Exit Caps

How are you guys underwriting exit caps for assets that are trading 50-100bps higher today than ~2 years ago. For example, I am underwriting a single story MOB at 6.50% when last year comps were around 5.50%-6%. I would get crushed if I assume a 5.50% exit on the basis rates are going to "normalize". The deal still yields an acceptable LIRR at a 6.50% but idk I feel completely lost right now. Rather be conservative than get a deal approved on a poor/aggressive exit assumption. Am I being stupid here or what?

 

When you say you'd get crushed do you mean your superiors would be pissed if you underwrote a 5.50% at exit? There's literature out there that discusses what happens to treasuries and credit spreads after peaks during rate hike cycles or other recessionary periods - they always normalize. It always feels aggressive to underwrite a tighter cap at exit than at acquisition, but this feels like one of those times you could do it. That being said, what I'd probably do is UW the same going in and exit caps, and then sensitize for tighter exits, and support it with the literature/data. At the end of the day you want your deal to make sense from a cash flow perspective and not just capital appreciation. 

Side note, a 6.5% LIRR on an MOB deal is acceptable, and that's with assuming no exit cap compression? Is this thing like NNN leased to a billionaire doctor for 15 years? 

 

Crushed meaning exactly how you defined it above. Lower exit cap, than stabilized. I put a few exit cap sensitivities together and showed the future upside if rates "normalized". I hear you on the cash flow part. We typically model 4 year holds with a sale at stabilization so little interim income to judge. We never look at 10 year cash flows...

And apologies, the LIRR is ~15% - I meant acceptable LIRR on a 6.5% exit!

 
Most Helpful

Playing devil's advocate a bit here, but not underwriting compression just because no one ever has is lazy.

The 5 year treasury forward curve has rates stabilizing at 3.40% which is 60 bps inside of where it is today ~4.00%. Why would an investor's risk premium remain 60 bps wide when other capital will compressing spreads over the treasury? Over the last cycle, when we had a "normal" yield curve, and rates were near 0, it made sense to always underwrite cap rate expansion, because rates can only go up (i guess technically not if you are the ECB). Not only that, but forward curves historically have a tendency to be conservative. You shouldn't not do something just because it hasn't been the status quo for eleven years - and again, there's plenty of literature to support the idea that spreads will meaningfully come in. I'm not saying it's going to happen, but I'm just providing a fresh perspective :) 

 

Right cause the forward curve has NEVER been wrong (hint - it's almost always wrong by a material margin, and being conservative from a historical perspective is looking at it as a whole and not during downturns as a standalone which is more relevant today).

I'm not saying don't underwrite any compression, but 100bps is fucking insanity and a violation of any quality firm's risk parameters. You're asking to get screwed.

 

Because everyone's risk premium today already incorporates the fact that the yield curve is going down in the future. Everyone is looking at the same curves to come to their conclusion on where they need to get their deal's yield to in the next 3-4 years to make sense and using that to back into what cap rate they can pay today. 

Also as noted above, those things have never been right (go look at the curve you used in a model 2 years ago), so you don't want your deals returns to hinge on betting that yields/cap rates are coming down. 

 

Odit est mollitia id voluptatem non nihil velit. Incidunt unde dolorem voluptatem qui et quos. Quis et quidem dolorem earum. Repellat odio molestias at molestiae.

Doloribus fugit provident autem eaque et est. Quisquam rerum veniam cupiditate omnis quas dolores unde. Aut iste veniam ducimus ut velit nostrum aut. Natus ab inventore accusamus repudiandae.

Et omnis ratione facilis laborum veritatis. Porro voluptates ut et. Et adipisci quos rem rerum. Culpa harum et quae quis nesciunt sed similique.

Career Advancement Opportunities

May 2024 Investment Banking

  • Jefferies & Company 02 99.4%
  • Lazard Freres No 98.9%
  • Harris Williams & Co. 25 98.3%
  • Goldman Sachs 17 97.7%
  • JPMorgan Chase 04 97.1%

Overall Employee Satisfaction

May 2024 Investment Banking

  • Harris Williams & Co. 18 99.4%
  • JPMorgan Chase 10 98.9%
  • Lazard Freres 05 98.3%
  • Morgan Stanley 07 97.7%
  • William Blair 04 97.1%

Professional Growth Opportunities

May 2024 Investment Banking

  • Lazard Freres 01 99.4%
  • Jefferies & Company 02 98.9%
  • Goldman Sachs 17 98.3%
  • Moelis & Company 07 97.7%
  • JPMorgan Chase 05 97.1%

Total Avg Compensation

May 2024 Investment Banking

  • Director/MD (5) $648
  • Vice President (21) $373
  • Associates (91) $259
  • 3rd+ Year Analyst (14) $181
  • Intern/Summer Associate (33) $170
  • 2nd Year Analyst (68) $168
  • 1st Year Analyst (205) $159
  • Intern/Summer Analyst (148) $101
notes
16 IB Interviews Notes

“... there’s no excuse to not take advantage of the resources out there available to you. Best value for your $ are the...”

Leaderboard

1
redever's picture
redever
99.2
2
Betsy Massar's picture
Betsy Massar
99.0
3
BankonBanking's picture
BankonBanking
99.0
4
Secyh62's picture
Secyh62
99.0
5
GameTheory's picture
GameTheory
98.9
6
kanon's picture
kanon
98.9
7
dosk17's picture
dosk17
98.9
8
CompBanker's picture
CompBanker
98.9
9
DrApeman's picture
DrApeman
98.8
10
Linda Abraham's picture
Linda Abraham
98.8
success
From 10 rejections to 1 dream investment banking internship

“... I believe it was the single biggest reason why I ended up with an offer...”