10 Comments
 
Most Helpful

have seen this on syndication deals with cash-on-cash return hurdles. Basically means that if you miss pref one year, that doesn't get paid back the following year if you exceed it.

For example: 7% preferred return hurdle then 80/20 split; $100 equity. Year 1 project return of 6% - $6 gets paid to LPs, but the $1 of missed pref is not carried forward to year 2 (non-cumulative) and the LPs are not entitled to a 7% return on that $1 (non-accruing). So year 2 project makes $12, $7 gets paid to LPs for pref, $4 (80% of $5 profit beyond pref) to LPs for profit split, and $1 (20% of $5 profit beyond pref) to GP for profit split.

 

So you essentially have a new 7% note each year? why would someone do this? The GP could hold all the cash flows for like Capex/Holdbacks and then only pay out on the liquidity event, skip the pref the first 4 years and only pay someone 7% in year 5 and then get a split for themselves on cash that they shouldve paid out.

This could give incentive to someone to not pay cash flows because there is no reason to.

 

You'd hope that the LP would have some protection from that in the operating agreement. Can't imagine that you'd see that structure in a deal with institutional LPs - you can infer a handful reasons HNWI would accept it (with varying degrees of cynicism) ranging from lack of understanding, access (more money chasing deal than syndicator needs so they can adjust terms to be more favorable to themselves), or maybe just trust - not going to have a lot of repeat investors if you are screwing them out of their pref.

 

I thought about this.

I could see this being a great way to restructure a deal. Lets say you had a bad deal but it had a 10% pref that was ticking for 4 years, the GP get so far underwater that he knows that he will never catch up and never make a promote. The GP might abandon the project or not put as much time in anymore since the promote will never happen.

You could incentivse a GP this way because then the Pref will stop ticking against him and if he could see the light in a few extra years and be re incentivised.

Other than that which is something that is a little out there I would be so hesitant with this.

 

The pref would also hurt the GP too, unless it's an LP pref that gets paid out first before GP takes $1. I've never seen this, also there are hundreds of ways to fraudulent convey cash by the GP (inflating expenses, reserves, affiliate txns, etc), all of which are probably violations of the OA but at the end of the day how will the LP even know, especially if it's not a sophisticated investor...

 

I've never seen that stucture also. That's why i posted the question. Here is distribution structure. Even though it's non-accruing, it still incentivize the GP to pay distributions since the LP needs to reach its IRR targets in order for GP to get its promote, correct?

  1. 100% to LP for current preferred return
  2. 100% to GP for current preferred return
  3. 100% to LP for unreturned capital contributions
  4. 100% to GP for unreturned capital contributions
  5. 100% to LP til LP gets IRR 12%
  6. 100% to GP till GP gets IRR 12%
  7. 77%/23 (LP/GP) to IRR 17%.
  8. 70/30 (LP/GP)
 

Et fugit ut adipisci totam et enim ut. Accusantium autem perspiciatis officiis aliquam dolorem quae dolore molestias. Harum ut quia veritatis libero fugit.

Fuga non cumque nihil consequatur. Est facere eveniet maxime et earum. Reprehenderit molestiae neque dolorem dolor. Qui non et aut esse. Qui tempora qui rerum ut adipisci veniam quaerat.

Unde accusantium aliquam qui est molestias rem. Soluta sit omnis tenetur sequi est. Architecto modi error repudiandae pariatur. Aut voluptatibus itaque dignissimos dolor dolor exercitationem. Et voluptate corporis exercitationem consequatur minus pariatur. Ut enim quia ab nesciunt fugit. Vel qui non dolores vel sed.

Consequuntur quia voluptas veniam esse qui eius voluptas. Aut maxime incidunt fugit architecto sint quisquam repellendus nobis. Reiciendis quia a sed qui. Mollitia impedit incidunt dolores eaque sed qui. Aut sunt in eveniet eum dolor quisquam et. Sunt accusamus fugiat in natus culpa.

Career Advancement Opportunities

November 2026 Investment Banking

  • Evercore 01 99.5%
  • Moelis & Company 01 99.0%
  • JPMorgan 01 98.4%
  • Guggenheim Partners 02 97.9%
  • Morgan Stanley 06 97.4%

Overall Employee Satisfaction

November 2026 Investment Banking

  • Moelis & Company No 99.5%
  • Morgan Stanley 02 99.0%
  • Evercore 01 98.4%
  • Banco Santander 04 97.9%
  • BMO Capital Markets 13 97.4%

Professional Growth Opportunities

November 2026 Investment Banking

  • Evercore 01 99.5%
  • Moelis & Company 01 99.0%
  • Morgan Stanley 05 98.4%
  • Goldman Sachs 01 97.9%
  • JPMorgan No 97.4%

Total Avg Compensation

November 2026 Investment Banking

  • Vice President (17) $409
  • Associates (58) $261
  • 3rd+ Year Analyst (8) $210
  • 2nd Year Analyst (29) $183
  • Intern/Summer Associate (16) $161
  • 1st Year Analyst (84) $151
  • Intern/Summer Analyst (77) $101
notes
16 IB Interviews Notes

“... there’s no excuse to not take advantage of the resources out there available to you. Best value for your $ are the...”

Leaderboard

1
redever's picture
redever
99.2
2
kanon's picture
kanon
99.0
3
BankonBanking's picture
BankonBanking
99.0
4
Secyh62's picture
Secyh62
99.0
5
GameTheory's picture
GameTheory
98.9
6
DrApeman's picture
DrApeman
98.9
7
CompBanker's picture
CompBanker
98.9
8
Betsy Massar's picture
Betsy Massar
98.9
9
dosk17's picture
dosk17
98.9
10
Linda Abraham's picture
Linda Abraham
98.8
success
From 10 rejections to 1 dream investment banking internship

“... I believe it was the single biggest reason why I ended up with an offer...”