Ares ASOF

Does anyone have any idea as to how good ASOF is considered (comp/returns/exits if its possible). People from my school have gone to the DL team as analysts and I know both teams take summer interns. How does ASOF compare in terms of learning experience and prestige? Also, how hard is it to get a return offer? Any insight is appreciated.

21 Comments
 

Based on the most helpful WSO content, Ares is highly regarded in the direct lending (DL) and alternative credit space. While specific details about ASOF (Ares Special Opportunities Fund) aren't explicitly mentioned in the context, here are some insights about Ares' broader reputation and structure that might help:

  1. Prestige and Learning Experience: Ares is considered a top-tier player in the direct lending space, often compared to firms like Golub and Antares. Ares stands out as the largest and most sophisticated, with a strong track record of generating impressive returns (e.g., 14% annual returns since inception for their DL group). The learning experience at Ares is robust, with due diligence processes that are close to private equity standards, albeit slightly lighter.

  2. Compensation and Returns: Ares' compensation is competitive, often in line with or above most middle-market private equity shops but below mega-fund private equity. Their funds, including private and BDC mandates, have raised tens of billions, showcasing their strong performance and market presence.

  3. Return Offers: Ares is known to provide analysts with offers to become associates once the traditional recruiting season begins, offering 2-4 years of job security. However, the culture at Ares can be demanding, with a focus on process, memo creation, and a narrow investment committee strike zone, which might influence the return offer process.

  4. Comparison to Other Teams: Ares' DL team is often highlighted as a powerhouse, with Golub being a slightly "watered-down" version in terms of pay and prestige. While ASOF isn't directly compared in the context, it's reasonable to assume that Ares' reputation for rigorous analysis and strong deal flow extends across its teams.

If you're considering ASOF, it would likely offer a strong learning experience and solid prestige, especially if you're interested in alternative credit or distressed opportunities. However, the return offer process and cultural fit might require careful consideration.

Sources: Lending/LevFin vs. MM IBD vs PE summer internships, , Ares Capital Management - Culture, Status, Word on the Street

I'm an AI bot trained on the most helpful WSO content across 17+ years.
 

It's called opp. credit now and recently moved to credit. IMO comp/exits similar to Bain Credit + SS, where comp is 220ish an1 and being in either credit or ss will give you good looks at a variety of exits across cap structure. 

Ares is pretty new on the SS side so materialized exits will be a bit harder to find, Fund III just raised at almost 10b so great trajectory there

 

ASOF has strong returns (unlevered btw) as well as fundraising

  • ASOF I ($3.5bn, 2019 vintage): 19% IRR / 1.8x MOIC / 1.2x DPI
  • ASOF II ($7.1bn, 2021 vintage): 18% IRR / 1.5x MOIC
  • ASOF III ($9.8bn, closed last month)

Return requirement is typically 15%+ IRR. Majority of portfolio is privates (pref equity, junior debt, debt+equity, etc) and ~30% is in publics (stressed/distressed debt with several years hold period).

There‘s around 35 investment professionals across LA, New York and London. The team is generalist so you work across all sectors and see a big variety of transactions.

 

Associate 2 in HF - Event

ASOF has strong returns (unlevered btw) as well as fundraising

  • ASOF I ($3.5bn, 2019 vintage): 19% IRR / 1.8x MOIC / 1.2x DPI
  • ASOF II ($7.1bn, 2021 vintage): 18% IRR / 1.5x MOIC
  • ASOF III ($9.8bn, closed last month)

Return requirement is typically 15%+ IRR. Majority of portfolio is privates (pref equity, junior debt, debt+equity, etc) and ~30% is in publics (stressed/distressed debt with several years hold period).

There‘s around 35 investment professionals across LA, New York and London. The team is generalist so you work across all sectors and see a big variety of transactions.

Super helpful - are those gross or net irr figures? Realized or unrealized? Thanks!

