Decisions under Distress

Max Wünsche (left), a hard-nosed leader in his late twenties, with more combat experience than any Allied soldier in France on that day, and awarded every major decoration one would want, had taken charge of five thousand 14-16 year olds, and was now sitting down in a war conference with two others. He had faced off with an entire Anglo-Canadian advance by the 21st Army Group consisting of 250,000 men, 2500 tanks, 800 artillery guns earlier that morning. Colliding with one Canadian and two British armoured divisions, he held his ground until they were stalled in the Bocage countryside near Caen, in three roads trying to close in on their objective: the Caripet Airfield and the city of Caen itself.

Wünsche thought he had a greater grasp of the information required to make a quick decision. On the other side of war conference sat Kurt Meyer (right). Meyer, or Panzer Meyer, was an entirely different leader. Cautious, but aggressive, his orders were more realistic and took into consideration the overall battle plan for the entire German army, the Panzergruppe West, throughout the Normandy battlefield. He held a general bird’s eye view to any operation, from a squad-sized one of 12 to an entire divisional attack. No advance, no matter the ground gained, he argued, could ever be achieved over the long-term if it didn’t suit the positions of other units that were commanded by equally different men.

Additionally, he knew about what was happening while Wünsche was gone. Fritz Bayerlein, formerly Rommel’s head of Panzer Operations in North Africa was now in charge of the Regular Army’s most prized asset -- The Panzer Division Lehr – which had stood, in force, to the exact left of the 12th SS Panzer Divison.

Like a completely different corporate culture, it wanted to push the Allies back too – but it wasn’t fanatical like Wünsche‘s 14 and 15 year olds of the 12th Panzer Regiment. Its men averaged between 27-32 years old, were combat instructors before and during the war, were often not Nazi-Party members, had families, and were more importantly had been better equipped until that morning.

After an enormous bombing by an entire American Air Army on the morning of the day, and the British shelling by up to six-hundred guns until the late morning, it had missed the 12th SS when Witt (centre) ordered the division forward, but scattered Panzer Divison Lehr. Kurt Meyer would later overhear Field Marshal Erwin Rommel call to Bayerlein, furious at his old friend, asking ‘Why are your men not advancing! Why aren’t they pushing them back like Wünsche’s regiment to your right? Why are you not with your men Fritz?’ some crackling could be heard over the radio by Panzer Meyer, but he ascertained Bayerlein’s fateful answer, ‘they’re not advancing, Herr Field Marshal, because they’re in their fox-holes sleeping and cannot move… they’re all still… they’re lying dead where they stood’.

More static. Rommel finally understood Panzer Lehr was no more. He pulled it out, bringing back a few thousand of the original twenty-thousand to Hill 112 behind the far left of the city of Caen and Kurt Meyer’s regiment. He called Kurt Meyer knowing he was on the frequency, with a stern repose to ‘take up the entire slack from Hill 60 to the airport.’ Once again, Kurt Meyer fully evaluated the situation on his own and called up Witt and relayed what Rommel had told him with an independent conclusion: to hold to the last there was nothing left between them and Caen. It was do or die.’ Meyer also understood that between them and Caen was a three-day drive from Paris – taking Caen meant taking Paris and the entirety of North France with an option of flanking around the remaining German troops and trapping them far west of the capital city.

Kurt Meyer, to paraphrase former Baxter CEO Harry Kraemer in his book, From Values to Actions, from that point embedded in his plan a larger perspective consistently, and it above all things gives a great leaders the upper hand. He lacked any real information about what he faced – but he knew what his objectives were, and more importantly surmised the objectives of neighbouring commanders – he went on to formulate Plan A, B, C, and D for each eventuality from that angle.

His first objective was to persuade the divisional commander and Max Wünsche into a very risky manoeuvre. Split the entire division of 15,000 into two groups. One under Max and one under him – take the other under Wünsche and have it settle down between the airfield and Hill 60. Meyer’s mechanized infantrymen would move to the left and take up the gap between Tilly-sur-Seulles and the road leading to Villers-Bocage left by Panzer Lehr.

Back at the war conference Meyer conveyed his plan to Wünsche. Meyer was correct, according to Professor Deepak Malhotra, as he stayed at the table and asked Max to fully commit, to engage fully with his plan while considering its flexibility. Wünsche who was technically more senior and didn’t have to follow along –understood there was very little to pivot from. He agreed because Meyer did not convince him with the merits of his plan but rather had essentially given him his view which took into contention what was going on while he had been gone -- an analysis of his he left out. The divisional commander Witt, completely exasperated became apathetic agreed because he calculated in ten minutes approximately a thousand tanks would be colliding into their lines. But Operation Perch would stop there, the 14th of June 1944.