Reasons for an IBank intentionally underpricing an IPO

Are there any fundamental reasons as to why an IBank might underprice an IPO? I mean legit reasons..not ones like they would want to do favors [insider trading style] for major accounts and personal corporate interests

19 Comments
 

I cant think of any legit reasons except maybe that the company or the bank wanted to let the stock trade up gradually and season in the open market over time. Under pricing is generally due to a lack of demand for the issue or general market conditions so I cant really think of any reason why a bank would want to under price an IPO.

What is the question in regards to?

 
rrrrr01First day pop = successful deal successful deal = other companies on the sideline want to play other companies on the sideline want to play = positive ipo environment positive ipo environment = fees

Very true. Pricing an IPO exactly correct would be talked about as a failure on CNBC. They would say something about low demand. Underprice an offering for that pop and all of a sudden Baidu/Linkedin are officially the shit.

 
Best Response

There have been some academic papers written on this subject that try to illuminate some of the strategy that occurs between banks and large financial sponsors in addition to the above stated. Basically, a bank can underprice at a specific point that still keeps their client happy and fosters their relationship, but still leads to some self interest. An underpricing will allow mutual funds and pension funds to get in at a lower price to realize a higher return when the stock is traded on the secondary market. Now, the large financial sponsors then transfer some of that free return back to the bank in the form of paying higher trading fees in the short term. This effectively allows the bank to earn a higher fee from the ipo. So the ipo firm lands in their range of capital wanted to be raised, but not the maximum; yet they are still happy. Then, the bank and sponsors are happy because their returns are higher. All of this occurs in stealth mode way under the radar though.

 

So several reasons:

  1. It's very difficult to figure out the "true" value to get it priced perfectly...but even if you could:

  2. Ibanks that offer the IPO can do an overallotment option or green shoe, which allows the underwriter to increase the offer size by 15%. This way the firm nets a greater profit and the ibank also gets a healthy spread.

  3. If the company decides to reissue stock, it's easier to sell new shares if the IPO was underpriced than over.

  4. If overpriced, ibanks buy back shares...which decreases everybody's profits.

Hope this helped.

 

IPOs need to be underpriced to some extent. The company going public has no history of filings, earnings calls, or research whereas the comps that help price it have that history. That's why IPOs usually have a 15%-20% discount built in. If the stock trades up an enormous amount in the first trading days then the company and bankers do realize that some money might have been left on the table. It still isn't the worst thing though as most IPOs only sell a small piece of ownership and the price gain attracts publicity for the stock in the WSJ, CNBC, etc.

 

In order to generate demand for the IPO from investors the shares need to be discounted from "fair value" otherwise their would be little to make investors want to buy on day 1 vs. day 30 of the stock trading. Similar for debt with an OID discount.

 

In general, yes, the price in the primary market is set at a discount. This is for several reasons:

1) For most IPOs, the underwriter/investment bank is committed to purchasing unsold shares and would thus be taking a large risk in pricing too high (taking into consideration that investors will price the security different from the investment bank)

2) The primary market is led by a small number of large investors whose yays or nays make or break a deal (which leads to the idea that Wall Street 'knows' whether a deal will be good or not). Because of this, selling to the primary market is mostly a relationship business, which requires providing a good return to those large investors to create excitement about an offering without which a deal is basically dead. It is also true that IPOs in which the intial price set pre-roadshow is raised by pre-IPO leads to price appreciation post-IPO, whereas when the initial price set pre-roadshow is lowered by pre-IPO, no price appreciation occurs post-IPO (i.e. no excitement created because of overvaluation by investment bank)

3) During roadshows, investment banks ask potential investors what valuation they are arriving at, which they use to adjust their own price. If investors reveal their true valuation and the investment bank did not provide at least a decent return (discount to the value provided), then investors would - in the future - never give the true valuation and would instead discount expecting that their returns would be erased. Economics then dictates that in the long run, especially where investment banks work with many of the same investors, that investors should tell the truth and investment banks should discount.

Therefore, yes, in general, there is a discount in the primary market. For a normal investor (you, or a trader), it may seem that investing in all the IPOs would be a guaranteed profit because of the discounting, but it is only the case in theory. In actuality, investment banks reward the investors with which they have long-term working relationships with the 'good' deals, while pushing the 'bad' deals to others. So, for an investor, even if you wanted to purchase IPO shares, there would only be free shares (and you would only be provided shares) for IPOs where the price is expected not to appreciate greatly post-IPO. Although the research shows a great return for IPOs in general, then, you could not trade IPOs indiscriminately and make money.

