More negative press on Apollo

From Matt Levine this morning.  Does anyone have access to the full BI article?

Apollo

A few years back, there were a lot of stories about how the big investment banks were becoming nicer places to work. “Take the weekend off,” a lot of banks told their junior employees, “or at least, like, 36 contiguous hours off most weekends, from Friday night until Sunday morning, unless of course, you are on a live deal.” As a humanitarian and a lazy former investment banker, I thought these initiatives were nice, but they troubled me a bit. They do not fit the stereotype of how high finance works. The trade-off is supposed to be (1) you work all the time but (2) you get rich and become a master of the universe.

Of course, it was possible — quite reasonable, really — that today’s young people do not want that trade-off, and would prefer to have a more normal work-life balance while making a bit less money and mastering a bit less of the universe. But it was also possible that the real driving force behind the change was that the banks could no longer offer that trade. Banks were still hungover from the financial crisis, the regulation was crimping their ability to make a lot of money (and pay a lot of it to their people), and the tech industry was booming and seemed more lucrative and appealing to ambitious young people. The financial industry might have been constrained by outside circumstances to change its pitch to “come to investment banking, you won’t make a lot of money but at least you’ll get 36 hours off many weekends.” I don’t know that that’s a very good pitch!

You don’t read so many stories like that anymore. Instead, we talked the other day about how Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Chief Executive Officer David Solomon wants his bankers to spend more time in the office and stop going out for lunch. Rough for them, but honestly kind of a good sign? There are deals to be done! There is money to be made! Get back in there and make it! The old trade-offs are back; finance is once again where the action is, and if you want to be part of that action the only choice is to take way, way too much of it.

It’s not an investment bank, but this Insider story about private-equity giant Apollo Global Management Inc., whose “hard-driving culture is extreme even by Wall Street standards,” hits some of the same notes. It sounds terrible! 

Associates are often handed assignments by executives late in the day, with the expectation that they are to forgo a night's sleep to prepare materials for early the next morning. Associates assigned to support a deal could expect to live without a full night of rest for weeks on end. One source who recently left Apollo said they often felt drunk because of sleep deprivation. 

One executive made it known that he hadn't taken a personal trip until he was promoted to principal — a point that associates took to mean that they shouldn't either, according to one Apollo associate who heard the remarks firsthand.

This person, and an employee who left the firm recently said that associates have coped with the work stresses by relying on a dark sense of humor to get them through the day, joking about everything from the perceived incompetence of superiors to more extreme statements, like saying they would rather kill themselves than keep working.  

Apollo also has a part-of-the-weekend off rule — no calls or meetings between Friday evening and Saturday evening, “unless it is urgent or related to a live deal” — but it doesn’t seem to have done much good:

Associates told Insider that partners at the firm simply compensated for the communications hiatus by piling on extra work on Saturday night. Within a month, it seemed as though the mandated break had disappeared, said two associates, one of whom has since left.

And you get vacation time unless you don’t:

Three other current executives said that the firm encourages employees to take two weeks off in August and another two weeks off in December. Two of these executives acknowledged that associates often weren't actually granted this time in practice if they were pulled into a deal and that breaks, for anyone, had been hard to come by over the past year during the pandemic. 

It is all extremely unpleasant. Also, as a former investment banker, I found it all pretty familiar. It suggests the old trade-off is back: There are deals to be done, money to be made, a lot of action everywhere, so you have to work all the time. 

It’s possible that this is all cyclical: When financial firms are busy, they tell junior employees “sorry we can’t offer you weekends or sleep, but here is a pile of money”; when they are not, they tell junior employees “sorry we can’t offer you as much money as you expected, but here is a Saturday off.”

But you never know. Back when everyone was getting half a weekend off, there was a lot of talk about how today’s young people don’t want the old-school trade-off, that the industry would have to change permanently in order to accommodate the next generation’s demands for meaningful work and personal life. “Seven of the 30 private-equity associates in Apollo's New York City office, along with one principal, have left the firm over the past three months.” “Associates at the firm are also granted some of the highest pay packages in the industry,” and yet they’re leaving anyway. Perhaps, having had a glimpse of the weekend, they can’t go back to the old ways.

