She teaches 4th grade, by the way.
Now, if you go on FinTwit, there are approximately 5 billion different explanations of what happened at SVB that led to the collapse. Rather than a 42-tweet thread, let’s sum up the important parts in 6 bullets:
- Deposits exploded, more than tripling in under a decade and doubling from March 2020 - March 2021 alone
- Banks view deposits as a cheap source of financing, so they had to do something with them to make $
- SVB invested those deposits in treasuries and MBSs, with a major over-allocation to long-term, fixed-rate notes
- Rates rising forced customers to withdraw cash at unprecedented levels, particularly because SVB’s clients work in the f*cked-up tech / VC industry
- To meet deposits, they had to sell those treasuries and MBSs at a $1.8bn loss to meet demand from customers to reclaim their deposits
- That loss triggered investors and customers to think there was a serious liquidity problem, causing a classic run on the bank to the tune of >20% of all deposits
That’s pretty much it. Now, we could get a lot more specific with it, but for today let’s focus on the implications.
Throughout U.S. history, bank failures have been all too common, so common they even made a movie about one after the Great Depression. In the past hundred years, however, regulations on what banks can and cannot do with their deposit base, among other things, have absolutely exploded. Laws and frameworks like Basel III, Dodd-Frank, capital ratio requirements, etc. *ideally* are designed to prevent these things. But, as of now, it looks like there are basically two things that went wrong:
- SVB overallocated its deposit base (which requires immediate liquidity) in long-dated, fixed-rate (+10-year, 1.56% on avg) MBSs and treasuries and did not mark some of those asset values to market (bc they didn’t have to)
- JPow’s rate hikes not only f*cked the value of those assets but also froze dealmaking in VC, causing companies and individual clients to pull funds from their bank accounts at levels that SVB had not modeled for
Now, you’re gonna see a lot more people calling for additional regulation in the banking sector. All those Socrates-wannabes on Twitter that were epidemiology, crypto, and macro experts over the last few years are now getting their weekend PhDs in banking regulation, so be on the lookout.
As of Sunday afternoon (5:01 pm), the only major developments have been Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s confirmation (allegedly) that they’re not gonna run any bailouts (allegedly).
There’s a lot that is happening and could happen, but damn, this is gonna suck for employees and employees at companies whose payroll is run out of SVB. RIP to all of them, but we’re gonna be talking about this one for a while. We’ll keep you updated; for now, enjoy the irony-filled list below that confirms we live in a simulation:
- Chief Administration Officer Joseph Gentile was formerly the CFO of Lehman
- SVB had no Chief Risk Officer from April 2022 - January 2023 (as the VC market imploded)
- CEO Greg Becker sold $3.6mn in shares two weeks ago, his first sale in over a year but one that did come as part of a pre-arranged sale
- Writers on Seeking Alpha predicted the collapse a few months ago while regulators apparently worked on their coloring books
The big question: Well, what the hell happens now? How damaging will the collapse of SVB be to the startup ecosystem? How will regulations change? Anyone going to jail? Anyone getting their money back??
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