Possible for declining fund to turnaround?

We've spent decent time talking about turnaround scenarios for companies but is it really possible for a declining fund to turnaround? A lot of JAMMBOs have faced challenges recently and legacy names raised down funds and have turnover at the MD level.

Those are still great legacy names with talent. Is it possible for those funds to outperform and eventually come back to the right route? Some firms have decided to focus more on core areas and thought more of exits (e.g. Am Sec). With the example of Am Sec who has had very great exits in the past year, is it possible for them to make a comeback story and regain trust of LPs?

Talking about third quartile legacy funds that can win against newer up-and-coming funds like Nautic who have raised bigger funds recently arguably

Will business school exits at those new funds catch up to the legacy names?

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Turning around a declining fund is challenging but not impossible. Based on the most insightful WSO threads, here are the key factors that could enable a fund to regain its footing and outperform:

1. Refocusing on Core Strengths

  • Legacy funds like Am Sec have demonstrated that focusing on core areas and executing strong exits can rebuild LP confidence. By doubling down on sectors or strategies where they have a proven track record, funds can stabilize performance and attract renewed interest.

2. Talent Retention and Leadership Stability

  • Turnover at the MD level is a red flag for LPs, as it signals instability. However, retaining top talent and bringing in experienced professionals who have navigated downturns can help rebuild credibility. LPs value consistency in leadership and strategy.

3. Proven Exit Strategies

  • Strong exits, even in a challenging environment, can be a game-changer. Funds that demonstrate the ability to deliver returns despite market headwinds (e.g., Am Sec’s recent exits) can regain trust and attract capital for future raises.

4. Adapting to Market Conditions

  • Funds that were overly aggressive in valuations or lacked discipline in prior cycles (e.g., paying high multiples for cash flow-negative companies) need to pivot. Demonstrating valuation discipline and a focus on quality investments can differentiate them from newer funds.

5. LP Relationship Management

  • Legacy funds must actively engage with LPs, addressing concerns transparently and showcasing a clear plan for recovery. LPs are more likely to stick with a fund that acknowledges past mistakes and outlines a credible path forward.

6. Competing with Newer Funds

  • While newer funds like Nautic may have raised larger funds recently, legacy funds have the advantage of established networks, historical performance (even if uneven), and institutional knowledge. However, they must modernize their approach to compete with the agility and innovation of newer players.

7. Business School Exits and Talent Pipeline

  • Newer funds may attract top talent from business schools due to their growth trajectory, but legacy funds can still compete by offering mentorship, exposure to complex deals, and a chance to be part of a turnaround story. Highlighting these opportunities can help attract and retain high-caliber professionals.

Final Thoughts:

A declining fund can absolutely make a comeback, but it requires a combination of strategic focus, leadership stability, and disciplined execution. Legacy names with strong reputations and talent pools have the foundation to outperform newer funds, but they must adapt to the current market environment and rebuild LP trust through consistent results.

Sources: Troubled fundraising processes, Q&A: Distressed/PE Associate

I'm an AI bot trained on the most helpful WSO content across 17+ years.
 

It depends on the platform. Typically the larger firms can survive a couple underperforming flagship funds (3rd/4th quartile), especially if they have a cohesive story to tell on lessons learned and how the strategy has been refined. It is much more challenging for any firm in the LMM/MM space because you don't have the larger franchise that LPs are committing capital to. TPG is an example of this. They had a couple funds during the last recession that were 4th quartile but have been able to rebound because LPs had a broader relationship with the firm beyond just their flagship vehicle and were willing to give them another chance. There are also plenty of examples of funds in the LMM/MM space that weren't able to rebound - eg Gores Group - and are now zombie funds. 

If you're considering taking a chance on a firm with a spotty track record, you should really give that some more thought and speak to former employees. There's a decent chance the firm doesn't make it and the opportunity cost is massive when you factor in carry. If you can find a growing platform, not only will the culture be significantly better but you're not taking a binary bet on a firm that has a good chance of not raising another fund. 

 

Nothing is impossible but it's going to be a serious grind for those firms. I'd take the under on all of them. Also consider that the culture has been impacted by all the failures and turnover that resulted from it. That can be a very tough environment to walk into as a new hire.

 
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The longer things drag out, the more likely it is that the 35-45 year old people leave these firms to start their own thing as their carry is worthless and they've grinded way too long to get nothing. Those people will drag their favorite associates with them. I think it's pretty difficult for firms who are not going to hit carry to ever turn around as the good talent will bounce leaving shitty young talent and seniors who just don't care if the firm winds down over the next 10 years.

 

CD&R is one that comes to mind as a firm that had been heading for obscurity over tough performance that was able to turn it around (and look where they are now). Couple late 90s funds were bad performers. 

 

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