Rent-seeking

Situations in which a person or organization tries to improve its riches at the expense of society. 

Author: Antra Sharma
Antra Sharma
Antra Sharma
Reviewed By: Ankit Sinha
Ankit Sinha
Ankit Sinha

Graduation: B.Com (MIT Pune)


Post Graduation: MSc in Econ (MIT WPU)

Working as Admin, Senior Prelim Reviewer, Financial Chief Editor, & Editor Specialist at WSO.

 

Honors & awards:
Student of The Year - Academics (PG)
Vishwakarad Merit Scholarship (Attained twice in PG)

Last Updated:May 3, 2024

What Is Rent Seeking?

Rent-seeking is increasing one's wealth without generating any more wealth. It is a term used in economics to describe situations in which a person or organization tries to improve its riches at the expense of society.

It is financial gain obtained by resource management that is cunning or manipulative. For example, rent seekers may benefit in a market through attempts to capture regulatory authorities.

It will help them obtain a coercive monopoly while the organization's uncorrupt rivals may suffer. This behavior is considerable and gets noticed among potential rent seekers.

Rent-seeking is when a firm asks the government for aid, benefits, or tariff protection. It doesn't boost economic output. Instead, it primarily benefits you financially without requiring any labor. Furthermore, it will be regarded the same if you contribute but deduct it from your taxes.

Key Takeaways

  • Rent seeking is a term used in economics to describe situations in which a person or organization tries to improve its riches at the expense of society. 
  • British economist David Ricardo first used the phrase "rent-seeking" in the 1800s. 
  • Rent seekers may benefit in a market through attempts to capture regulatory authorities. 
  • Regulatory and tax policies will be effective if people equally distribute economic and political power.

Understanding Rent Seeking

Rent-seeking behaviors are frequently seen as anti-innovative. As a result, companies may rely on this approach to boost their wealth rather than create unique, inventive revenue-generation strategies.

For example, suppose your present wage is $250,000, but you would stay there if it were $150,000.

Hence, you make $100,000 a month in rent. This term refers to the payment made to a production factor that is more significant than what is necessary to maintain that factor's current usage.

Robert Shiller cites the example of a story where the landowner built a fence across a river that passed through his property. He appointed his agent to charge revenue for the passing boats to open the gate. 

This story is the archetypal instance of RS. The fence and the revenue collection agent are both unproductive.

The owner has not added any direct or indirect value to the river but only benefits himself. Finding a means to profit from something that was once free is all he does.

Invention & Origin Of Rent Seeking

Adam Smith, a Scottish economist and philosopher credited with conceptualizing the term "rent," was a significant figure in the Scottish Enlightenment and a pioneer of political economy.

The term refers to Adam Smith's separation of income into profit, wage, and rent rather than a lease's payment. However, the term's historical context mentions taking ownership of land or other natural resources.

As one of the methods of generating revenue, the word "rent" is used. It involves lending one's resources in return for specific advantages. Compared to other sources of income, this one might be the least dangerous and labor-intensive.

The primary theoretical pillar of the research, however, is the "rent-seeking theory," which sheds light on the behaviors of agents or market brokers in traditional economic marketplaces like the rental property market.

British economist David Ricardo first used the phrase in the 1800s. In 1967, American economist Gordon Tullock, well recognized for his contributions to public choice theory and applying financial reason to political circumstances, created the idea.

Tullock initially claimed that renting-seeking expenses in democracies are not significant.

However, in 1974, the phrase was first coined by American economist Anne Osborn Krueger. Krueger served as the World Bank's chief economist from 1982 to 1986 and was the initial deputy director of the IMF (International Monetary Fund).

For Turkey in 1968, Krueger calculated that rents from import permits alone were nearly 15% of Turkey's gross national product and that government regulation produced rents equivalent to 7.3% of national income.

Krueger did not attempt to calculate the proportion of these rents lost in pursuing them. 

Causes of Rent Seeking

Some different facets and casualties may create such a scenario. Although some level of rent-seeking always occurs in any economy for certain.

Followings are some of the potential aspects that enrich the possibilities of the outcome of

1. Political Choices and Incentives 

Studies of the causes have historically categorized political choices based on the relative costs and rewards for winners and losers. 