Array
 

Thank you. ASOF 1 returns are very strong. Do you know how they achieved it? Even if you do a lot of pref/ equity, pe returns themselves are barely clearing 15%. Is it a bump from good entry levels during covid in 2020?

Array
 

Many private deals have equity components, for example pref equity might be convertible, there might be warrants or some minority equity.

Then on the public side a lot of the deals are high IRR (sometimes with shorter hold period) and in several cases ASOF has meaningful post-restructuring equity positions (e.g Swissport).

And some Pref / PIK debt that has no equity upside can still be very lucrative (imagine 15% PIK, 3% OID, 1.75x Min MOIC and maybe an exit fee).

Overall, performance is good because of strong due diligence (very few losers in portfolio). You might have a small IRR boost from some good public deals in 2019 (Covid), but equally a lot of good publics in 2022 and the way the world is moving there may be some good opportunities on the horizon again.

Comparing ASOF with recent PE returns, the strategy benefits from being more senior in the capital structure and often not being exposed to the “hottest“ sectors where (in my view) there‘s a tendency to overpay (e.g. Software in 2021). There are also a lot of opportunities to provide capital to sponsors that cannot exit portcos. Equally though, would be very hard to achieve 30%+ IRR, which PE funds can in theory deliver. 
 

 
Most Helpful
  1. Their returns are largely mark to model (even their public stuff in many cases) and IRR for opportunistic credit isn’t a good metric. You can pump your IRR by drawing on sublime and trading in and out of positions (for publics). Would only look at MOIC and just annualize it for entire fund life. In any case older vintages did knock it out of the park, and they’ve capitalized on it to achieve great fundraising. I am much more pessimistic on things prospectively.
  2. “Long hold period” is a negative, not a positive in distressed or stressed public credit. It means you haven’t gotten the catalyst(s) you were betting on, and that the market doesn’t appreciate your fundamental view. So then, to salvage your investment, the thesis changes from “earnings will improve from trough and loan will go to low 90s as leverage goes down” to “post LME things will improve (after you’ve taken a haircut and accepted PIK)” to “we are in a cyclical trough but on mid cycle numbers we are covered through our create”. Have seen this a ton of time with low quality analysts and many low quality funds. Patience is rewarded / selling too soon is bad in equities, but in credit, when things work you go back to single B or higher and trade to par+ and let long only / clo buy your position (or you are refi’d into the bond or syndicated loan market). When they don’t work and you work at a political bureaucracy like ares, you just hodl and look away…
  3. Lack of losers is just not true. These guys aren’t running an Arini type book so fact that I know of a few off the top of my head is a sign they have had many blow ups. See Spirit or CSOD as just two.
  4. All that said it’s a great place to work and learn. But wouldn’t pump up the place as aggressively as people here have. If it were so good I wouldn’t see so many resumes from there, and I also would t find so many of their current employees to be duds (though to be fair they have some rockstars). 

    Finally on the cap solutions in privates they do, there are a number that have done well and they do have very good sourcing. 

    But the big issue is that the highest return pref / holdco deals are still horrible relative value to just buying public equities. Create on deals is about where public comps trade and you’re giving up a lot of upside, for not much downside protection. And needless to say, levered sponsor companies are almost always underinvested vs public peers. Financing those long held portcos w subordinated capital is basically the private markets equivalent of a Eminence Capital catch falling knife approach. Always have to ask — if the asset is as good as sponsor claims, why can’t they just sell or IPO (latter to delver + retain upside post offering). The answer is often not good.

 

Thank you so much for the reply, this is a helpful perspective

1. What makes you more pessimistic now? Is it more of, did well because of a few good plays (eg. Savers) and a select set of good opportunities, that are unlikely to repeat/scale with the larger fund size?

2. Is this generally true about credit vs equity? Debt trading at a discount is, more often than not, a short term play?

4. How would you think about working there from an analyst perspective instead of ib vs aso/post-banking? Is the main downside the smaller opportunity set for exits?

