Value investing myths
If something is repeated often enough people will eventually start to believe it.always buys "good" companies, and Graham bought companies on the verge of bankruptcy. Investors who buy into good companies doen't need to worry about the price they pay. Whereas Graham investors need to be worried because eventually all net-nets go to zero.
Sometimes the truth is more nuanced. Woulddisciples be surprised to read a story about buying in and out of a small stocks in his personal portfolio? Would investors be surprised to read a quote by Graham about preferring quality factors in companies they look at?
On: In 1999 he purchased a $3.3m stake in Bell Industries. The technology company was in the process of restructuring and had sold off a large division. purchased his Bell stake in December of 1999 and by January 18th of 2000 he had already sold out for a quick 50% gain. The famed 'buy and hold' investor had purchased into a tiny tech stock and flipped it for an 80% gain in less than two months. The LA Times sums up the investment perfectly:
But as his earlier experience with Bell showed, that's not always 's practice when he pulls out his own wallet. In that case, bought a 5.3% stake in Bell in early December 1999, triggered a surge in Bell's market price, and then dumped his stake a month later for a profit of about $1 million, or 50% on his original investment." (source)
Now onto . Graham is often associated with purchasing stocks feature low statistical measures such as price to book, or price to earnings. One area that Graham has left a mark is by suggesting investors who purchase companies below NCAV can consistently outperform the market. Lost in the past 70s years has been some of Grahams warnings and suggestions around buying net-nets. Graham as shown below suggested investors purchase net-nets with high earning power, high returns on equity, or an imminent catalyst. His original framework has been diluted to "buy anything below NCAV no matter how terrible the company is". Here is what Graham originally wrote:
"Nevertheless, the securities analyst should exercise as much discrimination as possible in the choice of issues falling within this category. He will lean toward those for which he sees a fairly imminent prospect of some one of the favorable developments listed above. Or else he will be partial to such as reveal other attractive statistical features besides their liquid-asset position, e.g., satisfactory current earnings and dividends or a high average earning power in the past. The analyst will avoid issues that have been losing their current assets at a rapid rate and show no definite signs of ceasing to do so." (p595-596)
His plea to appreciate quality wasn't isolated to those paragraphs. Sprinkled throughoutare recommendations that investors look for higher quality companies over lower quality companies. At one point he even recommended that investors simply buy the best company in each industry when the entire industry hit its low point in the business cycle.
How is it that these messages have been lost to the sands of time? But more importantly does that mean anything for us now?
CreditBubbleStocks has captured the current sentiment towards value investing with his post titled "Value Investors Obsessed With "Compounders", ROE; Don't Care About Liquidation Value Or Margin Of Safety" The post is short and worth reading, his point is that what is considered value investing today bears little resemblance to what value investing has traditionally been.
Value investing has morphed from buying average things cheap to buying companies with high returns on equity. I have read a few blog posts where Buffett disciples proclaim that there is no price too high to pay for a company with high returns on equity. Of course this line of thinking is lunacy. As a company grows larger their returns fall, this isn't math, it's common sense. If a company can grow at 20% forever they will eventually run out of humans to sell things to. A perfect example is, which is praised for their high returns on equity. A few months back I ran a simple simulation and if they can continue to grow at 15% a year in less than 20 years they will be the only bank in the US with 100% marketshare. It's possibly they can keep up their high returns on equity due to financial engineering, but it's more likely their returns will naturally fall as they grow. Nothing can grow forever.
What Buffett, Graham, Schloss and others realized was that buying anything for far below what it was worth was a winning proposition. These famed value investors kept things simple, they purchased obvious values and didn't base their investment on assumptions or approximations of the future.in the wake of a scandal was a good purchase for Buffett and is a great example. If one thinks about the salad oil scandal it fits Graham's advice better than the platitude of a great company at a marginal (high?) price.
For those who manage billions of dollars it is difficult to find truly cheap companies. But for anyone who isn't managing billions I firmly believe the best course of action is to find decent companies selling for absurdly low values. But like Buffett and Bell Industries I'm also not opposed to buying something below average if the price warrants it and selling when the opportunity arises.
