Unique LP/GP Setup - Governance Mechanics, Economics, Other Fun Considerations

PE Principals & Partners of WSO - I find myself in what I think is a fairly unique scenario. I'm going to have to be frustratingly opaque to maintain any confidentiality, but I'll do my best to get at the heart of the issue.

My firm has advised a group of family offices for many years. Started out on M&A work and have gradually worked into more ongoing portfolio company oversight and investment strategy. The group of offices is related but independent and so they have different personalities and investment styles, which we have worked to accommodate. (Should also mention that they each have a CIO of sorts and investments in a variety of public and private asset classes, and our work has been focused on whatever their direct private equity allocation has been.)

One of them has proposed a formalization of the structure, that codifies us as a GP and them as LPs and irons out roles and responsibilities and economics. I love the idea in concept, as I've never been totally comfortable with the informality of the arrangement and this would enable us to "lock up" the relationships and staff appropriately.

The devil is in the details, though. We're not talking about just spinning up a PE fund with a group of anchor investors; we're talking about these groups contributing a mix of cash and existing ownership interests in operating companies (not all of which are 100% owned by these groups) that would constitute our "fund." My concerns are:

- Relative valuations of contributions will be a mess. Everyone always thinks their portion is worth more than someone else's.

- Not all of the assets are ones we would have invested in, and I don't think we can cherry-pick the best ones for inclusion in the "fund" and leave out the rest. Any economic mechanics will have to account for the heavy lifting required on the "dogs."

- I don't have a great idea as to how to structure our economics off of this kind of vehicle - it's envisioned as an evergreen investment vehicle, and the ability to grow AUM is likely more a function of cash generation from inside the fund than additional external contributions. It seems like it lends itself more to a heavy management fee and less of a promote/carry mechanism, but at the same time that seems like a less healthy way to align incentives.

- Governance is going to be tricky. I would love to hear how others have navigated LP relationships that want to be ultimate decision-makers on an IC but still want someone else to do the work. I'm leaning towards the tough conversation of "look, if you want us to truly be principals, then we need to be principals, and that means having authority and matching the economic incentives appropriately" but I'm open to ideas.

- They're all a bit different. They all like working with us and are supportive of the idea of us taking a larger role but are unsure how their own idiosyncracies will be preserved. I also don't know, short of building in sidecars / sleeves, which then opens up the risk of the perception of not treating each member equally / fairly / with equivalent attention. (They're a range of sizes, of course.)

Figured I'd throw this out into the WSO ether and see what others' experiences have been. Would be glad to chat over DM as well if it helps keep things under the radar. Thanks in advance for your thoughts.

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Hey man. Love seeing you back on here.

My advice: don't straddle the middle, either do a fund (where you are an autonomous GP) or don't accept the headache.

This sounds rife with difficulty.

  • You've got people who don't agree about valuation. Does this mean that there are multiple instances of a single party disagreeing with you about the valuation of an asset they wholly own, or that there's a single asset with shared ownership between these parties where those parties have differing ideas about valuation of that asset? Each is a problem, but those are very different problems.
  • You've got all parties contributing both cash and assets. This is going to be annoying because some people will put up more cash than others, and that means they're going to want to have more of a say than those with a lower actual dollars-out-of-the-bank-account-into-your-discretion investment.
  • You've got some dogs in the mix. You have enough experience in this segment to know they're going to require significantly more attention than the leaders in exchange for less reward than the leaders would offer in response to the same attention. But because of the relationships, you can't do the rational thing with your time allocation.
  • You've got too many parents to report to, none of whom want to loosen the apron strings to let you loose. It's bad enough having a single GP investor own a chunk of your business; this sounds worse, like having everyone ignore the first letter in 'LP'. 

If for some insane reason you're committed to doing this because you are both a glutton for punishment and interested in fostering these longstanding relationships even further, a way better structure is to do this as an investment corporation.

The immediate objection is "Oh my god, double taxation!", but not only is there all kinds of tax optimization you can do, but the whole idea is that you don't actually issue distributions, you use them to fund further growth initiatives and make new investments. 

This solves a lot of your issues.

  • You can solidify the governance issue in a way that preserves the measure of autonomy you need through board structure. The board is 9 seats. You and your colleagues have three. You give three to the families; since there's presumably more than three of them, you create a rotating basis where none of them go longer than two years without having a seat. You get three independents, one of which you select, one the families select, and the last you mutually agree on.
  • You bifurcate management from governance. You and your colleagues are the C-suite at the holdco level. (And you can go hire other executives to bolster your skill gaps or just distribute the workload more kindly.) You have operating autonomy, under the auspice of strong reporting to that board. You're in the driver's seat on corpdev, financing, budgeting, and the full gamut of day-to-day decisions across the portfolio.
  • You crystallize your economics up-front. You negotiated 13.5% of the holding company as a 'GP' team? Congrats, that's yours. (You should absolutely concede to a vesting schedule for this.) This is super favorable for your personal life. It's so much easier to get lending products against shares in a company than against in-the-money but unrealized carry economics.
  • You have a wonderful forcing function over asset inclusion. Hate one of the companies and don't think it's worth including in the portfolio at all because of how much work it'll require to manage and exit? Don't include it in the holding company creation. 

This structure really works for your circumstance. You get paid for all the work you do. Instead of a management fee, you negotiate an executive compensation program that the board approves. Your shares are your long-term incentive, and because the operating distributions provide you the cash basis for further acquisitions or investments, you actually get to skip the fundraising timesuck of the fund business model. If you decide you need more capital than that path offers, you can do an equity raise at the holdco level. The easiest audience is that same set of families. The broader audience is the entire institutional investor universe.

You can run this as long as you want. If it's your forever thing, congrats. If it's for five, eight, whatever time it takes to monetize either the entire holdco or just your personal position, perhaps as part of a transaction with the first external investor joining the company, that's great and you just earned both the GP commit and track record to set you up for a traditional fund unencumbered with all the idiosyncrasies your original idea here presents. 

I am permanently behind on PMs, it's not personal.

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