I think I got dumber for watching that video.
I love how they say rate locks are more expensive for some reason and it was unexpected. Ashcroft seems like a terrible operation if they keep paying inflated rate lock fees.
These guys milked all the investors in the last 10 years and are now trying to maintain their status quo. See the recent "multifamily syndicators are scum" thread
Aren't the class A shares already quasi preferred equity? In the Ashcroft fund 3, class A is a 9% coupon with no upside. Good luck getting approval from two class investors to place additional preferred equity on top of the existing preferred equity class. If I was a class A investor and assuming it has priority positioning over class B, I'd be forcing a sale.
If I was in Class A I would be forcing class dilution and taking over the GP's equity stake. The only way to save this is to run those fuckers out of town becuase they are 100% still fee milking this. The Class B shareholders are going to be pissed but if I was them I would rather have people with skills running the ship.
Fuck does anyone have shareholder lists for these groups? I smell an opportunity for an activist play. Buyout the scared investors and gut these idiots.
Lol this isn’t an institutional deal. Class A is made up of many people. There is no way, even if they have the right, that they can band together to ‘kick out the GP.’
Obviously they're in a bad spot, but since I'm more junior just want to confirm for the future - regarding rate increases they should've had more cushion to deal with these issues, rate cap increases happened but again should've been aware of that and asked for more money up front? As an investor I'm sure you can say you should've known as the RE operator, but you also invested in the deal.
What are rebuttals you as an investor can say in the situation to the issues they're facing as a they should've been prepared? Or at this point is it more about knowing not to put anymore money in and where you can push for a sale and never invest with them again?
I guess it's also they've seen the run up the last 10 years, they know these deals could fuck over investors but didn't care since they were getting fees? Now when they're in trouble they want the investors to put in more money to maybe bail them out?
Yes and no. Reg D filings need more regulation from the SEC. Most of the investors were promised something ridiculous and they fell for it. Yes they're partially to blame but most of these investors are not knowledgeable. The syndicators have built their business on retail investors being clueless. When you can have an 18 year old spend a $1k in filing fees and then raise money for real estate projects with no experience, there has to be better oversight. The SEC has took their foot off the pedal here and i think the rate increases will decimate most of these multifamily syndicators.
Yes and no. Reg D filings need more regulation from the SEC. Most of the investors were promised something ridiculous and they fell for it. Yes they're partially to blame but most of these investors are not knowledgeable. The syndicators have built their business on retail investors being clueless. When you can have an 18 year old spend a $1k in filing fees and then raise money for real estate projects with no experience, there has to be better oversight.
Why? I said this on another thread, but why do we as a society have an obligation to protect greedy fools from the consequences of their actions? If someone is deliberately lying or running a fraud that only a federal investigator is well placed enough to detect or stop? By all means, lets crack down on that. Just because someone promises pie in the sky returns doesn't make them a fraudster, it just means the people investing with them are stupid and greedy, and neither of those are or should be protected classes.
The government should not be our savior. I think this is a very weak position to take. In a democratic society built on capitalism, these things happen. Not all times are good times and we (those who lost $) can learn from this
I edited some statements because I’m trying to be nicer.
I mean if it's true about the rate cap they bought initially, that's early 2021 late 2020 pricing (assuming a $50/60MM ish deal, right?). I'm a young AM guy so naturally pessimistic but who the hell was thinking in 2020/2021 that rate caps were going to explode to the degree they did? Not defending them but legitimately curious as well what they should have done, keeping in mind that hindsight is 20/20 blah blah blah
They can't be faulted for not foreseeing an increase in rate cap costs. No one did and if someone says otherwise, they're dumb for investing in real estate and not trading fixed income. HOWEVER, they are 100% at fault for not realizing that we were very late cycle and that 80% LTV debt fund execution + preferred equity on 1970s vintage assets is extremely risky.
Yes, of course. But so many of these sponsors came into the industry post GFC and seem to want to ignore what capital markets & asset values truly did during these times of economic crisis. Sure, short rates may fall but their asset's underlying fundamentals (& possibly credit spreads) will be fucked. These dudes are rate traders w/ no counter cycle experience.
In early 2020, I went to a syndicators conference in Colorado. Most of the big names were there including the Ashcroft team. The amount of inexperience among the operators was very apparent especially given the nature of the topics of discussion. The entire event felt like an MLM show (echoing the idea that everyone can be successful in multi as long as they do XYZ; strong emphasis on marketing). One of the key takeaways was that everyone was chasing asset value appreciation and pitching "passive cash flow". Most of the attendees were mainly concerned about getting the most amount of leverage available and were confused about why anyone would want to borrow Life Company financing. Even back then, right before Covid, many operators were looking for floating rate financing to take advantage of the yield curve.
I would say that the idea that a light-moderate recession could be good for Multi is plausible. Here are some thoughts:
1) If a recession were to occur, it would occur because of the rapid climb in rates. In theory fundamentals are solid, hence why GDP growth is still going strong despite the drastic increase in rates.
2) CRE (multi especially so) is largely a leveraged finance play. It is acutely affected by interest rates, much more than most other industries.
3) If we were hit by a recession, presumably rent growth would slow (it's already pretty much at 0), vacancy rates may increase (which is plausible given lack of new supply coming online 1+ years from now and people still need a place to live), capital markets would dry up a bit (but life cos and agencies will still be lending). However, Debt Service constraints would diminish quite a bit which would lead to much better economics for multifamily properties assuming vacancy and rental rates aren't severely impacted (which even in 2008, they were not) and assuming that spreads don't blow out significantly
The government should have 0 obligation to police private investments like this RE: above post.
Excessive regulations have already cut off high quality growth companies from public markets. Look at the huge and sad drop in the amount of companies going public decade after decade.
Now they want to put a collar on private markets because some greedy idiot gave his money to an obviously inexperienced "investor".
The government should have 0 obligation to police private investments like this RE: above post.
Excessive regulations have already cut off high quality growth companies from public markets. Look at the huge and sad drop in the amount of companies going public decade after decade.
Now they want to put a collar on private markets because some greedy idiot gave his money to an obviously inexperienced "investor".
The cynic in me is that there aren't enough quality private companies to actually make it in public markets because public markets see straight through bull shit and demand profit at a certain point. Most private companies that have grown to unicorn status are just a pray growth continues forever and maybe we'll figure out how to be profitable at some point.
The government should have 0 obligation to police private investments like this RE: above post.
Excessive regulations have already cut off high quality growth companies from public markets. Look at the huge and sad drop in the amount of companies going public decade after decade.
Now they want to put a collar on private markets because some greedy idiot gave his money to an obviously inexperienced "investor".
The cynic in me is that there aren't enough quality private companies to actually make it in public markets because public markets see straight through bull shit and demand profit at a certain point. Most private companies that have grown to unicorn status are just a pray growth continues forever and maybe we'll figure out how to be profitable at some point.