And as a response to the last point about privates. I definitely see the argument about creation multiple and public comps. But specifically the point about "why can't they sell, " is the counter argument not simply that there exist maybe low quality businesses (maybe its simply bad bs) but some offer good relative value with more unique/creative structuring? Of course, the counter argument to that is that these opportunities are few and far between, and thus, larger funds will have greater difficulties in exploiting them

Again, I appreciate the insight, would love to hear your thoughts on any of the above
 

 

Not critical all the time, but credit is naturally mean reverting. You either refi and get par, or you default/restructure. That happens usually in a short period of time in leveraged credit as tenors are generally short 5-7 years and the hair doesn’t occur in years 1-3 post issuance, usually.


 The whole premise of special situations investing is that there will be an event or events that create massive upside. There is are discrete problem(s) in business and they resolve and you trade to index spreads +/- once such problems have resolved. 

Even in a equitization scenario, sitting on your hands not seeing the price move is a bad sign. You should only hold the post reorg stock if you see material upside that, at very least, would outperform spx. This can be catalyzed via M&A, asset sales, capital markets activities, fundamental improvement that is concrete and substantial. These things usually don’t take many years in a special situations context where owners have taken the keys.

 

Yes, complement. Because they bet big, get some things very right and get others wrong. So when they are right enough of the time, the winners can offset the losers. 

This doesn’t work when a lot of the book is par high carry loans.

 

Voluptas voluptas quod aliquam magni ut voluptatum omnis. Doloremque error nam neque qui. Maiores error unde qui aut nesciunt eaque.

Saepe non dolores repellat eius eaque. Fugiat et et ut distinctio necessitatibus. Veniam sint et suscipit blanditiis voluptatem.

Blanditiis eius dolorem id nihil dolores. Nemo corporis aspernatur cumque nam ratione molestias ducimus in. Necessitatibus cum impedit ea consequatur nostrum. Quia vero similique deserunt corrupti illum repellendus voluptatem vel. Ut sit praesentium minima in possimus doloremque.

Career Advancement Opportunities

May 2026 Hedge Fund

  • Point72 99.0%
  • D.E. Shaw 98.1%
  • Citadel Investment Group 97.1%
  • AQR Capital Management 96.2%
  • Magnetar Capital 95.2%

Overall Employee Satisfaction

May 2026 Hedge Fund

  • Magnetar Capital 99.0%
  • Millennium Partners 98.1%
  • D.E. Shaw 97.1%
  • Blackstone Group 96.1%
  • Citadel Investment Group 95.1%

Professional Growth Opportunities

May 2026 Hedge Fund

  • AQR Capital Management 99.1%
  • Point72 98.1%
  • D.E. Shaw 97.2%
  • Citadel Investment Group 96.2%
  • Magnetar Capital 95.3%

Total Avg Compensation

May 2026 Hedge Fund

  • Portfolio Manager (9) $1,648
  • Vice President (27) $464
  • Director/MD (12) $423
  • NA (9) $320
  • Engineer/Quant (86) $288
  • 3rd+ Year Associate (26) $284
  • Manager (4) $282
  • 2nd Year Associate (32) $253
  • 1st Year Associate (76) $192
  • Analysts (240) $181
  • Intern/Summer Associate (28) $146
  • Junior Trader (5) $102
  • Intern/Summer Analyst (282) $96
notes
16 IB Interviews Notes

“... there’s no excuse to not take advantage of the resources out there available to you. Best value for your $ are the...”

Leaderboard

1
redever's picture
redever
99.2
2
kanon's picture
kanon
99.0
3
BankonBanking's picture
BankonBanking
99.0
4
Secyh62's picture
Secyh62
99.0
5
DrApeman's picture
DrApeman
98.9
6
Betsy Massar's picture
Betsy Massar
98.9
7
dosk17's picture
dosk17
98.9
8
CompBanker's picture
CompBanker
98.9
9
GameTheory's picture
GameTheory
98.9
10
bolo up's picture
bolo up
98.8
success
From 10 rejections to 1 dream investment banking internship

“... I believe it was the single biggest reason why I ended up with an offer...”