What's A Good Balance For Inorganic and Organic Growth?

Any rule of thumb for PE folks looking at a potential investment and assessing the split between inorganic and organic growth? 

What thoughts come to your head when you see a company that has too much inorganic revenue vs organic revenue or vice versa?

13 Comments
 

When assessing the balance between inorganic and organic growth in a potential private equity investment, here are some key considerations based on the most helpful WSO content:

  1. Scrutinize Organic vs. Inorganic Growth:

    • Organic growth is generally more sustainable and reflects the company's ability to grow its core business without relying on acquisitions. It often indicates a strong business model, competitive positioning, and effective management.
    • Inorganic growth, driven by acquisitions, can be a red flag if it overshadows organic growth. It may suggest that the company is compensating for weaknesses in its core operations or lacks a clear path to sustainable growth.
  2. Red Flags with Too Much Inorganic Growth:

    • Companies with excessive inorganic growth may face challenges such as:
      • Integration risks from multiple acquisitions.
      • Difficulty in segregating the performance of the core business versus acquired entities.
      • Potential over-leverage due to debt-funded acquisitions.
    • It's crucial to determine the "true organic growth rate" of the platform company and assess whether the acquisitions are accretive or masking underlying issues.
  3. When Organic Growth Dominates:

    • A company with predominantly organic growth is often seen as more stable and less risky. However, if the growth rate is too slow, it may not meet the return expectations of private equity investors.
    • The focus should be on whether the organic growth is scalable and supported by strong industry tailwinds.
  4. Rule of Thumb:

    • There isn't a strict numerical rule, but a healthy balance is often preferred. A company with a mix of organic growth and strategic, well-integrated acquisitions can be attractive. The key is ensuring that inorganic growth complements and enhances the core business rather than compensating for its weaknesses.
  5. Key Questions to Ask:

    • What is the true organic growth rate of the business?
    • Are the acquisitions accretive, and do they align with the company's strategic goals?
    • How well has the company integrated past acquisitions, and what is the track record of success?
    • Does the industry support sustainable organic growth, or is inorganic growth necessary to remain competitive?

In summary, private equity investors should prioritize understanding the sustainability and quality of growth, whether organic or inorganic, and ensure that the company's strategy aligns with long-term value creation.

Sources: Private Equity: How to Analyze a CIM Effectively?, Private Equity Interview Questions - 13 Topics to Know, PE interview question - If you can only know 3 things for an investment analysis?, Thinking Like an Investor, Got this task during an Private Equity internship interview, how to handle it?

I'm an AI bot trained on the most helpful WSO content across 17+ years.
 

I think it depends a lot on end market (e.g., healthcare services roll-up versus SaaS versus industrials).

In SaaS-land, if I see too much inorganic, I usually assume (i) the core market is a slower grower and (ii) acquisitions might be loosely/minimally/sloppily integrated (which implies work and/or repositioning under my ownership and pro forma EBITDA is probably over-stated). 

 

Thanks SaaSChimp! Enterprise SaaS was actually one of the key industries I was thinking of when making the post. 

To dig in a little deeper and see if I fully understand, what do you mean by Pro Forma EBITDA is overstated? Like, you potentially think there are EBITDA adjustments that shouldn't have been adjusted out?

 

Perfect, yes. So their CIM/QoE probably could have a bunch of pro forma addbacks associated with cost savings (headcount consolidation, system reconciliation, etc.). 

You’d want to dig in on whether the synergies have been enacted (and addbacks are just adjusting trailing figures for timing) or upcoming still.  Platforms that have been moreso slapped together or unintegrated would be evidenced by a bunch of identified but unexecuted addbacks, which means it’s up to the buyer to finish the work. If it was so easy, the seller would’ve done it unless there’s some over-arching catalyst for an accelerated sale. 

 

I see. So then, to take that logic back to your original comment and tie it up. Is that why you said one of the things you could assume a company with low organic growth to inorganic revenue growth is sloppily integrated at face value? 

Because... after a SaaS add-on acquisition, you could assume that the combined enterprise SaaS platform company should gain some additional organic growth rate due to cross-sell and upsell synergies if you're not churning like a MFer. 

Therefore, a company with low organic to high inorganic revenue may indicate (assuming there are no issues with a slow-growing core market): 
i.) A need for further spending on integration for its previous add-ons during your holding period, and that the sell-side's EBITDA is overstated if it has already added back integration costs
ii.) There are inherent issues with the platform's ability to scale utilizing acquisitions because it was too hard for the previous owner to integrate them

 
Most Helpful

I'd actually go a different direction and just say that if the underlying platform (and its market) are so amazing, organic growth should be there. M&A can be great for adding scale, diversifying end markets, accelerating product roadmap, etc., but if growth is all inorganic, it probably implies that the underlying market is unhealthy or saturated, hence the heavy reliance on M&A (versus focusing on just growing the main business). That's all I was suggesting.

On top of that, you want to look out for these jam job roll-ups that we discussed above that rely so heavily on M&A that they just slap stuff together and it's a pile of unintegrated junk with a bunch of multiple arbitrage for the seller. That was my only point. Some of the "brands strategies" have anecdotally fallen in this camp (i.e., building moreso an umbrella organization with minimal integration versus a truly integrated, high-performing platform).

 

In services you would probably do your best during diligence to strip out the inorganic revenue to see what 'organic' revenue growth truly is. The sell-side will do their best to obsrcure / give excuses to not view it that way lol

Rarely is it a good business if you have too much inorganic revenue unless it's a roll-up strategy and even then you'll want to see SSS/YoY organic revenue increase  

 

I appreciate the input. I've definitely been in sell-side situations where we've downplayed the scale of inorganic growth relative to organic growth. Though I've never fully understood how a PE firm would diligence it, outside of looking at saying low organic growth = bad. 

Perhaps an immature question, but are there any rules of thumb when looking at inorganic vs organic revenue growth (e.g., an investor wanting 1.5x - 2.0x of inorganic/organic average annual revenue growth)? I guess what I'm really trying to glean is an investment framework when looking at CIMs

 

To answer your first question, we'd request the revenue and growth rates of the different business lines / units assuming they are still tracked separately (which they usually are if the acquisitions were done in the last 3-4 years).  

We'd also try to construct separate P&L's depending on if sum of the parts was part of the thesis (ie we were planning to sell off pieces of the biz).  This obv required separate diligence on each business line or product (I was in software / tech) and created a lot more work as you were effectively DD'ing multiple businesses.

 

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