 

LOL...these lateral opportunities are perennial, and a trap for most careers. Apollo knows that the great majority of lateral hires end up leaving, and unless you are a woman or URM (Apollo is making a big show of being socially conscious, for self serving purposes) you will be treated like sh*t, used up, and spit out. For many it derails their PE careers. Thanks but no thanks.

 

Anyone know if the hybrid value group at Apollo just as bad or better?

As bad or worse. There were a bunch of guys in credit/PE that wouldn’t have gotten promoted, but they were good little toy soldiers/company men, so they moved them into HVF where they can have a promotion track. So basically all these guys are just nose to the grindstone animals, and constantly feel less than and like they have something to prove. A few of the senior hybrid value guys are the quintessence of bad Apollo culture.

 

Anyone else think Leon Black looks like lucifer? I'm not some conspiracy theorist, it's just funny how being evil can actually morph your facial features to look more malicious. Amazing the guy can be pals with Epstein and have his career still survive. Guess when your reputation is being a piece of crap, having Epstein ties doesn't change much..

 

What makes Apollo uniquely bad?:

Humans are capable of extreme evil. They are also capable of noble conduct. In most environments, rules and accountability keep our evil instincts in check. The best among us behave well because of our internal values, but others need external regulation.

When external controls are lacking, or worse yet, when the environment INVITES selfish and ruthless conduct, the worst among us are free to maximally exploit and abuse others for our own advantage or ego needs. War time, concentration camps, organized crime, etc are extreme examples. The world of high finance has many pockets where despicable human conduct thrives because of a permissive environment, Apollo may well be the worst of these.

It is a moral wasteland. Not everyone is bad, of course. But the path to power, rooted solely in making money for the firm, is such that many vile human beings are in control, and will continue to ascend to power in the future. There is an absolute power divide between the associates and Principals/Partners, as in the associates having exactly zero control, and being 100% at the mercy of higher ranks. There are some quite decent Principals and a few reasonable partners, and if an associate is fortunate enough to largely work with these, he will survive. But there are teams of Principals and partners who will deliver such an absolutely intolerable experience that there is no alternative but to leave....there is zero opportunity to address any injustice. So greatly differing experiences await new associates, and accordingly some will stay and others will desperately seek to get out. There are Principals here who think nothing of utterly destroying days in a row of an associates time to endlessly tweak a work product for no reason to cater to their own obsessive need to make themselves look 1% better to the Partner. These same guys will never get over the slightest resistance, and will work behind the scenes to discredit the associate, and others in power will blindly accept all such efforts and the associate will simply plan to leave in disgust. This is an example of a permissive environment where bad conduct is free of cost. There is simply no mechanism to address legitimate grievances.

The disgust an associate may feel is directly proportional to the extent his own values and sense of morality diverges from this environment. If extreme, there will be no way to reconcile with such a system, no matter what the $ rewards. If moderate, or if the associate is lucky enough to mostly work with the better people, he can find a way to survive without personally adding to this kind of evil. But there are others who naturally have an instinct to actually exploit such an environment, to ingratiate themselves with those in power, no matter how vile they may be, and who await their own chance to get promoted and then perpetuate the abuse and exploit juniors for their own gain. For some of these, a 1% perceived gain for themselves is worth unchecked heinous treatment of an associate. And there is no one the associate can complain to. These are the future leaders. The system cannot be fixed, because fixing it would mean that some of the despicable human beings currently running the show would need to examine their own values and conduct ( which is not even possible for people of that ilk), conclude that they need to change, and then enforce change down the line. Not possible.