When political incentives offer substantial advantages to a small, well-organized interest group and negligible costs to a sizable number of consumers or taxpayers in the unorganized public, governments are more inclined to provide such prizes and encourage rent-seeking.

2. Utilization of Social Institutions for Redistribution

Rent-seeking is very profitable because it utilizes social institutions, such as the state's authority, to redistribute income among various groups without producing new wealth. In contrast, profit-seeking, in this sense, entails the production of capital. 

Capital risk must be typically taken to generate profit with the hope of receiving a return. Capital risk is the potential loss of an investment or a part of it. The three income streams might be risky, but it is the simplest to achieve.

Note

The three income streams - rent (economic rent), interest, and rental - represent ways in which rent-seeking behavior allows individuals or groups to extract economic gains without engaging in activities that contribute to the production of capital or wealth.

3. Revenue Sources from Resource Possession

When people or organizations profit from the ownership or management of resources, such as real estate, natural resources, or intellectual property, it can also be considered rent-seeking.

This can involve leveraging monopolistic control over necessary goods or services, collecting royalties from patents or copyrights, or collecting rent from land or property leases.

In these situations, rent-seekers take economic value without making any innovative or constructive contributions.

The Tullock Paradox

The seeming contradiction between the substantial advantages of rent-seeking behavior and its comparatively low costs is known as the Tullock Paradox, after economist Gordon Tullock.

Here are two instances that demonstrate this paradox:

1. Political Bribery

Rent-seekers may engage in bribery or lobbying operations to sway political decisions in their favor. The expenses of bribing politicians or engaging in lobbying activities are frequently quite cheap despite the possibility of significant cash advantages from advantageous policies.

A rent seeker who expects to gain a lot from a certain policy, for example, might only have to spend a small portion of their expected income to sway decision-makers, resulting in an unbalanced benefit-to-cost ratio.

2. Maritime Piracy

In a thriving maritime economy, pirates steal from cargo ships instead of working for a living. This is an example of their rent-seeking behavior.

Even while there can be significant financial gains from piracy, merchants' expenses in fighting it—such as employing privateers or armed escorts—are frequently far smaller.

Note

Rent-seeking is paradoxical because merchants may still have a sizable profit margin after incurring the costs associated with deterring piracy, although one that is diminished.

The Tullock Paradox highlights the disparity between the advantages enjoyed by rent seekers and the comparatively low costs associated with engaging in such behavior, which results in inefficiencies and distortions in economic activity. 

Addressing this paradox often involves implementing reforms to mitigate rent-seeking incentives, promote competition, and enhance governance mechanisms to ensure fair and equitable resource allocation.

Important Factors of Rent Seeking

Rent Seeking is a typical tendency. The result of political lawmaking and governance consent is its origin. The regulations, laws, and financing determinations that control endeavors and the distribution of government subsidies are made by politicians.

These laws and activities represent such tendencies due to scarcity or little reciprocity. The following are some crucial factors for it

1. Business Rent Seekers

Industrial social services programs are often created to assist businesses in promoting economic growth. For example, they might ask the government for assistance in the categories of grants, competitiveness, and tariff relief.

Suppose it is successful in having legislation enacted to restrict competition, get them out of financial trouble, or erect impediments to the entrance for others. The corporation can yield economic rents without putting any additional productivity or capital at risk.

2. Tax Planning

Rent-seeking makes up a large portion of what we do in wealth management. Many of our customers have already generated their whole revenue. After that, we manage our taxes and try to lessen the authorized rent seeking by the government.

Note

Although tax planning might benefit an individual, it does not benefit society.

Therefore, not engaging in it when doing so would be advantageous to you is merely an unnecessary personal cost in situations like tax planning.

Even if we take advantage of this chance, we ought to reject the laws that created the incentives in the first place.

3. Licensing Necessities

Another extremely particular instance of this is advocating for a reduction in the criteria for occupational licensure.

Licensing is necessary to practice in numerous professions, including medicine, dentistry, and flying. Unfortunately, this procedure is time- and money-consuming.

