Thought Banana
It Happened, But…What Happened?
SVB – aka “Hipster Soy Capital,” as a very loving and apparently coming-for-my-job ape coined on WSO late last week – was the largest house of cards in banking since those far larger houses of cards were saved Benny B back in 2008.
So naturally, the question becomes, what the hell happened? I don’t have to tell you apes that there are quite literally thousands of explanations meandering around the ol’ world wide web as we speak, but let’s do it better.
First, it was Lebron, D-Wade, and Bosch. Then, it was Steph, Klay, and Draymond. This time, it was rapid growth, poor management, and daddy JPow’s rate hikes.
Rapid Growth
As we touched on earlier this week, Silicon Valley Bank’s growth was explosive. Licking the boots of every startup on the planet during a boom time for loose credit and looser business morals will do that to you, so this alone can’t be too surprising.
An exploding deposit base actually creates a big problem for a bank. All of a sudden, the bank has all this cheap financing sitting as a liability on its balance sheet. Naturally, we want to turn those liabilities into assets.
So, when banks get deposits, they tend to invest those. In the United States, FDIC chartered banks must maintain at least 8% of their deposit base as liquid cash, available in an instant. The other 92% can be invested in an extremely tight, strict set of virtually riskless securities like treasuries, MBSs, and ABSs, to name a few.
Poor Management
And that’s where poor management comes in.
Yields were lower than Eeyore’s dopamine levels for most of the past decade, especially the latter half, right when all these deposits flooded in. SVB took those deposits and, wanting to earn a higher spread on the yield it earned vs. what it paid out to customers on deposits, searched for the highest yields it could.
Given the (very) limited investment universe available to Hipster Soy Cap, there was really only one way to eat up the yield they were hoping for: extending the maturity of their investments.
That’s all fine and dandy until you realize one basic fact taught in Fixed Income 101: the higher the duration of your assets (aka the longer the maturities), the more responsive those asset prices will be to moves in base rates.
Since JPow has been on a rate hike tirade characterized by more determination than George Washington crossing the Delaware, the value of those long-dated treasuries, MBS, and ABS on SVB’s balance sheet got f*cked.
Daddy JPow’s Rate Hikes
Remember those 475 bps of rate hiking we mentioned earlier? Yeah, that was the nail in the idiotically built coffin of SVB’s balance sheet.
Now, the problem comes from a subtle difference in the accounting treatment of certain assets in which banks invest their deposits. They fall into two buckets: Available-For-Sale (AFS) and Hold-to-Maturity (HTM).
AFS assets are just that - the bank’s CFO and other financial managers can choose to sell those assets into the market whenever they please. As such, these assets must always remain marked at their current market price on the bank’s balance sheet (aka “marked-to-market” assets.
HTM, on the other hand, does not need to mark-to-market as the bank has the legal obligation to hold the assets to maturity. That means that they’ll get their par value back when (and if) that maturity date comes.
So, Powell’s rate hikes eviscerated the value of these assets, particularly as high-duration assets are more exposed to rate hikes. Moreover, the relationship is not linear, but we don’t have time to get into convexity today.
What Happened
So, because those HTM assets did not have to be marked-to-market, few investors managed to see what was brewing. SVB realized a $1.8bn loss on its AFS assets, causing it to look to raise funds and triggering the bank run.
Now, unrealized losses on the HTMs and other far-too-nerdy assets on the firm’s balance sheet were the real problem. The dollar value of these losses exceeded the amount of equity in the bank held by investors, meaning the entire company is worthless. If they could’ve held those assets to maturity, who knows what could’ve happened. The game was over as soon as the bank run was underway.
We can blame regulators, we can blame JPow, but the idiots running this bank are clearly the most at fault. A junior with a C+ average getting a finance degree could’ve spotted this duration mismatch had they had the requisite data. Too bad a CFO making nearly $4mn/yr couldn’t.
The big question: How will regulations on the assets banks be allowed to invest deposits in change in the aftermath? Will any SVB executive be held liable? Are there any other banks teetering on the brink?
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