This is why there are some principals and partners who are universally hated, who are known to be absolutely intolerable to work with, and who break every rule of decency, yet thrive at this place. Some of them are purely all about petty process, lacking real investment skill, and producing work done entirely by associates and taking credit for it while pleasing the people above them. That is all it takes. Many associates with far greater talent and promise than these animals have left because of them.

Brief word about the high pay: the money does get real for principals and partners. For associates, it is a bad deal. Apollo extracts its work from half the number of associates that the workload demands, so the high pay still saves them a ton of money. Some other MFs could slash their work force in half and double the pay, exceeding Apollo pay easily.....

 

Conscience, personal integrity, values etc are the basic differentiating factors. A lack of these qualities, coupled with unlimited greed and ruthless self interest set some folks apart. Some will do anything to gain the upper hand. And such people at all levels will do anything to vindicate the system, including brazen misrepresentation and lies. Just another aspect of what we know humans to be capable of. It is the way some organizations roll.

 

Apollo and H&F associate very rarely stay in private equity afterwards ("learned a lot, worked my ass off, and I just don't think this job is for me"), so I always thought that was quite telling about their cultures. For Blackstone and KKR they stay in the industry, so I figure the associates like the job enough to stay. Warburg is very group-dependent. Carlyle they tend to stay in the industry as well. Not sure about TPG.

 

Yep. 40% of associates will be leaving from NY alone. This is typical Apollo response, bribe the guys instead of addressing he root problem....because the root problem is with several senior guys as well as principals. Apollo is not capable of addressing that issue. They are recruiting like mad, and will no doubt snare some starry eyed wannabes, who will make a deal with the devil. Big mistake. This is not a one time transaction, it has career implications, and for most that will be a blunder.

 

The key input to your math is bps of carry, and I'm not sure where you're drawing that from.  There are a lot of mouths to feed.  

I also wouldn't say starting this path as an associate at APO is anything like the path Jon Gray went on.  He's very talented, but got immensely lucky being in the right place and the right time when PE was still in growth mode with a lot of low hanging fruit.  Making it to the highest echelons today takes much more than just time/grind, it also takes immense talent (which I realize you acknowledged) and political savvy.

Also, I'm not sure sacrificing my life for 20 years is worth any amount of money.  To those that succeed at Apollo, though, it's not a sacrifice, it's their entire identity and I believe they truly love the game (for better or worse) and everything that comes with it.  

 
Controversial

What kind of dipshit math is this? You assume they hit a 2x MOIC, then realize that half the economics walk out the door to public shareholders, so you then gross up the returns to 2.5x just to make your math work?

Also because you weren't smart enough to pick up on the prior poster mocking your dumb as a box of rocks math predicated on a mountain of IFs, I'll spell it out for you. IF your entirely uninformed and made up assumptions check out, and IF the math above is right, and IF the return compression that is true for every single asset class and particularly PE doesn't apply to one of the largest PE investors making up this asset class, then yes, it all shakes out. Another true statement: if my mom had a dick, she'd be my dad.

 

Also, why do you keep posting the same thing over and over again under different names?

dollarbillstearnofficial

Let's show some work:

Suppose Apollo raises a $25bn fund, and let's say you're a partner (and suppose fund lasts for 7 years). Assuming a 2x MOIC, the GP share is $5bn. If the partner's carry is 100bps, that implies $50mm over 7 years (~7.1mm per year), and if its 75bps, that implies $37.5mm over 7 years (~5.5mm per year). HOWEVER, Apollo is public, and that effectively cuts the GP share in half..solution? Maybe instead of 2x MOIC, they do 2.5x, which I think is reasonable considering how everyone says Apollo is the top performer, AND we are forgetting about RSUs: so let's just leave the numbers as they are lol. So we're talking $5-7mm per year in carry just from this one fund alone.