Bingo! You fucking nailed it!
I have worked with many private real estate operating companies who plan on going public. But once they begin to comprehend the compliances and legal standards of being a REIT, they do a 180-degree turn and run for the hills.
The government should have 0 obligation to police private investments like this RE: above post.
Excessive regulations have already cut off high quality growth companies from public markets. Look at the huge and sad drop in the amount of companies going public decade after decade.
Now they want to put a collar on private markets because some greedy idiot gave his money to an obviously inexperienced "investor".
The cynic in me is that there aren't enough quality private companies to actually make it in public markets because public markets see straight through bull shit and demand profit at a certain point. Most private companies that have grown to unicorn status are just a pray growth continues forever and maybe we'll figure out how to be profitable at some point.
This isn't even a cynical take. It's the truth. Most of the "tech" companies that have defined entrepreneurship for the last two decades are, essentially, scams. WeWork is a perfect example, for many reasons. It's just a vibe, a fun idea that people threw endless piles of cash at in the hopes it would be the next Facebook, and even when it was obvious it wasn't, people kept burning money because they hoped to pass the buck to naive retail investors and get their money out before the whole house of cards came down.
How many "disruptors" can you name that are actually profitable? Or have a path to it? Almost none of them. Which is why none of them go public, because once you have to stand up and say "we don't make money and never will" it's impossible to keep the fiction alive that any of this shit is a good idea.
Companies that actually perform a service or produce a good and make a profit doing it will still go public. Unfortunately for efficient allocation of capital, pretty much everything to come out of Silicon Valley in the last 15 years isn't and never will be profitable. Even the "success" stories, like Uber, aren't and will never be particularly profitable (and yes I know Uber just posted its first profitable year, but that sort of underlines my point).
They talk about rate caps but they don't talk about cap rates. They also don't mention that the deals are under water and that the naked dscr is probably 0.6x DSCR.
Curious if things have changed for Ashcroft and other firms like them? Can they recover, I saw they got $50mm in funding recently and bought two new deals in the last 4 months. Isn't this a bad time to buy? Thoughts on the overall firm pedigree and if they will survive? Always see that bingo book and noticed firms like Carroll which I thought had a great rep.
Curious if things have changed for Ashcroft and other firms like them? Can they recover, I saw they got $50mm in funding recently and bought two new deals in the last 4 months. Isn't this a bad time to buy? Thoughts on the overall firm pedigree and if they will survive? Always see that bingo book and noticed firms like Carroll which I thought had a great rep.
Other comments aside, what makes you say isn’t this a bad time to buy?
they'll be using their rescue fund to recap the good deals in their portfolio. original investors will get wiped. rise will roll its equity since it controls the new LP. the really bad deals will be lost but the enterprise will survive.
They sent this to their LPs. Pretty brutal and just sounds like kicking the can and hoping for a market bailout
As communicated in previous updates, we have dedicated months to discussions with lenders and potential partners to refinance, restructure, and stabilize the debt of the AVAF1 portfolio. Our goal is to address three major factors:
Allow the multifamily market time to stabilize.
Decrease ongoing costs of floating rate debt while preserving flexibility across AVAF1.
Meet liquidity needs for rate caps, capital expenditures and unexpectedly high debt payments.
How do we achieve this?
Fortunately, after months of negotiating, we’ve secured a path to address all three factors, that will require a successful capital call of 19.7% and partnering with a strategic capital partner.
This is Ashcroft’s first capital call, and while it’s regrettable to take this step, our primary focus remains safeguarding your investment. Therefore, all LPs must participate, including ourselves, with our collective co-investments of $3m. As a gesture of our ongoing commitment, we will extend a $1M note payable at 0% interest upon the successful conclusion of the capital call (details below).
AVAF1 is comprised of assets that are poised for a strong rebound in value as markets improve. This is due to the institutional quality of assets and the high-growth markets in which they were acquired. Moreover, demand and absorption rates are currently at 25-year highs and are continuing to trend in that direction with a 70% reduction in new construction permits and drop off in deliveries in early 2025.
Our strategic partner will help us refinance the 3 largest loans in the portfolio into fixed rate debt, which will lower the blended cost of the floating rate debt. This also significantly reduces the total floating rate debt from $400M down to $265M. We will maintain flexibility on the other 5 properties to sell or refinance as markets improve. In the meantime, the fund will need to cover rate caps costs and restart renovations.
Why is a capital call necessary?
Preserving Capital: If this capital call is not successful, the fund will have to sell assets into an inopportune market. This would result in selling the assets below our basis in these deals and incurring a significant loss of LP-invested equity. Specifically, if forced to sell now it would be a total loss of capital for Class B and Class A would only get approx. 71% of the original investment back.
Replacing Rate Caps: We are refinancing 3 assets now and intend to sell or refinance others as coverage permits. In the meantime, the other 5 assets still have obligations to buy rate caps.
Resuming Renovations: Given rising inflation and labor costs, our capital expenditure exceeded initial underwriting. This prompted a temporary pause to renovations. However, resuming renovations is essential to increasing revenue, essentially facilitating the refinancing or sale of other assets. A capital infusion allows us to resume both interior and exterior renovations. We will consistently evaluate the cost vs. benefit, adjusting the renovation scope as necessary.
Reducing Portfolio Debt Risk Exposure While Maintaining Flexibility: This restructure will reduce risk on $400M of floating rate debt with near term expiration by refinancing the three largest loans into fixed rate 5-year debt, while still maintaining flexibility to sell or refi the other five properties as soon as the market improves.
Maintaining Lender Requirements & Loan Covenants: We (Joe & Frank) will consistently support you and our other investors through both favorable and challenging times. We’ve already extended a $11M interest-free short-term loan to cover various unexpected expenses, including the replacement rate caps over the past 12 months. While this was meant as a temporary solution, it must be repaid promptly to maintain compliance with loan agreements and ensure adequate liquidity across our Ashcroft portfolio.
Buying Time to Increase Return Potential: Anticipated interest rate cuts are projected to start in mid to late 2024, which are expected to raise asset values, with rates forecasted to decline to 3-3.5% by 2026. This provides for a potentially more favorable transaction market in 2025 and 2026, increasing your overall return potential.
As your partners we believe that when we say we have aligned interests, our decisions and actions should reflect that. Here are some actions we have and/or are taking:
Future GP Participation Opportunity: Your full participation in this capital call will qualify you to share GP profits in a future deal with us (Joe and Frank). While this is not industry standard, we want to show our deep appreciation and value for our partnership.
$11M Interest Free Loan: The 0% interest $11M loan we provided, postponed the capital call by 12 months while we worked on a solution. In order to show further alignment, upon completing the full capital call, in addition to the $3M+ in LP investments we have alongside you, we will extend a $1M note payable at a 0% interest rate.
