Dec 29, 2021

Private Credit League Tables

It's end of year and I have a PC offer from a MF (Apollo/BX/KKR). I'm trying to find out where on Bloomberg or anywhere else I can find data/league tables about private credit funds' performances (preferably by strategy such as distressed, direct lending, special situations, opportunistic, etc..)? I'm primarily interested in megafund comparisons.

 

Most aren’t published or if they are you have to take with a grain of salt. Know for a fact that kkr credit does a bunch of bs to try to claim they’re the lead on deals purely for league tables. The more traditional players in PC do not publish the deals they do imo

 

Hey thanks for this, though not what I'm looking for. There are several sites I can find funds' AUM data. I can't find anything on how those funds actually perform though. I'd like to see if investors are just throwing money at PC funds due to branding power or if they actually care about the kinds of returns they get, because when I hear numbers like 9-11% IRR I'm interested to see what the net returns look like at the top shops vs the smaller firms.

 

Would say that that is the right ball park IRR. Remember - they are comping these to B bonds / credit spreads (which is what these loans are typically rated at). If you think about the alpha of ~5-7%, that is absurd which is why funds are ramping up aum like crazy. Very few other asset classes are providing that sort of direct, compable alpha

 

This is a hugely misinformed statement… 9-11% Net IRRs for DL funds are levered numbers - this should be more aptly compared to CLO equity returns of 8-15% which represents a substitute return stream you can get from levering up syndicated loans.

Current unlevered DL market pricing is 6-8% vs. B Loans 4-6% and CCC Loans 7-9%. DL unitranche leverage multiples are most comparable to a combined 75% B Loan and 25% CCC Loan (1st Lien/2nd Lien weighted average stack). There is basically no alpha left for taking illiquidity risk in DL markets anymore due to how aggressively the AUM growth has been put to work and yields have compressed and we will see if DL loans were actually “comparable risk” when the tide goes out (these loans are typically to much smaller issuers vs. HY market issuers).

Reminds me of Distressed Debt asset class at 2010 when LPs piled in after fantastic returns in the preceding decade, but proceeded to get smoked on returns as a capital glut formed in that niche.

 
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This is wildly inaccurate, and the fact that this has gotten as many upvotes makes me question the credibility of WSO as prospective monkeys will think this is right. I've spent time in private equity, direct lending, and opportunistic credit / special situations. Assuming average yield of DL deals for a firm is S + 6% for a direct lending firm (which is a reasonable assumption depending on risk appetite of DL firms), average 1-mo. SOFR of ~3% throughout duration of loan, 2.0% OID, CF sweeps, and minimal amort, your unlevered yield should theoretically be ~10%. Levered return should be low teens (approx. ~14% +/- 1%) depending on advance rate and cost of capital of the leverage facility. 

To the above poster, you are not at an opportunistic credit fund if you are targeting ~9-11% gross unlevered returns. I'm currently at an opportunistic credit / special situations large-cap fund that is industry and asset  class agnostic targeting high teens (17%+ gross returns) on an unlevered basis (ex. 1L rescue financing at mid-teens returns w/ penny warrants, convertible pref or participating pref, litigation finance, DIPs, purchasing debt at meaningful discounts to par and foreclosing on assets, high-octane construction loans, NPLs, credit card receivables purchases, etc.) . Targeting 9-11% gross unlevered returns in the private markets is akin to direct lending, not opportunistic credit or special situations. No idea where this misconception of DL returns came from.

 

AUM raised is really one of the worst metrics to look at. Many large firms easily generate investment dollars just because of how large and well known they are but their returns really aren’t great. Try Creditflux, they should give you a decent gist of the industry and aren’t bias at all towards the larger firms which I find this forum tends to be.

 

All the returns for the industry now are bullshit until we go through a credit cycle. 

 

OP: Private Credit League Tables.

Key Metrics, AUM below of:

  • (1) Top Direct Lenders - Key Metrics (AUM)
  • (2) Top BDCs - Key Metrics  (AUM)

Note: DRAFT w/ some metics estimated, + Dated, nonetheless insightful. 

