EBITDA vs. ARR multiples for SaaS

What kind of multiples is used by buyout and growth equity investors (e.g., Hg Capital, Summit Partners, TA Associates) to value SaaS companies? Do they only rely on EBITDA multiples just like for "traditional business models" or use ARR/revenue multiples as well?

Looking at the cash flow profile of SaaS companies, some might be EBITDA negative, but operating cash flow positive thanks to up-front collections on annual contracts. Besides, looking at the public market, looks like there's a strong correlation between the ARR and the market cap; and some EBITDA multiples just sound outlandish (cf. Workday being valued > 1000x EBITDA).

Any insights from practitioners or SaaS specialists would be more than welcome. Thanks!  

6 Comments
 

It's kind of an either or thing; cash burning companies will use an ARR multiple, cash flow positive will use a cash adjusted EBITDA. There's kind of a no man's land where companies go from unprofitable to profitable (or break even to profitable) and a lot of firms that specialize there; buy on arr sell off ebitda 

To your point on might be operating cash flow positive while ebitda negative, sure that’s true and that’s a classic cash ebitda adjustment but if you’re at the break even ish point anyway it’s like you’ll be valued on arr 

 

It's obviously case-by-case, but what I see (as a growth equity investor) is that software businesses with 25%+ EBITDA margins will trade on EBITDA multiples, and below that the banker will usually guide buyers to a revenue or ARR multiple. That being said, even for highly profitable businesses the revenue/ARR multiple is relevant and often quoted.

When looking at a deal we'll look at both, assuming the company generates meaningful EBITDA.

 
Most Helpful

I'm not expert in SaaS but a few thoughts I would like to contribute:

1) typical SaaS model is long-term 75%+ gross margins and 20%+ operating margins. at an early / growth stage you'll likely be spending 100%+ of revenue on the SG&A / R&D growth portion and then tease out the operating leverage to get to positive EBITDA. in this early stage you'll see companies forcibly valued off of TEV / revenue as the EBITDA is negative. in today's environment, it's quite normal to see > 10x TEV / revenue. this is the most common used valuation measure... take a look at all the $3-15bn SaaS / platform tech companies out there this year.

2) the issue is that revenue is often a trailing 12 months indicator and so some will adjust to use ARR or the run-rate form of the past quarter to be more current. so you might see TEV / ARR multiples. even then, ARR is still stale compared to a leading indicator like billings, bookings or RPOs. so TEV/bookings is another possibility.

3) some companies it's more appropriate in terms of benchmarking to value off of operational KPIs. so you might see TEV/MAU or TEV/clicks or TEV / GMV for platforms such as ABNB / Afterpay / etc.

4) as you get to later stage you will see FCF (CFO less capex) break even and once that becomes stabilized at say 25%+ revenue margin, you'll see a P / FCF or FCF yield on price being used (barely any debt is used in public SaaS so TEV effectively = market cap with net cash position). or you'll see the typical TEV/EBITDA multiple. then it becomes another vanilla / conventional multiple valuation exercise.

Array
 

Corrupti natus laudantium nam et corporis mollitia. Incidunt dolores vitae voluptatem corporis nemo similique maxime. Nemo laudantium optio placeat qui. Earum vitae et sit sit. Quod enim itaque porro. Corporis numquam est provident molestias commodi voluptatem. Ea nobis qui molestiae repudiandae adipisci at qui aut. Cupiditate debitis omnis accusamus id placeat.

Illum dolorem quo ut nihil nulla iste nemo. Non fugiat nihil sunt vero. Praesentium ea est sint assumenda.

Dolorem recusandae voluptatem eligendi harum. Ad dolorem rerum consequuntur dolores et eligendi. Reiciendis autem enim quidem nemo qui. Est voluptas a occaecati asperiores dolorem ipsam modi.

Repellat accusamus ut eaque hic. Et illo occaecati debitis nam sint. Eum iure dolor maxime nisi fugiat magni nemo aut. Non et natus ut et provident ut molestiae. Eaque nihil officia non non maxime ut fuga. Aperiam provident autem hic laborum architecto qui. Nam et tempore natus rerum aut quo.

Career Advancement Opportunities

May 2026 Private Equity

  • The Riverside Company 99.6%
  • KKR (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts) 99.2%
  • Blackstone Group 98.9%
  • Warburg Pincus 98.5%
  • Bain Capital 98.1%

Overall Employee Satisfaction

May 2026 Private Equity

  • KKR (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts) 99.6%
  • The Riverside Company 99.2%
  • Ardian 98.9%
  • Blackstone Group 98.5%
  • Starwood Capital Group 98.1%

Professional Growth Opportunities

May 2026 Private Equity

  • Bain Capital 99.6%
  • The Riverside Company 99.2%
  • Blackstone Group 98.9%
  • Starwood Capital Group 98.5%
  • KKR (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts) 98.1%

Total Avg Compensation

May 2026 Private Equity

  • Principal (9) $653
  • Director/MD (24) $547
  • Vice President (97) $363
  • 3rd+ Year Associate (104) $281
  • 2nd Year Associate (234) $272
  • 1st Year Associate (411) $229
  • 3rd+ Year Analyst (33) $157
  • 2nd Year Analyst (95) $134
  • 1st Year Analyst (271) $124
  • Intern/Summer Associate (37) $80
  • Intern/Summer Analyst (351) $61
notes
16 IB Interviews Notes

“... there’s no excuse to not take advantage of the resources out there available to you. Best value for your $ are the...”

Leaderboard

1
redever's picture
redever
99.2
2
kanon's picture
kanon
99.0
3
Secyh62's picture
Secyh62
99.0
4
BankonBanking's picture
BankonBanking
99.0
5
DrApeman's picture
DrApeman
98.9
6
Betsy Massar's picture
Betsy Massar
98.9
7
CompBanker's picture
CompBanker
98.9
8
dosk17's picture
dosk17
98.9
9
GameTheory's picture
GameTheory
98.9
10
Jamoldo's picture
Jamoldo
98.8
success
From 10 rejections to 1 dream investment banking internship

“... I believe it was the single biggest reason why I ended up with an offer...”