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Curious as to how you don't know a ton about their firm but somehow have insight into their fee structure haha

"My name's Ralph Cox, and I'm from where ever's not gonna get me hit"
 
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Of course, the PE industry is facing fee pressure. It's simply not very evident to observers outside the industry. Headline fees may not have come down, and that's simply because of LPs moving more of their assets from public to private markets, and thus taking away their own leverage when negotiating with GPs.

But GPs have yielded to the pressure in more subtle ways - fee-free co-investments with large LPs asking for (and getting) co-invests over 50% of their primary capital, thus cutting overall fees in half, the increase of management fee offsets from 0% to 50% to 80% to the now almost universal 100%, the reduction in headline management fee from 2% to 1.75% to 1.5% as fund sizes grow, discounts for first closers and / or early closers etc.

Hurdle rates reducing or even going away is not that big of a concern and does not actually lead to significantly better economics for the GP given that the firms who ask for that will almost certainly pass the hurdle anyway. It simply brings forward cash from the waterfall rather than altering the absolute amount. Yes, the NPV to the GP is slightly better but it's more of a power move (yet less subtle than KPS' 30% carry) than anything else.

 

UMM distressed equity player - selling point is "we partner with bankrupt companies" rather than loot them.Well respected by our FoF group. 6b last fund size.

Other distressed funds of their size and vintage have shit the bed once they got too big (excluding clearlake) but they are apparently doing well.

Focus on industrials and manufacturing.

 

As mentioned above, they are a distressed fund that focuses on operationally distressed companies, ie. companies that are really fucked and need a phenomenal turnaround. They have managed to built a great track record by buying and turning around business that were heading to liquidation and that nobody wanted. Known to partner with Unions to save businesses. Due the the nature of the companies they buy, especially at the outset, it's a very hard-working place, there's just no getting around around getting your hands dirty when you invest in that space. 

 

Not necessarily, as I mentioned in my earlier post, these guys buy EBITDA negative businesses that no one else wants to touch and then go and live on site while they turn around the operations. When I think of sweaty culture, I think more of places that have imported bad behavior from banking (ie. having to produce massive decks for their IC, having a "everything needs to by done by tomorrow am" and "we don't care about junior's time" culture with a lot of expectations for face time and over analysing everything). 

 

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