Note 2: Image is visible on PC, blank on App (@wallstreetoasis - note bug to IT) . I'll copy n paste Text from Table in images below to accomodate - but it'll be sloppy

URL of thread:

https://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forum/private-equity/private-credit-league-tables---

DIRECT LENDRRS - KEY METRICS

Note:

  • HPS - $80B AUM - as of December31,2021 (via Inv Pres 2/22/2022)
  • Ares $17.7B AUM as of Sept 30, 2021
  • image-20221202094745-1

BDCs - KEY METRICS

image-20221202094910-2

Copy n  paste - Images above (pasting table in PDF - may come out sloppy)

DIRECT LENDERS - KEY METRICS

1 HPS TBD TBD ~$222 (Average given data) $68,000
2 Blackstone Credit TBD $1,500 $55,000
3 Sixth Street Specialty Lending $500 $300 $48,000
4 Ares Direct Lending $250 $200 ($75 Sr. / $125 Jr.) $46,000
5 Golub Capital $700 ($25 co-invest) $35,000
6 MidCap Financial (Apollo) $750 $20,500
7 Crescent Private Credit $20 $500+ $19,000
8 First Eagle Private Credit $50 (check) $50 $14,000
9 Owl Rock “Blue Owl” $500 $14,000
10 Ares $500 $13,800
11 Barings $200 $11,700
12 Madison Capital $200 $10,600

13 Varagon Capital $400 $7,200
14 Churchill Asset Management $200 $150 $6,800
15 LBC Credit $150 ($15 small-cap) $7,400
16 AEA Investors $50 ($10+ Mezz) $5,200
17 Comvest $200 $4,300
18 Tree Line Capital $150 $1,500
19 Balance Point Capital $50 $1,100
20 Twin Brook $400 $150 $15,200
21 Deerpath Capital Management $50 $3,000
22 Goldman Sachs Specialty Lending $150 $150 N/A
23 Graycliff Partners $50 TBD
24 Peak Rock Credit $200 $50 (check, used to say $300 TBD
25 TCW Direct Lending $300 $250 (typically $25-150) $5,000
26 MC Credit $250 ($40-250+)

-----

# BDC Name Total Assets ($B) /  % 1st Lien Debt / Equity

BDCs - KEY METRICS (AUM / 1L Debt/Equity)

  • 1 Ares Capital Corporation $15.0 45% 1.1x
  • 2 Owl Rock Capital Corp. $10.2 79% 0.7x (4)
  • 3 FS KKR Capital Corp. II $7.8 67% 0.8x
  • 4 FS KKR Capital Corp. $7.1 54% 1.3x
  • 5 Golub Capital BDC, Inc. $4.4 97% 0.8x
  • 6 New Mountain Finance Corporation $3.0 57% 1.5x
  • 7 Main Street Capital Corp. $2.7 71% 0.8x
  • 8 Apollo Investment Corporation $2.7 77% 1.6x
  • 9 Bain Capital Specialty Finance Inc. $2.6 87% 1.4x
  • 10 Owl Rock Technology Finance $2.5 74% 0.7x
  • 11 Hercules Capital, Inc. $2.5 81% 1.1x
  • 12 Sixth Street Specialty Lending, Inc. $2.1 95% 0.8x
  • 13 TCG BDC, Inc. $2.0 73% 1.2x
  • 14 Solar Capital Ltd. $2.0 91% 0.6x
  • 15 Owl Rock Capital Corp. II $1.9 79% 0.6x
  • 16 BlackRock TCP Capital Corp. $1.7 76% 1.3x
  • 17 Oaktree Specialty Lending Corp. $1.6 62% 0.8x
  • 18 Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc. $1.6 76% 1.5x
  • 19 Barings BDC $1.2 92% 1.3x
  • 20 PennantPark Floating Rate Capital $1.1 89% 1.4x
  • 21 PennantPark Investment Corp. $1.1 41% 1.1x
  • Average 74% 1.1x

----

Note:

  • As of 9/30/20 unless otherwise noted. Includes publicly-traded BDCs with total assets >$1bn, as well as ORTF and ORCC II; NA: Not available.
  • (1) Excludes revolvers, delayed draw term loans, letters of credit, and positions marked at 0 or NA
  • (2) Based on fair value; Internal expectations are based on BDC-manager ratings as available in their respective financial statements; Includes investments rated below equivalent of ORCC 2-rating
  • (3) Metrics per Wells Fargo “4Q20 BDC Scorecard” published 9/11/20; Data as of 6/30/20
  • (4) Represents Net Debt / Equity
 

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