Deferment of Asset Management Fee: We are not currently charging an asset management fee and are prepared to continue deferring these fees to prioritize your returns.
85%/15% Profit Split: We are changing the waterfall to a straight 85/15 LP/GP split. This is an improvement for you compared to our current 70/30 split (from 8%-13% IRR) and we are eliminating the 50/50 waterfall altogether. Note: The new waterfall structure is reflected in the return projections outlined below.
GP Capital Call Participation: As referenced above, we (Joe and Frank) will be fully participating in the capital call on $3M+ of combined personal LP investments in AVAF1.
Ashcroft Employee Participation: All employees of Ashcroft who invested in AVAF1 are in agreement with this solution and they will be participating in the capital call.
How is this solution structured?
I. Capital call of 19.7% of your initial investment.
II. A refinance into fixed debt on our 3 largest loans while simultaneously lowering the interest rate.
New blended rate of 7.49% vs. existing rate at 8.18%
III. Strategic partner will provide approximately $48mm in preferred equity to buy down current loans and refinance over $165M into fixed rate debt which removes 41% of current floating rate debt exposure.
They are capped at 12.75% versus having uncapped upside potential.
They are treated more like debt than preferred equity, with 6% paid from cash flow from operations, and the remaining 6.75% paid at a capital event.
This gives us flexibility to sell or refinance the 5 remaining properties in 2025 or 2026, which could return significant capital back to you while we wait for the others to sell.
IV. Your 19.7% capital call contributions will accrue at the current coupon rate of 10% for Class A or 7% for Class B.
V. When you fully participate in this capital call (19.7%), we intend on providing you with the opportunity to profit from GP positions in a future offering* outside of the AVAF1.
*The specific offering will be chosen at the discretion of the GP, should such an opportunity arise.
Due to the above, we have created a solution that is best suited to preserve capital and offer the opportunity to still deliver a strong return once the market valuations stabilize.
We anticipate returning your called capital within 24 months of investment
Please note, we evaluated several options before arriving at this solution, bolstering our confidence in the chosen path forward as we explored each alternative. For context, here are three among several others:
Larger capital call without a preferred partner: This would have required a 32% capital call from you, insufficient to refinance any properties. Sell One or Two Now to Avoid Capital Call: While this might mitigate ongoing costs of rate caps, it would leave us vulnerable to failing lender requirements for necessary extension tests in mid-2024. Selling All Properties Now: This would incur significant capital losses. Class B would face a total loss, while Class A would recover only approx. 71% of the original investment.
"Give us 19.7% more money so that it can sit behind preferred equity at 12.75% which has priority over your initial investment and the 19.7% that you just provided." No thank you.
Where will Class A, Class B, and new equity sit? Here's the difficulty of these A and B structures - it's impossible for Ashcroft to act in the best interest of both classes. They've openly just admitted that Class B is wiped out and Class A is 71% of initial investment. If new capital (lets call is class C) sits ahead of Class A, Class A is wiping out their remaining 71%. If the Class C (new capital) does not sit ahead of Class A, the new capital is instantly gone once it's contributed.
Preferred equity, new capital, class A, class B - Any way you want to spin it, Class B is wiped out.
So in general for a capital call this new equity always has a lower priority in the same bucket than the initial investment (since going in as LP equity and not as a different structure like more pref or a mezz structure)? Have never dealt with a capital call before.
I haven't really dealt with capital calls and term modifications like this, but for the investors isn't not participating the obvious choice?
Sure. But you have to remember that these guys are basically out here scamming grandma out of her savings, not dealing with institutional partners or people with real estate knowledge/experience. So they're going to bully a bunch of naive rubes into participating, and their marks may not even know that not participating is a choice.
"Maintaining Lender Requirements & Loan Covenants: We (Joe & Frank) will consistently support you and our other investors through both favorable and challenging times. We’ve already extended a $11M interest-free short-term loan to cover various unexpected expenses, including the replacement rate caps over the past 12 months. While this was meant as a temporary solution, it must be repaid promptly to maintain compliance with loan agreements and ensure adequate liquidity across our Ashcroft portfolio."
Could this loan technically be pushed out and Joe/Frank put in more equity to maintain compliance? Seems they're saying we're here for you but oh wait we need our $11mm loan back asap so they get out of bad deals and the kicker is their loan is higher priority than the LPs who are putting in more $.
"Maintaining Lender Requirements & Loan Covenants: We (Joe & Frank) will consistently support you and our other investors through both favorable and challenging times. We’ve already extended a $11M interest-free short-term loan to cover various unexpected expenses, including the replacement rate caps over the past 12 months. While this was meant as a temporary solution, it must be repaid promptly to maintain compliance with loan agreements and ensure adequate liquidity across our Ashcroft portfolio."
Could this loan technically be pushed out and Joe/Frank put in more equity to maintain compliance? Seems they're saying we're here for you but oh wait we need our $11mm loan back asap so they get out of bad deals and the kicker is their loan is higher priority than the LPs who are putting in more $.
So Frank and Joe had $11M of cash liquidity between the two of them? That's the real head scratcher. Unless I am naive and these scummy syndicators have all made 8 figures during their acquisition spree pre-2022?
"As your partners we believe that when we say we have aligned interests, our decisions and actions should reflect that. Here are some actions we have and/or are taking:
Future GP Participation Opportunity: Your full participation in this capital call will qualify you to share GP profits in a future deal with us (Joe and Frank). While this is not industry standard, we want to show our deep appreciation and value for our partnership. There aren't going to be GP profits most likely right so this is a moot point?
$11M Interest Free Loan: The 0% interest $11M loan we provided, postponed the capital call by 12 months while we worked on a solution. In order to show further alignment, upon completing the full capital call, in addition to the $3M+ in LP investments we have alongside you, we will extend a $1M note payable at a 0% interest rate. The $3mm in LP investments day 1 was likely higher than this and has come down right as the property value has declined or LP has not been hit as there is still GP equity left? So they're asking for $11mm back to put in only $1mm.
Deferment of Asset Management Fee: We are not currently charging an asset management fee and are prepared to continue deferring these fees to prioritize your returns. Wouldn't there be something in the OA that the property needs to hit certain thresholds to take an AM fee, so this is bs?
Ashcroft Employee Participation: All employees of Ashcroft who invested in AVAF1 are in agreement with this solution and they will be participating in the capital call. How much do employees have in and employees have a choice in putting in more or not right? Or is this them saying to employees hey put in money or there may be repercussions internally or we can potentially let you go?
Blue Lake has always been an anomaly to me. Do tell! How have they been able to go from owning nothing to acquiring $75MM+ projects?
Like a lot of the "weekend warrior" syndicators out there that are heavy on marketing and light on experience, they use a number of Co-GP "feeder funds" (note that I'm using that term generously, as they're just other syndicators) to tackle the raise with them. It wouldn't be uncommon to have a handful of these in any given equity raise.
