rates.That's a key difference than any of the blips you mentioned over last 30 yrs. Goes without saying but figured would start there.

2) Institutional LPs are getting truly f*cked by this downcycle. They have the most % in PE / other illiquid alts in history. Literally telling PE GPs that it would be better if they delayed capital calls. It's because they don't have as much liquidity as they should in liquid / public markets. I think there's a decent chance this overcorrects. You have to ask yourself as an endowment (or other risk-averse LPs), is it worth screwing up my university's capital spending projects and student financial aid since I was trying to be a hero and over allocating to PE and VC to squeak out a few more percentage points? Also, if #1 holds true, probably can't even make the argument as easily that PE has higher forward IRRs.What does this mean for PE investors? Probably LPs overcorrect and take away a chunk of the allocation to PE moving forward and put it somewhere more liquid.

3) Given dynamics of point #2 above, a lot of PE GPs are struggling to take advantage of the down-market part of this cycle since they are skittish to capital call with last vintage sucking wind and knowing things are tight with LPs. This will hinder the vintage on the backside of this cycle. Said differently, they are being constrained from truly buying throughout the full cycle this time and the deployed capital is skewed towards buying at the top.

And this isn't to mention all the GPs that effectively blew themselves up by deploying way too much at the top of the market or mentioning anything about how this industry is incredible more competitive due to the returns it produced post-GFC and through 2020.

 

Great post above and agree that there will always be a place for top quartile funds and buyout in a diversified LP portfolio. Alternative investing will only continue to grow as an asset class overall as it becomes more mature and accessible (and in doing so lower fees). Strong funds will have a chance to differentiate themselves over the next decade and many funds founded in the late 90’s and early 2000’s will likely struggle with leadership transitions. You are already seeing a heavy movement down market to find less competitive or proprietary deal flow. Every founder I speak with that is $5M-$10M of EBITDA in an interesting sector is constantly being courted by PE. JAMBOs will likely struggle the most unless truly thematic or heavy downstream buy and build as the mega caps will always be able to find market dislocations via public equities/debt such as we are seeing now with more take private activity and carve-outs (granted, with their typical 2x baseline gross returns versus say 3x).

 

Interesting comment about JAMBOs. I was thinking that large cap would struggle a bit more given that there are so many funds that can do large deals these days, and only so many deals of those size. But I guess the headwinds will be felt in different ways across the industry. I work at an MM/UMM and I think we feel well positioned for the future, but idk for sure of course

 

Radical idea here, just spitballing w a macro prediction. I actually am extremely bullish on private equity. One of the main reasons why PE took off after the GFC is because of the growing regulatory burden of banks. If you think about it, a private equity firm is able to take more tail risk on credit which a bank, post GFC with rising capital requirements, can’t. Unstable banks create problems as we have seen during the SVB and First Republic bank runs, and the failure of CS. The failure of banks to hedge risk for rates volatility will create more policy which restricts risky credit opportunity for banks. Just like the GFC, and the bank runs we have seen so far in 2023, this creates an endless cycle that restricts the crediting ability of banks more and more after each mistake.

In the Long run, it is possible that we are adapting to a banking system that takes very little lending risk—because private equity and other non bank finance is able to fill this role. All of the risky lending that banks previously did can be done from PE and other non bank finance without being funded by liquid demand deposits—which run the risk of a bank run. As banks become more and more regulated there will be a structural demand for the lending capabilities of PE.

There are many caveats to this thesis which I could see preventing a clear structural need for PE in the manner which I describe. I will list them in separate points below:

1.) This argument assumes private equity always adds more value than bank creditors in high rate environments. Private equity has been the largest beneficiary of the low rate, growing money supply macro regime we have had for the last decade. At the end of the day, it was very easy for these funds to invest over the past decade and many took on risky investments that worked out well because of the current smooth macro outlook. What will happen when PE deals with higher rate environments? Will their higher tail risk and greater DD than banks still yield high returns? For the foreseeable future, the FED will not be able to park rates back down like they did after GFC. So far, there answer is no, PE isn’t doing great in a high rate environment. Growth has been slowing pretty fast in the industry over the past 2 years, and the returns of many of WSO’s great MFs, risk adjusted, hasn’t been great. If private equity cannot thrive in a high rate environment, then it cannot be a structural answer to the long run regulatory tendency to reduce the risk taking lending capabilities of banks.

2.) what do we do about money supply in this PE-lending future? PE doesn’t create money when it loans. A bank does. In this world, people would get yield on money markets on short terms at high rates from the Feds. Likely because of a higher need to inject money to manage money supply, bc macro 101 says that the multiplier effect of lending is no longer in effect. Curious how this change would affect the macro regime, and PE performance, as a whole. What I proposed is a possible way the Feds respond to deal w money supply, but there are other ways as well.

 

If your theory holds then PE won’t be PE anymore as it’s known.  It will become a high risk boutique bank. The more success the see there, the more of a financial services company they will become.  So it won’t be the same career anymore.  And it could attract regulation and start the cycle that created this once again.

 

Wouldn't pricing dynamics eventually shake out at least some of these concerns?  Long and short being higher rfr will eventually shake out lower EVs?  Add to that some forced-selling and liquidity seeking LPs to the current secondaries markets should make some strong opportunities for the near term.  *Disclaimer: thoughts from an endowment allocator*

 

Don’t confuse easy with rewarding. Low rates made taking on subpar deals attractive and made it EASY to make profit.  It’s back to reality, at least for now.  You have to roll up your sleeves, pick good investments, and actually manage them because capital isn’t  free anymore for the ridiculously stupid risks private equity takes. People in PE need to ask themselves:  Are you there for the paychecks and what you think is prestige? Or do you actually want to do the job, 

 

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