Russian government controls some 60% of the market - good luck to foreign shareholders

Some investors have been jumping into Russian equities in the wake of the recent selloff. After all it's one of the BRICs that is now up "for sale" - assets that would have been in high demand just a year ago. But before getting too excited about this investment opportunity, consider the structural issues that smaller (particularly foreign) investors would face in Russia.

Barrons: - Russia's concentration of economic power means the state can hold its oligarchs for ransom and force enterprises to forgo profits at the bidding of politicians. A 2012 study by Troika Dialog Research estimated that the Russian state owns 30% of the equity market, with another 30% held by oligarchs and domestic "businessmen." Russia's 10 richest men own $25 billion in publicly listed Russian companies, according to Wealth-X, which tracks individuals of ultra-high net worth. The Russian stock market has a total valuation of $150 billion. Many of these rich individuals owe their wealth to Putin, so they aren't likely to defy him. 

This means that in effect the state controls some 60% of the market because the Russian oligarchs will follow Kremlin's lead - simply to preserve their wealth and often their freedom (Khodorkovsky, who has been a leading financier of Russian opposition parties got 14 years in prison a few years back). In fact the situation could be getting worse as the oligarchs have bought additional shares in recent weeks to gain an even greater percentage of the market.

And just in case you are still considering making a long-term strategic investment into some Russian shares, remember that minority shareholders can be squeezed simply by not being a member of the elite "club" - see this story for example. It's no wonder that analysts have now labeled the Russian stock market a "frontier" rather than an "emerging" market (similar to many African markets except for poor economic growth - see story)

Foreign investors are especially vulnerable. With so much control of the market in the hands of the government, if Western sanctions tighten further and tensions escalate, Putin's retaliation could easily involve exacting pain on certain foreign shareholders. For those who wonder what a retaliation like that could potentially look like, here is an example from another emerging markets nation with an authoritarian government.

 
Best Response

I liked your post and would like to parse out the ramifications of the topics you bring up.

First

On an individual level, investors may worry, but that is part of investing in Russia and no one can honestly claim to be surprised. Intrusion into the public sector by Kremlin/mafiya thugs is entirely to be expected, and using political power as leverage to affect economics is par for the course there. On a systemic level...the US has companies that are in the same size bracket as the entire stock market there, and is insulated from any false moves they may make. Russia simply doesn't have the ability to affect our economy on any meaningful level. Russia understands that they can get away with a certain amount of mischief and accompanying bravado, but understand that beyond a certain point they will be cutting off the nose to spite the face.

Second

The Falklands case is more similar to the situation in Bolivia than Russia. It will not shape the interactions of numerous continents or power blocs, and so can be regarded as more of a local issue, and will likely be settled between Spain and Argentina, with the US and perhaps some EU mediation. Neither Russia nor China have much ability to affect the outcome without serious, immediate blowback and weakness caused by drawing resources to the area. The US has more ability to affect the outcome but less overarching geopolitical considerations as of yet to expend the resources to take a lead role. Some argue we should anyway. They may be right.

More broadly

If the EU decides to deal with Russia in accordance with economic imperatives, as recent history would indicate, and if the US doesn't increase their energy production, then Canada will bypass the entire Keystone issue and build their own pipeline to the East coast, led by the Irving family. Europe could gladly reciprocate by diverting their exports more to North America over the next decade after. Within 5-15 years, Russia could isolate itself from the West a great deal, and much to their own detriment. The West will be fine. This leaves China as Russia's primary energy trading partner within a decade and then they have no ability to influence energy policy with brute force. Russia can score a few short term cheap points, but it will cost them over the longer term given China's current economic inferiority to the EU beyond price point advantages for lower end goods and services, that and their authoritarian government being less open to negotiations.

Putin took advantage of Ukraine's chaotic state to annex Crimea, which they view as part of Russia, and they may also move in on the Eastern border of Ukraine. But after they burn the little bit of political capital they have, they will not be able to secure the stable, long term cash producing agreements given North American energy production ramp up and turning public opinion. Also note: the US did essentially nothing to stop the Georgian war and Western policy changed little if at all....Russia may be operating under the incorrect assumption that they can take a similar course of action with westward expansion and suffer no longer term consequenses. This would be a serious miscalculation on their part, as even Putin the great calculator may be deluding himself along with the enabling, sycophant echo chamber of yes men he calls a government.

Strangely, the bright point is that this is largely about money: it seems obvious that open military conflict is the last thing that the US, the EU, or Russia want. Evidence the completely bloodless occupation of Crimea. War is very expensive to begin with and after the fact it is economically detrimental to govern a people who wish to be seperate. Russia understands that they can push the envelope a bit but unless Putin is suffering from serious misconceptions (or a mental breakdown) they understand that each move will come with a heavy longer term price tag. The US can only benefit over the long term, although it is of course preferable to do so under amicable or at least peaceful terms.

Note that China abstained from a UN vote last month given their reluctance to sour relations with their most important trade partner, the US. Russia and the US derive less than 2% of their trade with each other, and can afford to let the relationship stagnate, and also come to terms that the previous pretense of a good relationship was far more shallow and useless than previously acknowledged; mostly driven by post 911 opportunistism. Economically, North America can prosper from a continued deterioration of the situation as detailed above. Militarily, it is unlikely the US or EU would intervene directly, but in the event it becomes necessary, western militaries and intelligence are more sophisticated and in much better condition to win a sustained direct (or more likely proxy) conflict.

In conclusion

One would hope that Russia takes a sober look at the medium to long term, that they can not win with these tactics as they put them at a strategic disadvantage. They can not win beyond a very small set of objectives, and each of those 'wins', again, cost them dearly. It is not entirely clear what they see in these gains as being worth the cost, at least not to me at this time. Crimea can be looked at as a pawn gambit by the West, and Putin would do well to study Alekhine's Defense: grabbing minor victories puts them at a time (development) and space (alliance) disadvantage with no conversion to strategic gain or profitable outcome. Putin's only real victory may be greater internal consolidation of power, but he has to take into account the silent but real grumblings of the oligarches: individually, they are easily controlled, but together they have the resources to depose or assasinate him.

Food for thought.

Get busy living
 

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