Rumor has it: her husband comes from major family money. I have heard any "class A" position or whatever the highest tier Blue Lake offers is taken by the in-laws.
I don't understand why they need a rate cap. These properties are stabilized. Why not just take fixed rate term debt? Wouldn't that be cheaper? Or they can't make DSCR at 6-7%, or whatever they rate they would get for a 3 year term?
They are likely sub 1.0 dscr at today’s fixed rate equivalent. When loan to values are likely 100% at todays prices, they would like require a significant cash infusion to refi into fixed rate debt.
That's what I figured. I don't get why didn't they take term debt when interest rates were half of what they are now? Did they just want more leverage and and even lower floating rate?
And, as the email alludes: they went in on bridge debt, so even outside of DSCR, the current LTV would likely result in need to buy down the loan before any fixed rate could be swapped out.
I received this info today from Ashcroft when I asked what happens if I don’t participate in the capital call as a class A investor. Thoughts?
Class A participation:
· If a Class A shareholder doesn’t participate what happens to their position?
o Class A shareholders who do not participate will drop down in the capital stack, and will now sit behind those who do contribute to the capital call.
o If you don't make the capital call your LP Percent ownership will be diluted proportionately. In this case, because the capital call is 19.7% your ownership will decrease by 16.5%. Please note that if the fund sells for less than the capital call and original class A equity, you would receive less of your original investment than other Class A investors due to this dilution. More to the point, if a successful capital call is not met the fund will unfortunately have to sell assets at today'sheightened interest rates which would result in significant loss of invested capital.
· When you participate as a Class A investor here is how it benefits you
o If you participate in the capital call, your capital call dollars will now sit in a priority position above your originally invested capital. This new equity funded through the capital call will also receive the Preferred Coupon rate of 10% in a priority position to your originally invested capital.
o We anticipate returning your called capital within 24 months of funding.
o Without a successful capital call we are at risk of a partial loss of Class A capital by being forced to sell into an inopportune market.
I'm not putting this lightly. Class A investors need to sue and either force a sale or wipe out Class B while accepting new preferred equity. Legally, they should be in the driver seat here. This is exactly the problem with Class A and Class B structures being managed by a single entity. It's impossible to act in the best interest of both share classes. All investors were screwed over by bad investments but Class B equity is gone, forever, not coming back. Class A investors are being completely screwed over by this capital call, a deliberate act by the sponsor.
Reason being, Ashcroft initially stated that if sold today, Class A investors would lose 29% of their initial capital. Not great but much better than Class B and that additional safety is the reason you invest in Class A. Now, Ashcroft is taking away the Class A priority position in the capital stack and forcing them to contribute more capital or else lose 16.5% of their initial capital through dilution or contribute which will put 119.7% of your initial investment at risk and behind a larger preferred equity provider. They're essentially holding Class A hostage but if you're a Class A investor, you have rights.
If this was an outside controlled preferred equity partner, I can guarantee they would not be accepting either of these options. They would be evaluating two options:
1) Selling and licking your wounds with a 29% loss.
2) Wiping out Class B and continuing with an outside preferred equity partner. Class A would essentially be the new common equity in this scenario and receive any, and all, upside in the future. Whereas, the Ashcroft proposal requires Class A to contribute while still leaving Class B intact. In some miracle scenario where the market has a monster rally, you're telling me that Class A still just receives their initial capital and 10% while Class B receive the additional upside? I don't think so. I don't care how unlikely the scenario of a monster rally is, I would never agree to it as Class A, nor would an outside preferred equity provider.
I don't know how much more clear I can be to Class A investors in this fund. You are willingly allowing yourself to be taken advantage of in this situation if you do not fight. The response might be that these control rights for Class A are not included in the operating agreement which they probably aren't but guess what, Ashcroft raised a fund with two equity share classes and they are required to act in the best interest of their equity investors which as I stated earlier, is impossible to do in this scenario and because of this, gives Class A legal standing. It may even subject Ashcroft to recourse.
I'm not putting this lightly. Class A investors need to sue and either force a sale or wipe out Class B while accepting new preferred equity. Legally, they should be in the driver seat here. This is exactly the problem with Class A and Class B structures being managed by a single entity. It's impossible to act in the best interest of both share classes. All investors were screwed over by bad investments but Class B equity is gone, forever, not coming back. Class A investors are being completely screwed over by this capital call, a deliberate act by the sponsor.
Reason being, Ashcroft initially stated that if sold today, Class A investors would lose 29% of their initial capital. Not great but much better than Class B and that additional safety is the reason you invest in Class A. Now, Ashcroft is taking away the Class A priority position in the capital stack and forcing them to contribute more capital or else lose 16.5% of their initial capital through dilution or contribute which will put 119.7% of your initial investment at risk and behind a larger preferred equity provider. They're essentially holding Class A hostage but if you're a Class A investor, you have rights.
If this was an outside controlled preferred equity partner, I can guarantee they would not be accepting either of these options. They would be evaluating two options:
1) Selling and licking your wounds with a 29% loss.
2) Wiping out Class B and continuing with an outside preferred equity partner. Class A would essentially be the new common equity in this scenario and receive any, and all, upside in the future. Whereas, the Ashcroft proposal requires Class A to contribute while still leaving Class B intact. In some miracle scenario where the market has a monster rally, you're telling me that Class A still just receives their initial capital and 10% while Class B receive the additional upside? I don't think so. I don't care how unlikely the scenario of a monster rally is, I would never agree to it as Class A, nor would an outside preferred equity provider.
I don't know how much more clear I can be to Class A investors in this fund. You are willingly allowing yourself to be taken advantage of in this situation if you do not fight. The response might be that these control rights for Class A are not included in the operating agreement which they probably aren't but guess what, Ashcroft raised a fund with two equity share classes and they are required to act in the best interest of their equity investors which as I stated earlier, is impossible to do in this scenario and because of this, gives Class A legal standing. It may even subject Ashcroft to recourse.
I'm a little unfamiliar with how the various classes work and why having the sponsor controlling it vs a different party is not a great structure for the LP who entered into either class. Do you mind expanding on that?
The capital call deadline was 5/20 and.as of today only 49% of investors have funded. They extended the deadline. As a class A investor in the fund, it appears it’s in my best interest for the cc to not to go through.
As class A, beware of what they might attempt next by either 1) using full their fund 3 bridge the gap and effectively take over the deals and/or 2) bringing in additional, more riskier preferred equity which will surely lose the rest of your capital.
I’m pretty certain using funds from Fund 3 to bridge gaps in Fund 1 is illegal. Bringing in another equity partner is an interesting threat I guess it all depends on what they are willing to do to avoid the appearances of defeat. I am so done with them.
I recall reading about a sponsor starting a fund or a REITs recently and the assumption is they’ll use them to provide rescue capital to their struggling portfolio. Not opining on the legality of it, only that I wouldn’t be surprised to see it.
