The VP Promotion: "Marrying" a Fund
Hey folks – I've been more of a ghost than a contributor on this site for most of my career, but as I have reached a part of my career where I view myself as a wise fool. With that spirit, I’d like to share some of the views and questions I’ve been grappling with recently with regards to a VP path at my current fund (keeping it general intentionally). Welcome any challenges and other perspectives to help refine my thinking. For a bit of context, I’m currently a senior associate at $1 to 5Bn fund and, of course, an “incoming MBA Applicant” to all the top MBA programs, where I stand little to no shot at matriculation.
"Marrying" a Fund – Exaggerating a bit for effect here but the promotion to VP feels like you are "marrying" a fund especially as the golden handcuffs start to tighten. That got me thinking: how should I approach evaluating whether I want to make that kind of long-term commitment to my current fund? A few considerations I’ve been reflecting on:
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Ease of Fundraising: We’re currently raising another $1-5bn fund and have been in the market since mid-2023. While we’re nearing our target, we’re still about ~$500M shy of our hard cap. I understand the fundraising market has been difficult, but it seems like we are really reaching for dollars as we make several trips to countries across the globe. Furthermore, we had to amend our fund documents from a mid teens term to closer to 10-years. Since I haven’t experienced a fundraising cycle in a market like this before, I’m trying to contextualize what this says about our positioning in the broader market. Is this simply a reflection of the current fundraising climate, or could it signal deeper structural issues that I should weigh when considering my long-term alignment with the fund?
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Long-term GP Considerations: Our founder, while not particularly active, still controls over 50% of both the management company and the carry pool. Within the partnership itself, we have fewer than a handful of members with stakes in the management company, and one of them is set to retire this year. Given the size of the fund, I see succession planning as a challenge – both for the retiring partner and potentially for the founder. It seems likely that transitioning will eventually require selling a portion of the management company and carry pool to a non-producing partner, such as Blue Owl or a similar entity. While this doesn’t weigh heavily in the near-term career implications, I see it as a long-term concern if I were to pursue the partnership track here.
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Returns: Our earlier funds have delivered great results, with IRRs exceeding 25% and MOICs surpassing 4x while subsequent funds have yet to see significant realization events – a challenge consistent with broader industry trends. We are forecasting IRRs in the high teens and MOICs just above 2.5x. That said, there are several portfolio companies that are dogs given challenges surrounding exits. While some investments maintain a low carrying multiple, I see more downside than upside in our current valuations. Compounding this, one large portfolio company from an earlier fund – a quite the "whale" of a hold period – may require incremental equity (1/10th of that fund’s size) to stabilize operations, and with reserves fully tapped, I struggle to see where this money is coming from. Looking ahead, I anticipate these subsequent funds may achieve mid-teen returns, which, based on vintage benchmarks, would place them in the lower half of the second quartile. That said, I understand that every fund experiences periods where returns soften, and I’m struggling to contextualize whether this is cyclical or indicative of a larger trend.
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Industries of Focus: Our fund operates with a broad mandate across the consumer, industrials, and services sectors. However, we consistently avoid paying multiples required to compete in industries with strong tailwinds. Anything above low-teens multiples – especially in a competitive process – would likely get shot down by committee. From my perspective, this approach creates significant challenges. Investing in stagnant or declining industries often requires either taking market share or excelling in operational improvements – neither of which aligns with our current skill set. This limits the upside potential of our investments, given the constrained growth prospects, and introduces a need to underwrite multiple compression in some cases. However, no partner here would openly incorporate multiple compression into an underwriting case while trying to push a shitco through committee. In my view, this dynamic will likely result in a meaningful drag on returns.
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Differentiation: I find it challenging to pinpoint a truly unique angle that sets us apart from other firms in this space. Much of the positioning and messaging across firms—ours included—feels strikingly similar, almost as if there is some plagiarism… This lack of clear differentiation makes it difficult to articulate what gives us a competitive edge, especially in such a crowded market segment. Everyone has their spin, but it isn’t truly unique, just said differently.
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Politics: Having worked at seven firms throughout my career, this is the most politically environment I’ve encountered. While I assume some level of politics is inevitable in private equity, the dynamics here often feel like I am back in high school. I would conjecture that this dynamic stems largely from a lack of a strong feedback culture. People seem more inclined to discuss issues behind closed doors rather than addressing them directly, but alas, above my paygrade…
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Upward Mobility: Our firm currently has a relatively heavy middle management layer but is lean at the partner level. While the path to VP and principal seems clear, I struggle to see a realistic trajectory to partner. I could envision the firm adopting a KKR-style model, introducing an additional title between principal and partner. This dynamic leaves me contemplating the timing of career moves. One option would be to take the VP promotion, gain additional experience, and then look to recruit externally if the lack of upward mobility becomes an issue or the path becomes elongated. However, as mentioned earlier, the "golden handcuffs" tied to our vesting schedule could make that a costly decision, potentially leaving significant value on the table.
