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Yea I mean, I agree I'm sure it's tough at MS to get that kind of stuff done - this was more my "out-there" prediction. 

There's a TON of HNW and UHNW personal wealth management accounts from founders who exited and just kept all accounts with SVB. I think that a reputable firm with strong PWM arm like yours or GS would be interested in taking a look.  I would at least expect the lights to be on at 1585 and 200 West this weekend, whether Gorman or Solomon actually pull the trigger is something else entirely. 

 
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SVB was never a shitty bank. It was always very respected. The above comments captured the situation by calling it a "perfect storm".

“SVB was never a shitty bank”

dude are you high? They had $200bn of assets and went into receivership within 2 days

that is the definition of a shitty bank - they are the largest blow up since 2009

edit: of course you’re a consultant

 

May not be "unemployed" atm but payroll is going to seize up real fast. Someone needs to step up and make moves to get acquired unless they all want to go down.

 

We are currently employed. I would suspect we are acquired as a standalone entity. Or spun out and sponsored. I do not know for sure.

 

I work on a rates desk. Multiple banks across the street have exposure with them, but that is not the real issue here. The real issue is that people are realizing all of these banks had extremely low funding costs for a long time by way of deposits and invested in long dated assets that are now shit (yield on SVBs MBS portfolio was like 1.56% aka dogshit). SVB was the first one but it is possible that there are more that have ran the same strategy albeit with likely less growth. This is where contagion could happen. All the BSDs in capital markets have been on calls all day trying to figure out which banks we cut off and where else we might have exposure. I hope it ends here but at this point it is anyone’s guess.

 

I just spent my morning running an analysis on several key bank partners (luckily, looks like we're all good) and digging through regulatory reports.

The key piece seems to be that SVB had a ton of securities (long-dated treasuries and MBS) marked as held-to-maturity, which meant they didn't have to mark to market. These things all got wrecked because interest rates have gone up - the FV adjustments (you can find them in the 10-K, etc.) exceeded SVB's equity. So, the moment they had to sell you saw all those losses coming due and wiping out equity. It became a prisoner's dilemma for accountholders - yeah, if you don't pull your money and no one else does, SVB weathers the storm; but on the other hand, if people start pulling deposits you don't want to end up at the back of the queue.

Looks like just about every other banks have taken a walloping on the FV adjustments on long-dated stuff, but (i) their exposure to these securities wasn't as bad (ii) deposits remained steady or even grew (iii) they classified their securities as available-to-sell, so they had already absorbed the losses, from an accounting perspective, and remained solvent.

Wacky stuff.

 

I also don’t think startups are fucked (minus any issues related to having funds with SVB). Was really an SVB specific problem. Startup valuations aren’t down all that much, and there’s a ton of dry powder, plus startups raised tons of cash in ‘21. Startups are however bleeding cash, so these down rounds should start very soon, especially if they’re having trouble getting their deposits back. 

 

Valuations aren’t down because they haven’t had to raise down rounds …. Yet. Lot of startups has 100% exposure to SVB cash deposits and their LPs / GPs had a ton of exposure too. If you’re not making payroll next week (because your Vc isnt bailing you out if they have 100 portcos in the same spot and their cash is tied up), then your employees are leaving next Friday on payday. People don’t realize how much financial leverage there is in the system with a 5% reserve requirement. Money multiplier effect is very, very real (especially in a concentrated industry) and the reverse of the multiplier is very true as well on the contraction

 

Very good points. It’s not like these funds are inaccessible though, correct? VCs and startups can get at least a large portion of their funds back soon I would think. If you look at proxies for what startups are valued at, they’re not in awful shape, though. Although that’s fair that it’s hard to say if the round hasn’t happened. 

 

That's a terrible rating for a bank as an FYI. Anything below an A for a company that regulated is pretty suspect.

BBB is still investment grade. Is it a turn worse that the average national bank (A rated). Pretty in line with other regional banks. Nevertheless, BBB is not a rating you give to a speculative bank servicing a speculative part of the market (startups). Definitely not the rating you give to an undercapitalized bank with any tangible possibility of default.  One agency actually just upgraded them to A- last quarter too after doing a wholistic review with non-public information. Even if BBB is worse than the average bank, it did not reflect the credit risk/profile of SVB accurately and that should be quite clear. 

 

Not how it works I think.

Banks have to say upfront how they account for their bonds. If categorised as AFS then mark to market. If HTM then not. Cant start selling HTM before maturity without having to mtm the whole bunch (=wipe out the equity).

So it’s really a treasury / cash flow planning question: AFS portfolio needs to cover ST needs alongside normal maturity of the HTM portfolio.

If everyone runs & bank needs to start selling from the HTM portfolio: game over.

Also, if your portfolio has 10 year duration, not only do you take a 10% loss (=2x your equity at 5% capital ratio), but you’re short on liquidity to face your claims as you’re selling at a discount.

Monday will be interesting, every bank around is going to start putting out statement explaining how their own HTM portfolio is immaterial in size relative to SVB (which is probably true TBH)

 

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