From what I read on BiggerPockets, they told another investor that they're around 64% of capital in hand and 88% committed. Once the deadline passed, they opened up the capital call offering to any existing investors. Next step will definitely be to all investors in their network, whether that's fund 3 or individuals. If I was Class A, I would 100% be filing a lawsuit to stop this process and forcing a sale to get my 70% remaining principal. Strong chance your 70% becomes 0% with the two layers of pref (third party pref & capital call pref) coming in.
We would again like to thank all investors who have funded the AVAF1 Capital Call. Since our last update, funding is currently at $14.8M, a $1.6M increase in just 2 days. We would also like to thank those who have requested to acquire additional equity from diluted investors who did not fund the capital call. With positive trends in both funding, and additional contributions, we continue to track towards a successful capital call.
Well 14.8 million is more than the 11 million loan Frank and Joe will take back right away so it was somewhat successful for the two principals. How the net 3.8 million helps against hundreds of millions of dollars of maturing debt etc. is less certain.
As we predicted, fund one still in trouble after raising millions in capital call and now Fund 2 and some others having their own Capital call. Does anyone have a link to the video for the new capital calls?
VAPRSN - Why do you say AVAF1 is still in trouble? I’m an investor in the fund, but I’ve been having a hard time getting a clear picture of its current status. The monthly reports seem generally positive, but the information is limited, and I feel somewhat in the dark. Unfortunately, any emails I’ve sent asking questions for clarification or additional details have gone unanswered.
And this isn't the primary tipoff that there is something seriously wrong? You're getting monthly reports that have little data but lots of positive fluff, and when you try to ask a question or request actual information, you get shrugged off. What exactly do these people need to do to alert you that they've stolen or frittered away all your money, send a certified letter?
I’m hearing AVAF2 is facing significant distress m including a major capital call, with the “upside” being a 75% loss instead of a total wipeout. I'm trying to get a clear read on how AVAF1 compares in terms of exposure and overall outlook. So far, I haven’t been able to get a straight answer on whether principal has been impaired, or to what extent.
I’m hearing AVAF2 is facing significant distress m including a major capital call, with the “upside” being a 75% loss instead of a total wipeout. I'm trying to get a clear read on how AVAF1 compares in terms of exposure and overall outlook. So far, I haven’t been able to get a straight answer on whether principal has been impaired, or to what extent.
When was AVAF1 deployed / which deals are in there? People like myself on this forum can give you informal sense of value / status with that info
Ashcroft made a number of buys not only at the peak, but at the peakiest prices. A portfolio they bought from Atlantic Pacific in ATL & TX immediately comes to mind, although presume that’s the 2nd fund.
Let me try to explain why AVAF1 is in so much trouble as of now:
All properties in the fund are worth less now than what they were acquired for as cap rates have increased significantly from 2021 to now. One property was already sold at a significant loss, and soon a second property will need to be sold at a significant loss as the second capital call appears to have been a failure.
If all assets in AVAF1 were sold today, all class B investors would receive $0. This is clear because of bullet 1 above and also because there are two classes of investors now ahead of Class B in the capital stack - Class A and preferred equity. Remember, nearly $50M of preferred equity was added to the capital stack at the time of the first capital call. The preferred equity will get paid back first, and I believe they also need to receive their 12% annual return.
The only hope for Class B investors to receive any money back is for cap rates to decline significantly between now and 2029 when the fixed rate loans mature on the 3 properties that were refinanced. The NOI of these properties would need to increase significantly as well. As more time passes, this is growing increasing unlikely. A significant decline in interest rates could cause such a decrease in cap rates, but there's not much indication of a significant decline in interest rates at this point.
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I think I got dumber for watching that video. I love how they say rate locks are more expensive for some reason and it was unexpected. Ashcroft seems like a terrible operation if they keep paying inflated rate lock fees. These guys milked all the investors in the last 10 years and are now trying to maintain their status quo. See the recent "multifamily syndicators are scum" thread
They were saying rate caps were more expensive, not rate locks
They should probably coordinate their talking points next time.
Person A: Operations are solid
Person B: Properties in Atlanta have been impacted by bad debt and slow leasing. As a result, are underperforming expectations.
Person A: We don't anticipate a capital call
Person B: Properties will likely require additional capital for upcoming deferred maintenance
Ahh yes, the typical good sponsor bad sponsor play. 50% of the time it works all of the time.
Aren't the class A shares already quasi preferred equity? In the Ashcroft fund 3, class A is a 9% coupon with no upside. Good luck getting approval from two class investors to place additional preferred equity on top of the existing preferred equity class. If I was a class A investor and assuming it has priority positioning over class B, I'd be forcing a sale.
If I was in Class A I would be forcing class dilution and taking over the GP's equity stake. The only way to save this is to run those fuckers out of town becuase they are 100% still fee milking this. The Class B shareholders are going to be pissed but if I was them I would rather have people with skills running the ship.
Fuck does anyone have shareholder lists for these groups? I smell an opportunity for an activist play. Buyout the scared investors and gut these idiots.
100% correct. Unfortunately, these investors are unlikely to be this savvy and probably don't have any idea how much equity has been lost.
Lol this isn’t an institutional deal. Class A is made up of many people. There is no way, even if they have the right, that they can band together to ‘kick out the GP.’
That was the dumbest call ever
Literally anyone who invested in that fund kiss your equity goodbye
“We have options like taking on Pref Equity”
said that in a cheery way too
Obviously they're in a bad spot, but since I'm more junior just want to confirm for the future - regarding rate increases they should've had more cushion to deal with these issues, rate cap increases happened but again should've been aware of that and asked for more money up front? As an investor I'm sure you can say you should've known as the RE operator, but you also invested in the deal.
What are rebuttals you as an investor can say in the situation to the issues they're facing as a they should've been prepared? Or at this point is it more about knowing not to put anymore money in and where you can push for a sale and never invest with them again?
I guess it's also they've seen the run up the last 10 years, they know these deals could fuck over investors but didn't care since they were getting fees? Now when they're in trouble they want the investors to put in more money to maybe bail them out?
Yes and no. Reg D filings need more regulation from the SEC. Most of the investors were promised something ridiculous and they fell for it. Yes they're partially to blame but most of these investors are not knowledgeable. The syndicators have built their business on retail investors being clueless. When you can have an 18 year old spend a $1k in filing fees and then raise money for real estate projects with no experience, there has to be better oversight. The SEC has took their foot off the pedal here and i think the rate increases will decimate most of these multifamily syndicators.
Why? I said this on another thread, but why do we as a society have an obligation to protect greedy fools from the consequences of their actions? If someone is deliberately lying or running a fraud that only a federal investigator is well placed enough to detect or stop? By all means, lets crack down on that. Just because someone promises pie in the sky returns doesn't make them a fraudster, it just means the people investing with them are stupid and greedy, and neither of those are or should be protected classes.
