Is MF1 (Limekiln) Done?

Interested to see what sentiments are on them. They’ve written some crumby loans to some crumby sponsors and I don’t see much room for them to make it out of the next few years.

If the hundreds of millions (billions?) of dollars in Tides Equities notes doesn’t take them down, then will Nitya, Rise48, Laguna Point (I think they’re already done)? I even heard they handed Grant Cardone one. There’s bullish, then there’s foolish…

All the ratings they have kept getting worse and worse over 2020-2023. I’ve been hearing about some of the AAAs being traded at 90/100. Just trying to get a sense of what people are thinking out there. Also they’ve been doing a lot of early bridge on/lease ups on development take outs now so that impact is going to be interesting.

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I don't know enough about the space to really understand MF1's exposure in their own issuances (I know it's customary for the issuer to retain a certain % of the pool as shared risk, but that's about it), but you can make an account on DBRS Morningstar and pull all of MF1's presale reports to get an idea of their collaterals going-in & projected metrics. 

& yes, MF1 did do a single-borrower issuance for Cardone Capital on a 585-unit property in FL (MF1 2021-W10X). I've linked the presale report for that issuance below.

https://www.spglobal.com/_assets/documents/ratings/research/12089590.pdf

FWIW, the rating agency assuming untrended rents, 7% vacancy, and a 6.25% exit cap to arrive at a stressed LTV of 140% (lol). Not sure how these ratings agencies and/or issuers are taken seriously & clear the market when advertising these stressed assumptions, but c'est la vie.

 

All the DBRS reports are terrible, they just keep marking the deals in each collateral pool as worse and worse. I wonder what they're broader reputation is, I've seen them become the bottom tier lender who will do a deal for spread regardless of other factors. Some groups out there won't even consider the Sponsorship that MF1 repeatedly lends to...

 

a) Different Berkshire, not the one lead by that guy whose famous quote was "when the Tides roll out..." which would have been hilariously coincidental.

b)  Sure some of their loans were "80% LTV" at origination, they're closer to 120% now... They don't want that crap, will have to also spend a lot on legal fees etc. for foreclosure, which will add to their basis. They'll most likely sell the note at a loss to a group who is more equipped of foreclosing and operating these assets correctly. 

 

MF1 is toast.  I'm really curious how Arbor has been able to hide the distress in their loan portfolio.  It seems like half of the sub 80% occupancy properties that come across my desk are Arbor bridge loans, yet they only reported 7 loans as 'doubtful' in their most recent quarterly report.

 

New short report out by Viceroy:  Arbor Realty Trust – Slumlord Millionaires

It is very detailed and very on point.  Probably worth starting a new thread on this one...  Let's get some bets going on how long ABR has left!

 

Very active, closing new loans left and right. High quality stuff too. 

They came to market with a CRE CLO ~6 weeks back, priced tight as hell too. They're def having a great year.

 

I don’t really have a definitive opinion on MF1 but will say that they are radioactive in the REPE space.
Don’t know a serious GP or LP that would do a deal that includes favorable assumable debt from MF1 just because of how they operate. Even assuming great deal level metrics and on the in place first trust. Have seen that personally. “Why waste time dealing with them”

 

I don’t really have a definitive opinion on MF1 but will say that they are radioactive in the REPE space.
Don’t know a serious GP or LP that would do a deal that includes favorable assumable debt from MF1 just because of how they operate. Even assuming great deal level metrics and on the in place first trust. Have seen that personally. “Why waste time dealing with them”

Putting MF-1 aside, why would a lender want someone to assume a bridge loan? If you’re at that point it’s a workout situation. For the buyer it’s an opportunity to put very little equity in because of the drop in values and reset the business plan, but can’t blame a lender for not wanting to extend their duration, have a new borrower come in with little to no skin in the game, and have that new borrower probably have a DSCR shortfall because bridge loans are 300+ over SOFR. Really only makes sense when it’s obvious the new buyer can turn things around and really strong credit, for example, Fairfield picking off the GVA deals that are most likely to stabilize above loan balance earlier this year. Otherwise it’s way less brain damage for lender to extract as much value as possible and buy time until market values start to recover then wrap up the deal via sale or foreclosure.

 

Just looking at what they're doing to keep these loans going without marking them down, doesn't that encourage people to use them? You know they'll do anything to avoid foreclosing, and their 3+1 loans are really more like 3+forever since they keep extending them until they can fully refinance. Plus, their covenants are like the points in 'Whose Line Is It Anyway'—totally made up and don't really matter.

I've seen many of their deals where the collateral is worth maybe 50% of the loan, with sponsors who are completely upside down (pretty much every 'The Real Deal Syndicator Story'). Yet, they keep modifying these loans ad nauseam, and the situation just keeps getting worse.

But on the flip side, doesn't that make them great to borrow from? It's like free money with no consequences.

 

Don’t most of the loan mods include MF-1/Limekiln/Berkshire taking personal guarantees? Thought I saw that in one of the Tides threads. Not exactly free money.

As a thought experiment, might MF-1’s “modification with recourse and don’t foreclose” strategy actually be the most rational move the last couple years? If they knew these properties couldn’t operate any worse than they already were and that rates were coming down eventually, doesn’t it make sense to wait it out? Any drop in rates or righting of the ship operationally would have non-linear effect on value. Conversely, groups that did note sales a year ago are probably kicking themselves about their recovery amounts vs what they could get today. 

 

I think that is part of it, yes

Sharky bullshit aside - nobody wants to deal with a lender that’s going to be combative. It’s also not a good look to deal with that kind of lender in general

 

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