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Compensation: Ah, we saved the fun one for last. Before diving in, I want to understand what market is these days, but given my ignorance to date, I am not going to stop now…
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Meritocracy: The firm seems oriented, especially at the associate and junior VP levels, to compensate folks based on tenure instead of merit. For example, an associate who is widely regarded as underperforming, working a 9am to 6pm, might receive a $100 bonus, while top-performing associates, who take on significantly more demanding roles, are paid $105, only slightly more. As an aside, it did cause one associate to leave earlier this year given the massive disparity in the work-to-pay ratio.
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Carry: Is carry typically granted posthumously across all funds that do not have realizations or prospectively only in the fund currently being raised? I’ve heard both approaches, but prospective grants seem to be much more common. At my current firm, carry is granted prospectively. However, one of the deals warehoused in our current fund is struggling, marked at around 0.5x given my firm struggles to understand the difference between cash EBITDA and PF Adj. EBITDA…This raises another question: Will carry be granted at the current mark, given it could dilute the existing holders? Also, how do folks typically value carry? Based on public equity research, it appears most folks assign a standard 20% private equity hurdle rate to these streams. That might overvalue carry as it doesn’t account for vesting schedules, only the likelihood of performance. On vesting, seems like the structures can vary significantly (e.g., a 4-year cliff versus evenly distributed over 7 years), so I am struggling to assign values to these streams as I compare alternatives.
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For the folks that got to this point, I am sorry… Kidding aside, would love to hear perspectives. As I re-read this message, I realize it comes off as pessimistic and I do not mean to imply that, this list is more of my considerations versus a list of merits.
Following - sounds like the fund I am at right now
Just take the promo without MBA if you can and reconsider from there - just don’t get married to your carry and pretend it doesn’t exist. If you’re still required to do an MBA the question comes too early as a lot can change in 2 years.
Interested as well
1. You should like you are at a JAMMBO - just-another middle-market (generalist) buyout fund - these funds are going to disappear over the next 5-10 years
2. Take the VP promote if you don't get into H/S - if you get into H/S - go
3. Once you are VP - look around opportunistically. The reality is the entire market is shrinking - and the funds that are growing are (i) in large-cap AUM markets (there is no alpha being the 50th principal at KKR / Apollo), and (ii) different strategies
4. You discount the carry 100% - you are very likely never to collect on that carry for a variety of reasons out of your control
5. Never, ever look at marked-IRRs - what is DPI. That is the only thing that is important. Did your prior fund hit anywhere close to ~1x DPI or materially the way there? If not, no amount of marketing materials in the world matter without that DPI.
This is an interesting take. What do you think happens to the JAMMBO's? Do they just struggle to raise and fade out? Will they move down-market into LMM territory? Curious to get your take on the future (assuming you're actually a PE MD lol)
Considering the first fund is above a 2x DPI while the other two are around ~0.5x, and despite being in the market fundraising for over a year, we remain on track to raise more dollars than the previous fund. Does this indicate that our strategy is truly differentiated? Perhaps a better question is: if you were evaluating funds opportunistically at the VP level, what factors would you prioritize? Are there specific strategies or areas you believe possess a durable competitive advantage or a sustainable moat?
1. There is usual a hard deadline of a final close 1-year after the first close - how close are you to that? No firm will tell you that it's not "on track" to achieve at least the prior fund until right before the hard deadline (which is when they usually announce cutting heads / restructuring teams). So figure out what "on track" really means - those two words are doing a lot of heavy lifting. There are several large, very well known, upper-middle market PE funds that went literally from high-single digit Bn AUM funds to 70% downsized funds (~$1-3bn range) that communicated they were "on track" right before firing entire teams.
2. No PE fund has a differentiated strategy or competitive moat. How can there be? It's the same group of people from the same banks hiring the same consulting firms to evaluate CIMs from the same set of bankers. And to win the deal you definitionally thought it was smart to pay a higher price than every single other person. Where does that alpha possible come from? The real moat lies in the institution - this is when things like scale, brand, diversification starts doing a lot of heavy lifting. True sector specialists have probably the next best strategy but the problem with that is you are levered to macro cycles so big ups and big downs (tech, healthcare) that has to do more with levered beta than alpha
3. You prioritize culture and strategy - they basically both come down to one thing. Career longevity. You choose the firm where (i) it will survive long enough, and (ii) you can stand long enough to vest your carry (usually you will need ~5-10 years) to make all that really happen which is also why carry at the VP stage should be heavily discounted (because you're statistically extremely unlikely to invest enough of it to make it matter and there are all sorts of provisions to screw you when you leave - it's a one sided piece of paper)
Why are you never likely to collect on that carry? If that is the case, doesn’t that imply taking a roll with more cash comp in year earned make more sense? For simplicity and realizing it’s a ridiculous comparison due to the different nature of the jobs as well as career longevity, but doesn’t it make more sense to take a hedge fund role?
PE has lower career volatility than HF. I don't know a single hedge fund friend who hasn't been fired multiple times.
Following, same boat but at a yeae behind you. 3rd yr associate who has been guided towards the promotion at end of 4th year, but having second thoughts on whether to stay at current fund if the fund size stays the same size (or smaller)
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