The government should not be our savior. I think this is a very weak position to take. In a democratic society built on capitalism, these things happen. Not all times are good times and we (those who lost $) can learn from this
I edited some statements because I’m trying to be nicer.
I mean if it's true about the rate cap they bought initially, that's early 2021 late 2020 pricing (assuming a $50/60MM ish deal, right?). I'm a young AM guy so naturally pessimistic but who the hell was thinking in 2020/2021 that rate caps were going to explode to the degree they did? Not defending them but legitimately curious as well what they should have done, keeping in mind that hindsight is 20/20 blah blah blah
They can't be faulted for not foreseeing an increase in rate cap costs. No one did and if someone says otherwise, they're dumb for investing in real estate and not trading fixed income. HOWEVER, they are 100% at fault for not realizing that we were very late cycle and that 80% LTV debt fund execution + preferred equity on 1970s vintage assets is extremely risky.
Surprised about this one.....Joe Fairless always talked a big game.
We should have a Syndicator Death Watch thread.
This man did not just say that a hard landing recession would lead to a recovery in the capital markets & higher valuations. I'm out.
This was biggest red flag in my eyes too..
He's admitting how screwed they are unless rates plummet.
Yes, of course. But so many of these sponsors came into the industry post GFC and seem to want to ignore what capital markets & asset values truly did during these times of economic crisis. Sure, short rates may fall but their asset's underlying fundamentals (& possibly credit spreads) will be fucked. These dudes are rate traders w/ no counter cycle experience.
In early 2020, I went to a syndicators conference in Colorado. Most of the big names were there including the Ashcroft team. The amount of inexperience among the operators was very apparent especially given the nature of the topics of discussion. The entire event felt like an MLM show (echoing the idea that everyone can be successful in multi as long as they do XYZ; strong emphasis on marketing). One of the key takeaways was that everyone was chasing asset value appreciation and pitching "passive cash flow". Most of the attendees were mainly concerned about getting the most amount of leverage available and were confused about why anyone would want to borrow Life Company financing. Even back then, right before Covid, many operators were looking for floating rate financing to take advantage of the yield curve.
I would say that the idea that a light-moderate recession could be good for Multi is plausible. Here are some thoughts:
1) If a recession were to occur, it would occur because of the rapid climb in rates. In theory fundamentals are solid, hence why GDP growth is still going strong despite the drastic increase in rates.
2) CRE (multi especially so) is largely a leveraged finance play. It is acutely affected by interest rates, much more than most other industries.
3) If we were hit by a recession, presumably rent growth would slow (it's already pretty much at 0), vacancy rates may increase (which is plausible given lack of new supply coming online 1+ years from now and people still need a place to live), capital markets would dry up a bit (but life cos and agencies will still be lending). However, Debt Service constraints would diminish quite a bit which would lead to much better economics for multifamily properties assuming vacancy and rental rates aren't severely impacted (which even in 2008, they were not) and assuming that spreads don't blow out significantly
These guys are toast. Why not be honest with the investors and stop throwing good money after bad?
Losing the deals because you didn't understand the market is one thing but throwing away more good money is terrible.
The government should have 0 obligation to police private investments like this RE: above post.
Excessive regulations have already cut off high quality growth companies from public markets. Look at the huge and sad drop in the amount of companies going public decade after decade.
Now they want to put a collar on private markets because some greedy idiot gave his money to an obviously inexperienced "investor".
The cynic in me is that there aren't enough quality private companies to actually make it in public markets because public markets see straight through bull shit and demand profit at a certain point. Most private companies that have grown to unicorn status are just a pray growth continues forever and maybe we'll figure out how to be profitable at some point.
Bingo! You fucking nailed it!
I have worked with many private real estate operating companies who plan on going public. But once they begin to comprehend the compliances and legal standards of being a REIT, they do a 180-degree turn and run for the hills.
This isn't even a cynical take. It's the truth. Most of the "tech" companies that have defined entrepreneurship for the last two decades are, essentially, scams. WeWork is a perfect example, for many reasons. It's just a vibe, a fun idea that people threw endless piles of cash at in the hopes it would be the next Facebook, and even when it was obvious it wasn't, people kept burning money because they hoped to pass the buck to naive retail investors and get their money out before the whole house of cards came down.
How many "disruptors" can you name that are actually profitable? Or have a path to it? Almost none of them. Which is why none of them go public, because once you have to stand up and say "we don't make money and never will" it's impossible to keep the fiction alive that any of this shit is a good idea.
Companies that actually perform a service or produce a good and make a profit doing it will still go public. Unfortunately for efficient allocation of capital, pretty much everything to come out of Silicon Valley in the last 15 years isn't and never will be profitable. Even the "success" stories, like Uber, aren't and will never be particularly profitable (and yes I know Uber just posted its first profitable year, but that sort of underlines my point).
They talk about rate caps but they don't talk about cap rates. They also don't mention that the deals are under water and that the naked dscr is probably 0.6x DSCR.
What's naked DSCR? Saw the article below across the fund they're at 1.28x DSCR right now.
Not sure if anyone saw TRD update - https://therealdeal.com/national/2023/11/02/multifamily-firm-ashcroft-p…
Oh wow. Momma I made it on the TRD
who's on your profile pic?
Does anyone feel that this "Joe" character is an AI bot?
Curious if things have changed for Ashcroft and other firms like them? Can they recover, I saw they got $50mm in funding recently and bought two new deals in the last 4 months. Isn't this a bad time to buy? Thoughts on the overall firm pedigree and if they will survive? Always see that bingo book and noticed firms like Carroll which I thought had a great rep.
Other comments aside, what makes you say isn’t this a bad time to buy?
When is Rise 48 going under?
They have a big social media push but oat of their deals must be dead by now.
I’ve been wondering the same thing especially since they have a “debt” (rescue?) fund as well
they'll be using their rescue fund to recap the good deals in their portfolio. original investors will get wiped. rise will roll its equity since it controls the new LP. the really bad deals will be lost but the enterprise will survive.
They sent this to their LPs. Pretty brutal and just sounds like kicking the can and hoping for a market bailout
As communicated in previous updates, we have dedicated months to discussions with lenders and potential partners to refinance, restructure, and stabilize the debt of the AVAF1 portfolio. Our goal is to address three major factors:
How do we achieve this?
Fortunately, after months of negotiating, we’ve secured a path to address all three factors, that will require a successful capital call of 19.7% and partnering with a strategic capital partner.
This is Ashcroft’s first capital call, and while it’s regrettable to take this step, our primary focus remains safeguarding your investment. Therefore, all LPs must participate, including ourselves, with our collective co-investments of $3m. As a gesture of our ongoing commitment, we will extend a $1M note payable at 0% interest upon the successful conclusion of the capital call (details below).