 

Well, it's not really sold at a "discount," it really tends to be sold to the primary buyers at a near-real price. The problem is that when new IPO's come out, there's a huge survival bias (Everyone remembers Google, no one remembers the Vonages), so when the institutions that initial buy the stock go to the market to sell, there is a huge demand by people that want to get "rich" off IPO's. This is why if you take the price after the first day of trading, there is on average a -7% return. Whereas if it were truly discounting, and the price after the ~15% bump were the true price, returns should be equal to a benchmark.

 

I don't know where you are getting your IPO first-day return of -7%. Ibbotson shows 18% raw return on an equal-weighted index for first-day return from 1960-2006. It also doesn't make sense to not discount when selling to the primary market. If you think about the risk-reward for such a transaction, it would be impossible to get initial investors to buy if it were sold at near-real price. As I stated above, it also doesn't make any sense in terms of risk-reward for the bank, nor does it make economic sense for both parties in the long-run. However, nobody said that discounting was always set at 15% - the 15% is an off-hand number that is an ex-post average, and as with all averages/statistics, it is not a predictive result nor will any returns be exactly predicted by that average.

 

eh, I'm going by what my foundation of financial markets teacher said, he was some famous dude so I believed him. Maybe it has something do with how different IPOs are weighted (perhaps he was going by sheer number of IPO's instead of market cap, which would presumably lower return). Are you sure Ibbotson didn't based it on initial price, not on end of first day? Also I'm not sure of end of first day is the best guess, since I think it peaks a lot at opening. But you could be right, I'm just going by the second source of my teacher...but he really beat in the point to never buy IPO's during first day of trading, and had a bunch of graphs.

 

Distinctio nisi repellat ab dolorem ut. Aut placeat ea blanditiis quod sint dolore voluptas nisi.

Voluptate sint et magnam harum. Optio et sit consequuntur quae rem nihil consequatur. Veniam vel qui velit nisi nesciunt asperiores perferendis. Ratione ea ut eos ut placeat iure.

Soluta voluptatem voluptas esse commodi. Ea sequi eligendi explicabo ut vero est.

Career Advancement Opportunities

June 2026 Investment Banking

  • Evercore 01 99.4%
  • Moelis & Company 01 98.8%
  • JPMorgan 01 98.2%
  • Guggenheim Partners 01 97.7%
  • Morgan Stanley 07 97.1%

Overall Employee Satisfaction

June 2026 Investment Banking

  • Moelis & Company No 99.4%
  • Morgan Stanley 01 98.8%
  • Evercore 01 98.2%
  • BMO Capital Markets 12 97.6%
  • Banco Santander 01 97.1%

Professional Growth Opportunities

June 2026 Investment Banking

  • Moelis & Company No 99.4%
  • Evercore No 98.8%
  • Morgan Stanley 05 98.2%
  • JPMorgan No 97.7%
  • BMO Capital Markets 12 97.1%

Total Avg Compensation

June 2026 Investment Banking

  • Vice President (14) $434
  • Associates (43) $259
  • 3rd+ Year Analyst (8) $210
  • 2nd Year Analyst (22) $179
  • Intern/Summer Associate (13) $156
  • 1st Year Analyst (75) $151
  • Intern/Summer Analyst (67) $101
notes
16 IB Interviews Notes

“... there’s no excuse to not take advantage of the resources out there available to you. Best value for your $ are the...”

Leaderboard

1
redever's picture
redever
99.2
2
BankonBanking's picture
BankonBanking
99.0
3
kanon's picture
kanon
99.0
4
Secyh62's picture
Secyh62
99.0
5
CompBanker's picture
CompBanker
98.9
6
DrApeman's picture
DrApeman
98.9
7
dosk17's picture
dosk17
98.9
8
Betsy Massar's picture
Betsy Massar
98.9
9
GameTheory's picture
GameTheory
98.9
10
bolo up's picture
bolo up
98.8
success
From 10 rejections to 1 dream investment banking internship

“... I believe it was the single biggest reason why I ended up with an offer...”