Consequences and Issues with Rent-Seeking

What is wrong with obtaining rent? Exactly zero. If you asked for a raise, then you would be rent-seeking. So, it would be up to my employer to decide whether or not my services are worthwhile.

Economists use the phrase to characterize people's lobbying the government to grant them special privileges, even if they seek rent by asking for a raise. The phrase "privilege seeking" is far superior.

Several consequences and issues associated with rent-seeking behavior are:

1. Market Inefficiency

Rent-seeking can lower market efficiency by distorting competition and raising obstacles to entry for new businesses. This may lead to a decline in competitiveness and impede the economy's ability to allocate resources effectively.

2. Unfair Advantage

Successful Rent seekers can earn economic rent without adding more to their productive output. As a result, some businesses may accumulate riches and market dominance at the expense of others, which could result in unfair advantages and market distortions.

3. Taxpayer Burden

Rent-seeking frequently entails requesting preferential treatment or government subsidies, which may be paid for with tax dollars.

Note

Rent seekers may profit monetarily, but there may be little to no progress in the economy or advantages for taxpayers. This may result in the wasteful use of public funds and perhaps worsen future financial challenges.

4. Political Accountability

In democracies, citizens have the right to hold elected officials accountable for engaging in rent-seeking activities like taking bribes or giving special treatment. Nonetheless, elements like the degree of political rivalry and the accessibility of information affect the effectiveness of accountability systems.

5. Impact of Political rivalry

Rent-seeking behavior's related costs may vary depending on the degree of political rivalry. Rent-seekers may be more likely to receive favors from politicians while they are vying for support, which could lower the cost of rent-seeking activities.

risk-seeking & Regulatory Measures

Economic and political power distribution is a significant factor in shaping national and subnational governments' regulatory and taxation policies. Regulatory and tax policies will be effective if people equally distribute economic and political power.

However, suppose it is distributed equally; in that case, subnational governments will use regulatory policy to redistribute income in favor of those with more economic and political power at the expense of productivity and output.

Regulation may increase output and productivity while preventing diversion, but it may also increase rent-seeking, lessen social welfare, and redistribute money among the population.

To comprehend national success, we must understand the logic of power. Those with coercive authority will execute predatory policies with minimal social engagement, whereas those with inclusive interests will do the opposite.

The capacity of various groups of people to influence the government that is political power and to seize the rents generated by regulation, which we call economic power, might be crucially essential aspects in resolving whether the government will use the law to redistribute income among individuals.

To comprehend regulatory policy, it is necessary to consider how power is distributed in society.

Lower productivity and higher corruption are both correlated with increased regulation. In addition, the distribution of political power in society may also be associated with regulatory effectiveness and corruption. 

Politics and rent-seeking

One of the essential economic findings over the past fifty years—and regrettably, one with the worst labels—is RS. Simple yet effective is the concept. When someone tries to use politics to advance their interests, it is said that they are "seeking rents."

Typically, they achieve this by receiving a subsidy for an item they produce or belonging to a particular class of people, a tax on a good they have, or a unique law that disadvantages their rivals.

Sometimes elderly citizens request high-security payments, steel production companies often demand restrictions on steel imports, and licensed doctors usually try to impose diminution to limit the competition from doctors who are not licensed.

These are the perfect examples of it. The ineffective resource allocation caused by the practice lowers economic efficiency.

Additionally, it frequently has other detrimental effects, such as decreased economic efficiency due to resource misallocation, less wealth generation, lost tax revenue, increased income disparity, and possible national collapse.

It is one fundamental tenet of the study of political economy. Unfortunately, Its application to economics is damaging and indicates undesirable political and economic activities.

On the other hand, due to the ongoing threat of competition from established players and upstarts, the economic market is characterized by cost reduction and innovation.

Thus, the phrase rent seeking indicates getting a payment that is more than the expenses of the linked resource.

As a result, entities will pursue such actions to gain economic rent that does not need a mutual commitment of output. As a result, taxpayers often fund prosperity for the same.

These tax revenues are utilized to create economic prosperity for rent-seekers, but they may or may not strengthen the economy or produce any advantages for taxpayers in general. This may result in depreciating money that demands more taxes in the future.

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