AVAF1 is comprised of assets that are poised for a strong rebound in value as markets improve. This is due to the institutional quality of assets and the high-growth markets in which they were acquired. Moreover, demand and absorption rates are currently at 25-year highs and are continuing to trend in that direction with a 70% reduction in new construction permits and drop off in deliveries in early 2025.
Our strategic partner will help us refinance the 3 largest loans in the portfolio into fixed rate debt, which will lower the blended cost of the floating rate debt. This also significantly reduces the total floating rate debt from $400M down to $265M. We will maintain flexibility on the other 5 properties to sell or refinance as markets improve. In the meantime, the fund will need to cover rate caps costs and restart renovations.
Why is a capital call necessary?
As your partners we believe that when we say we have aligned interests, our decisions and actions should reflect that. Here are some actions we have and/or are taking:
How is this solution structured?
I. Capital call of 19.7% of your initial investment.
II. A refinance into fixed debt on our 3 largest loans while simultaneously lowering the interest rate.
III. Strategic partner will provide approximately $48mm in preferred equity to buy down current loans and refinance over $165M into fixed rate debt which removes 41% of current floating rate debt exposure.
IV. Your 19.7% capital call contributions will accrue at the current coupon rate of 10% for Class A or 7% for Class B.
V. When you fully participate in this capital call (19.7%), we intend on providing you with the opportunity to profit from GP positions in a future offering* outside of the AVAF1.
*The specific offering will be chosen at the discretion of the GP, should such an opportunity arise.
Due to the above, we have created a solution that is best suited to preserve capital and offer the opportunity to still deliver a strong return once the market valuations stabilize.
We anticipate returning your called capital within 24 months of investment
Please note, we evaluated several options before arriving at this solution, bolstering our confidence in the chosen path forward as we explored each alternative. For context, here are three among several others:
Larger capital call without a preferred partner: This would have required a 32% capital call from you, insufficient to refinance any properties. Sell One or Two Now to Avoid Capital Call: While this might mitigate ongoing costs of rate caps, it would leave us vulnerable to failing lender requirements for necessary extension tests in mid-2024. Selling All Properties Now: This would incur significant capital losses. Class B would face a total loss, while Class A would recover only approx. 71% of the original investment.
"Give us 19.7% more money so that it can sit behind preferred equity at 12.75% which has priority over your initial investment and the 19.7% that you just provided." No thank you.
Where will Class A, Class B, and new equity sit? Here's the difficulty of these A and B structures - it's impossible for Ashcroft to act in the best interest of both classes. They've openly just admitted that Class B is wiped out and Class A is 71% of initial investment. If new capital (lets call is class C) sits ahead of Class A, Class A is wiping out their remaining 71%. If the Class C (new capital) does not sit ahead of Class A, the new capital is instantly gone once it's contributed.
Preferred equity, new capital, class A, class B - Any way you want to spin it, Class B is wiped out.
So in general for a capital call this new equity always has a lower priority in the same bucket than the initial investment (since going in as LP equity and not as a different structure like more pref or a mezz structure)? Have never dealt with a capital call before.
Also sent one out for individual syndications as well: https://www.biggerpockets.com/forums/960/topics/1185204-ashcroft-capita…
I haven't really dealt with capital calls and term modifications like this, but for the investors isn't not participating the obvious choice?
Sure. But you have to remember that these guys are basically out here scamming grandma out of her savings, not dealing with institutional partners or people with real estate knowledge/experience. So they're going to bully a bunch of naive rubes into participating, and their marks may not even know that not participating is a choice.
"Maintaining Lender Requirements & Loan Covenants: We (Joe & Frank) will consistently support you and our other investors through both favorable and challenging times. We’ve already extended a $11M interest-free short-term loan to cover various unexpected expenses, including the replacement rate caps over the past 12 months. While this was meant as a temporary solution, it must be repaid promptly to maintain compliance with loan agreements and ensure adequate liquidity across our Ashcroft portfolio."
Could this loan technically be pushed out and Joe/Frank put in more equity to maintain compliance? Seems they're saying we're here for you but oh wait we need our $11mm loan back asap so they get out of bad deals and the kicker is their loan is higher priority than the LPs who are putting in more $.
100%
I thought that sounded fishy. Thanks for confirming.
I like how they offer to get rid of their terrible IRR based waterfall like it's a concession to the LPs when they have no chance of hitting them.
So Frank and Joe had $11M of cash liquidity between the two of them? That's the real head scratcher. Unless I am naive and these scummy syndicators have all made 8 figures during their acquisition spree pre-2022?
A few questions underlined below on their points:
"As your partners we believe that when we say we have aligned interests, our decisions and actions should reflect that. Here are some actions we have and/or are taking:
On the GP participation - I think they're saying they'll let you invest in a GP entity on an unrelated deal, not GP profits on these current deals.
Frank & Joe turn to Neil & Bob.
Forget the syndicator bingo, WWE should schedule a Survivor Series style elimination match with all these jabronis.
Sean and Ryan from Tides
Neil & Bob from Ashcroft
Zach & Zach's wife from Rise48
Ellie & her Pomeranian from Blue Lake (by the way, we should start a separate thread of this train wreck)
Who else?
Blue Lake has always been an anomaly to me. Do tell! How have they been able to go from owning nothing to acquiring $75MM+ projects?
Like a lot of the "weekend warrior" syndicators out there that are heavy on marketing and light on experience, they use a number of Co-GP "feeder funds" (note that I'm using that term generously, as they're just other syndicators) to tackle the raise with them. It wouldn't be uncommon to have a handful of these in any given equity raise.
Yes. Curious. Whats up w Blue Lake?
Rumor has it: her husband comes from major family money. I have heard any "class A" position or whatever the highest tier Blue Lake offers is taken by the in-laws.
I don't understand why they need a rate cap. These properties are stabilized. Why not just take fixed rate term debt? Wouldn't that be cheaper? Or they can't make DSCR at 6-7%, or whatever they rate they would get for a 3 year term?
They are likely sub 1.0 dscr at today’s fixed rate equivalent. When loan to values are likely 100% at todays prices, they would like require a significant cash infusion to refi into fixed rate debt.
That's what I figured. I don't get why didn't they take term debt when interest rates were half of what they are now? Did they just want more leverage and and even lower floating rate?
And, as the email alludes: they went in on bridge debt, so even outside of DSCR, the current LTV would likely result in need to buy down the loan before any fixed rate could be swapped out.
So who's participating in the capital call?
Check bigger pockets, seems that's where the retail investors are at. There's a link to a post there higher up in this thread.
Yo OP - you got a link to the call they had today? :)
I received this info today from Ashcroft when I asked what happens if I don’t participate in the capital call as a class A investor. Thoughts?