One characterization I hate is that companies that don't earn their cost of capital are worthless. When I read things like this I have the thought that if this statement were true then American enterprise would cease to exist. Do you think the company that services your furnace earns their cost of capital? Or the local grocery store, or your mechanic, or almost any non-Wall Street company? The large majority of companies in America and around the world provide a service for customers, pay employees an income and provide an owner a modest income with a little bit left over to reinvest in the future. Without these companies our lives would be much more difficult, imagine fixing your own furnace, car, and growing your own food! It seems like we would all be a lot poorer if it weren't for low margin companies that don't earn their cost of capital.
Yet in the world of Wall Street and academic finance a family owned grocery store should either close their doors, or engage in financial engineering to artificially boost their financial metrics that pile on risk. Of course Wall Street is very happy to sell said products that achieve these goals, maybe that's why there's such a push?
This about the absurdity of return on equity for a few moments. Consider a company that has $100 in capital, and earns $5 a year. At present they have a paltry 5% return on equity. If the company were to take on $99 in debt that costs 3% a year their earnings are now reduced to $2 a year. But that $2 in earnings on $1 in equity is now an astounding 200% return on equity. My example is clearly simplified, the $99 in debt goes somewhere and doesn't magically make equity disappear. Of course if a company did want to make that money disappear they'd simply buy back shares. This example company would be a darling of Wall Street, with high returns on equity and giant per-share figures. Of course to hit these metrics the company went from being stable to increasingly fragile. A slight bump in revenue could send the company into bankruptcy court for a default.
I had a conversation with someone recently where they mentioned they considered a 10% return on equity to be the bare minimum a bank should be making, and that banks below that were considered below average. This investor said they only looked at banks that earned 15% on their equity, a value they considered appropriate for a US bank. Interesting enough a bank earning 10% on equity or higher isn't just average, they're far above average. In the most recent quarter the average return on equity for all banks in the US was 7.75%. Banks earning 15% or more on their equity are in the top 12% of US banks, of which only a handful are traded. What this person considered average criteria to themselves was actually very stringent criteria for an investment.
Many investors need to stop fooling themselves about what they're doing. There is nothing special to buying high growth companies, or companies with great brands. This alone forms the basis for most of the market, the market is obsessed with growth and growing companies. There's nothing wrong with looking for good companies, or for looking for great brands, but don't make the mistake of paying too much. There are many wealthy investors who have made fortunes buying stocks of great companies in bear markets from disenfranchised investors whose growth narrative vanished before their eyes.
At the right price many companies are worth a purchase. But to me the sweet spot is finding a good company at a very low price. These companies don't always have great ROE's, but at some point 50% of book value and a few times earnings is good enough for me. Two examples of companies that fit this description are Pardee Resources or Citizens Bancshares that I profiled recently. My portfolio is filled with companies like this, Installux, PD-Rx, Solitron, Precia Molen, Conduril, Kopp Glass, Conrad Industries and others to name a few. It's easier to find small companies with average or above average operations at great prices compared to compounders at anything less than nosebleed prices. Would I ever consider buying a compounding company? Absolutely, when the price is right. I purchased some Berkshire in the midst of the financial crisis for example.
If I could encourage value investors, or aspiring value investors to do one thing it would be to use their imagination. Acquiring companies, private equity firms, and budding managers use their imagination to take many sleepy companies to great companies by thinning the ranks, introducing new products, or selling unprofitable divisions. Yet many value investors invest as if what is happening now will happen forever. Just likewon't grow at 15% forever a small company with a profitable niche selling for a few times earnings won't be independent for long, they'll be acquired. The most dangerous type of thinking of investing is to think about things as if they were linear events.
The whole premise of valuing investing is purchasing something for less than it's worth. But I feel that value investing has hit it's 1998 moment where we're inventing new metrics like 'eyeballs per click' and other goofy things to justify a new narrative. If one looks deep enough, or in enough offbeat corners of the market they will always find value.
Originally posted at http://www.oddballstocks.com/2014/10/value-investing-myths.html