GP / Management Company Partnership Economics

I was reading through old Pershing Square transcripts and noticed an interesting exchange in their Q3’16 earrings call. 

“Some employees here are compensated with base and bonus, and then over time certain employees have had the opportunity to earn into a program where you get a profit, interest which gives you a piece of the management company, the GP, where you own an economic slice of those two interests. It is something that you lose if you leave the firm but it does align -- the interests of employees that we think of employees like -- as partners….once you become a profit interest partner, if you've been with the firm for 10 years and then you retire to become a school teacher or an artist or a professor or whatever it is, as long as you're not going and competing with the firm, you get to keep 25% of your profit interest on the day that you retire”

Two questions on this. How should I think about the economic ownership of the management company vs. the GP? The GP manages the funds and I assume that’s the entity where they get the carry (i.e. x% over a hurdle rate), but is that where the management fees come in as well? What income does the management company have or do they own a % of the GP as well? As an Associate in MF PE, I don’t really have great granularity into how the economics of the fund structure works so it would be helpful to get a better understanding of this.

Separately, is this a common structure across hedge funds (i.e., allocation of economics to investment analysts and 25% of profit interests on the tail end - pension like)? I only was able to find this b/c PSH is a public entity and has quarterly calls with its investors, but would the same apply for other hedge funds in the industry? I don’t think it would be for the multi-manager pod shops, but how about the tiger cubs or other single managers of the world (e.g., Soroban, TCI, Alkeon, Baupost, etc.)? Isn’t this structure theoretically more attractive than the PE fund structure?