Jan 19, 2026

Private credit - coinvestment deal flow considerations

I work at a credit asset manager, and have been asked by friends in the LP ecosystem on how to distinguish good private credit co-investment opportunities from bad ones. Here is a brief write up on key considerations regarding private credit deals, across LMM and UMM, especially when the deal sourcing is an LP.  Looking forward to what others think as well.

  • LMM direct lending vs UMM direct lending
    • Many LMM funds will say that LMM is less competed than UMM and therefor the deals are more differentiated and have more terms
    • This is largely no longer true - due to the amount of capital that has gone into private credit in general, if we talk to deal lawyer, they say that LMM terms are highly competed on, light, and converging toward UMM
    • In reality, UMM is a higher barrier to entry market - UMM sponsors do not open their doors to smaller private credit shops (no need), and therefore, not everyone can play in that private credit market
    • Conversely, when the ticket size is small, every one can play in the LMM market. All you need to do is to hire a few originators with LMM relationships, which is not hard. The market has a lot of originators on the market now, given platform consolidation (fewer, larger funds)
  • How does that impact deal quality
    • Before we go into the details, it's very important to understand one thing - sponsors (PE funds whose assets the debt support) are all direct lending fund's clients, just as LPs are also their clients. Private credit funds can not survive without sponsor relationships
    • What does that mean? It means that if a debt goes default, the PC fund is unlikely to really take the key unless absolutely necessary, because that will hurt their relationship with their clients, their future deal flow, their future ability to deploy at volume, and their future ability to charge fee on these volume
    • Therefore, I generally think it's best to stay on the safe side of private credit - picking up more yield by forgoing quality is not worth it
  • Deals I will generate not do / "orange" flags in deals
    • New sponsor relationships
      • When a direct lending fund is new to a sponsor relationship, they tend to underwrite "bad deals" to create the relationship. Ie, they would ordinarily not want to do a deal, no other funds want to do a deal due to pricing / business quality / leverage etc, but they did it to enter into the relationship.
      • From that perspective, it's better if a co-investment comes from a seasoned relationship of a direct lending fund
    • All PIK interest
      • When these deals go wrong, they can easily be a 0 since no cash interest was paid in the interim
    • Sources & uses
      • What's the debt raised for? dividend recap is usually not a great idea because it lowers sponsor's skin in the game
    • Sponsor with weak return itself
      • If the sponsor / PE fund has weak return itself, when the business goes wrong, it's unlikely to be able to put more cash in to defend the business
    • Why is the DL fund syndicating a part of the deal out if they can do all themselves?
      • Are they trying to decrease their own exposure in a potentially not so great deal?
    • Certain sponsors are known to be not good to work with from a lender's perspective, such as HIG (generally, those starting from a distressed legacy)
    • Regular credit metric assessment - attach / detach leverage and LTV, cash flow characteristics, quality of earnings, EBITDA adjustments
  • Overall expectations on return
    • In this market, LMM and UMM and public credit market are all at their tightest in history. If a direct lending deal says it can yield 15%+ return but there is nothing special about it, there is something wrong with it. In reality, even sponsor's own equity is only returning 12%-15%, so there is no reason for a lender to be able to earn a significantly higher return
4 Comments
 

Based on the most helpful WSO content, here are key considerations for private credit co-investment deal flow, particularly when distinguishing good opportunities from bad ones across LMM and UMM:

LMM vs. UMM Direct Lending

  1. Market Competition:

    • The claim that LMM is less competitive than UMM is increasingly outdated. Due to the influx of capital into private credit, LMM terms are now highly competed on and are converging toward UMM standards.
    • UMM has higher barriers to entry, as UMM sponsors typically do not engage with smaller private credit shops. Conversely, LMM is more accessible, as smaller ticket sizes allow more players to participate.
  2. Impact on Deal Quality:

    • Sponsors (PE funds) are critical clients for private credit funds. Maintaining sponsor relationships is essential for future deal flow and fee generation. As a result, private credit funds may avoid aggressive actions like taking control of assets unless absolutely necessary, even in default scenarios.

Red Flags in Deals

  1. New Sponsor Relationships:

    • Direct lending funds may underwrite subpar deals to establish relationships with new sponsors. These deals often involve higher leverage, weaker business quality, or unattractive pricing.
  2. All PIK (Payment-in-Kind) Interest:

    • Deals with all PIK interest carry significant risk. If the deal goes wrong, the lack of interim cash interest payments can result in a total loss.
  3. Sources & Uses of Debt:

    • Be cautious of deals where debt is raised for dividend recaps, as this reduces the sponsor's skin in the game.
  4. Sponsor Quality:

    • Sponsors with weak historical returns are less likely to inject additional capital to support a struggling business.
  5. Syndication by the Direct Lending Fund:

    • If a direct lending fund is syndicating part of the deal, it may indicate they are reducing their exposure to a potentially risky investment.
  6. Problematic Sponsors:

    • Certain sponsors, such as those with a distressed legacy (e.g., HIG), may be challenging to work with from a lender's perspective.

Key Credit Metrics to Assess

  • Leverage and LTV: Evaluate attach/detach leverage and loan-to-value ratios.
  • Cash Flow Characteristics: Ensure strong, predictable cash flows.
  • Quality of Earnings: Scrutinize EBITDA adjustments and ensure earnings are reliable.

Return Expectations

  • Be skeptical of deals promising 15%+ returns without unique characteristics. In the current market, even sponsor equity typically returns 12%-15%, so lenders should not expect significantly higher returns without added risk.

By focusing on these considerations, you can better evaluate private credit co-investment opportunities and avoid potential pitfalls.

Sources: https://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forum/private-equity/qa-non-target-top-bucket-ssg-private-creditdirect-lending?customgpt=1, Credit Fund to PE: Is it Doable, Alternative Lenders & the End of Risk Taking for Banks - Opportunity or Risk?, Is it dumb to exit to LMM PE rather than starting in bigger (MF/UMM) opportunities first?, What returns have you achieved from co-investing in your fund?

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