Class A participation:
· If a Class A shareholder doesn’t participate what happens to their position?
o Class A shareholders who do not participate will drop down in the capital stack, and will now sit behind those who do contribute to the capital call.
o If you don't make the capital call your LP Percent ownership will be diluted proportionately. In this case, because the capital call is 19.7% your ownership will decrease by 16.5%. Please note that if the fund sells for less than the capital call and original class A equity, you would receive less of your original investment than other Class A investors due to this dilution. More to the point, if a successful capital call is not met the fund will unfortunately have to sell assets at today's heightened interest rates which would result in significant loss of invested capital.
· When you participate as a Class A investor here is how it benefits you
o If you participate in the capital call, your capital call dollars will now sit in a priority position above your originally invested capital. This new equity funded through the capital call will also receive the Preferred Coupon rate of 10% in a priority position to your originally invested capital.
o We anticipate returning your called capital within 24 months of funding.
o Without a successful capital call we are at risk of a partial loss of Class A capital by being forced to sell into an inopportune market.
I'm not putting this lightly. Class A investors need to sue and either force a sale or wipe out Class B while accepting new preferred equity. Legally, they should be in the driver seat here. This is exactly the problem with Class A and Class B structures being managed by a single entity. It's impossible to act in the best interest of both share classes. All investors were screwed over by bad investments but Class B equity is gone, forever, not coming back. Class A investors are being completely screwed over by this capital call, a deliberate act by the sponsor.
Reason being, Ashcroft initially stated that if sold today, Class A investors would lose 29% of their initial capital. Not great but much better than Class B and that additional safety is the reason you invest in Class A. Now, Ashcroft is taking away the Class A priority position in the capital stack and forcing them to contribute more capital or else lose 16.5% of their initial capital through dilution or contribute which will put 119.7% of your initial investment at risk and behind a larger preferred equity provider. They're essentially holding Class A hostage but if you're a Class A investor, you have rights.
If this was an outside controlled preferred equity partner, I can guarantee they would not be accepting either of these options. They would be evaluating two options:
1) Selling and licking your wounds with a 29% loss.
2) Wiping out Class B and continuing with an outside preferred equity partner. Class A would essentially be the new common equity in this scenario and receive any, and all, upside in the future. Whereas, the Ashcroft proposal requires Class A to contribute while still leaving Class B intact. In some miracle scenario where the market has a monster rally, you're telling me that Class A still just receives their initial capital and 10% while Class B receive the additional upside? I don't think so. I don't care how unlikely the scenario of a monster rally is, I would never agree to it as Class A, nor would an outside preferred equity provider.
I don't know how much more clear I can be to Class A investors in this fund. You are willingly allowing yourself to be taken advantage of in this situation if you do not fight. The response might be that these control rights for Class A are not included in the operating agreement which they probably aren't but guess what, Ashcroft raised a fund with two equity share classes and they are required to act in the best interest of their equity investors which as I stated earlier, is impossible to do in this scenario and because of this, gives Class A legal standing. It may even subject Ashcroft to recourse.
I'm a little unfamiliar with how the various classes work and why having the sponsor controlling it vs a different party is not a great structure for the LP who entered into either class. Do you mind expanding on that?
The capital call deadline was 5/20 and.as of today only 49% of investors have funded. They extended the deadline. As a class A investor in the fund, it appears it’s in my best interest for the cc to not to go through.
As class A, beware of what they might attempt next by either 1) using full their fund 3 bridge the gap and effectively take over the deals and/or 2) bringing in additional, more riskier preferred equity which will surely lose the rest of your capital.
I’m pretty certain using funds from Fund 3 to bridge gaps in Fund 1 is illegal. Bringing in another equity partner is an interesting threat I guess it all depends on what they are willing to do to avoid the appearances of defeat. I am so done with them.
I recall reading about a sponsor starting a fund or a REITs recently and the assumption is they’ll use them to provide rescue capital to their struggling portfolio. Not opining on the legality of it, only that I wouldn’t be surprised to see it.
From what I read on BiggerPockets, they told another investor that they're around 64% of capital in hand and 88% committed. Once the deadline passed, they opened up the capital call offering to any existing investors. Next step will definitely be to all investors in their network, whether that's fund 3 or individuals. If I was Class A, I would 100% be filing a lawsuit to stop this process and forcing a sale to get my 70% remaining principal. Strong chance your 70% becomes 0% with the two layers of pref (third party pref & capital call pref) coming in.
Here is the latest:
We would again like to thank all investors who have funded the AVAF1 Capital Call. Since our last update, funding is currently at $14.8M, a $1.6M increase in just 2 days. We would also like to thank those who have requested to acquire additional equity from diluted investors who did not fund the capital call. With positive trends in both funding, and additional contributions, we continue to track towards a successful capital call.
Well 14.8 million is more than the 11 million loan Frank and Joe will take back right away so it was somewhat successful for the two principals. How the net 3.8 million helps against hundreds of millions of dollars of maturing debt etc. is less certain.
Any idea who the strategic partner is?
As we predicted, fund one still in trouble after raising millions in capital call and now Fund 2 and some others having their own Capital call. Does anyone have a link to the video for the new capital calls?
Bump - interested
VAPRSN - Why do you say AVAF1 is still in trouble? I’m an investor in the fund, but I’ve been having a hard time getting a clear picture of its current status. The monthly reports seem generally positive, but the information is limited, and I feel somewhat in the dark. Unfortunately, any emails I’ve sent asking questions for clarification or additional details have gone unanswered.
And this isn't the primary tipoff that there is something seriously wrong? You're getting monthly reports that have little data but lots of positive fluff, and when you try to ask a question or request actual information, you get shrugged off. What exactly do these people need to do to alert you that they've stolen or frittered away all your money, send a certified letter?
cooked
I’m hearing AVAF2 is facing significant distress m including a major capital call, with the “upside” being a 75% loss instead of a total wipeout. I'm trying to get a clear read on how AVAF1 compares in terms of exposure and overall outlook. So far, I haven’t been able to get a straight answer on whether principal has been impaired, or to what extent.
When was AVAF1 deployed / which deals are in there? People like myself on this forum can give you informal sense of value / status with that info
Ashcroft made a number of buys not only at the peak, but at the peakiest prices. A portfolio they bought from Atlantic Pacific in ATL & TX immediately comes to mind, although presume that’s the 2nd fund.
Let me try to explain why AVAF1 is in so much trouble as of now:
All properties in the fund are worth less now than what they were acquired for as cap rates have increased significantly from 2021 to now. One property was already sold at a significant loss, and soon a second property will need to be sold at a significant loss as the second capital call appears to have been a failure.
If all assets in AVAF1 were sold today, all class B investors would receive $0. This is clear because of bullet 1 above and also because there are two classes of investors now ahead of Class B in the capital stack - Class A and preferred equity. Remember, nearly $50M of preferred equity was added to the capital stack at the time of the first capital call. The preferred equity will get paid back first, and I believe they also need to receive their 12% annual return.
Damn these dudes can barely put a sentence together. Goes to show that anybody could raise money back then.
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