When this partner was a principal, they probably had carry in a fund that is still paying out. Let's say that was $15-20mm over 7 years, so $1-3mm per year. There is definitely going to be some overlapping between when the old fund and new fund payout, implying $6-10mm a year in carry alone (during those overlapping years). When you add on cash comp at the partner level (idk maybe another $1.5-2.5mm -- can anyone comment on this? What does an Apollo partner make in cash comp?), you get a number that is in the low 8 figures per year. But yes, those overlapping years won't last forever and that first fund will eventually be fully juiced out. So what, just subtract $1-3mm from that total comp figure in those overlapping years and it's still around 8 figures. 

So imagine if 4 years later Apollo does a $30bn fund, and now you get a few more bps of carry because you've been there a little longer, and then another 4 years later the same thing. By now you're 18 years in (10 years associate/principal, partner for 8 years, and your'e around 42 since you joined APO at age 24). If you stay there for 20-25 years (which is a challenge in and if itself, don't get me wrong), you'll get more carry in each successive fund fund. Now let's say all along, you've been putting a large portion of your carry back into the fund via co-invest. GUYS. Add all of this stuff up.

Fund 1 (Principal): $15-20mm

Fund 2 (Partner): $30-50mm

Fund 3 (Partner): $40-60mm

Fund 4 (Senior Partner): $50-70mm

Co-Invest all along with leverage: God knows how much, probably well over $100mm

That is an unfathomable number. I'm sure that number is greater than what you could make working as a partner at any tiger cub (assuming you're a notch below someone like Scott Shleifer/Kelly Granat). That number is something like $200mm on the lower end over those 20-25 years. SURE, inflation, returns getting weaker, economics getting worse...let's apply a more than modest 50% discount...$100mm. Not too shabby. But it's not all sunshine and rainbows. Getting an associate gig at Apollo is very hard, and staying there is 10 times harder. Let alone staying there for 20-25 years. But the math is there, and for anyone capable of standing up to the challenge, a treasure chest will be waiting for you. And we're not even considering the random blowout funds/investments they've had like Lyondell Bassell where they put up 7x MOIC. If we are being really optimistic with the numbers, I'd venture to say that you could even reach $500mm-$1bn. But that's lofty. But hey, look at guys like Jon Gray at BX and Kleinman at APO, they're EXACT evidence of this. 20-25 years is a long time and it's not as easy as it sounds. Maybe 1 in 1000 people will slay the beast. Those are my 2 cents, interested to see where I went wrong with this lol, or, if I'm right

duedillydally

OK, a bit of Math may help:

$25B Fund

At 2X return, GP share = $5BILLION

Assume Principal Carry is 50bps....that equals $25 Million over 6 years, or $4.16 Million average/year, add average base comp ~$1.2 mill/year, Total = $5.3 Mill/year 

At 25bps Carry, total comp = over $ $3.3 Mill/year average

If Fund goes 1.5X, the total comp at 50bps Carry is $ 3.3 Mill/yr. average over 6 years

At 25 bps carry, total comp is $2.3 Mill/year average

In all of these cases, total comp. is within or beyond the $2-4 mill/year average range that I originally posted.

People can believe what they want, of course.

 

Your math is the equivalent to when Arod signed his big deal and news networks asked how many planes he can buy now. Similar to when the extreme left call out the top 1%, cause they are in the 1%.

Facts are, we know an IB analyst at top bank makes 70k for instance, while we know none make 120k, maybe one makes 65k or 75k. Why cause we have multiple data points over the years for that process, we also know the band is small.

You are using the same process to judge the sr roles. It dont work that way and truly its annoying them all. All these guys keep pointing to that survey/publication to say “yes my base and cash comp” is in that ballpark you can relax I get paid well. But none of them is saying, the “level of carry quoted” is what you are guaranteed if you get to that level at xyz fund or similar fund. Unlike the starting IB analyst range they know at their levels the ranges vary way more and circumstance change massively. They would be doing a massive dis-service to claim otherwise.

Here is an exercise...why don’t you go find out what possibly the worst vp/principal at these firms could make...then why dont you go see what investment in the fund caused it to be dragged down versus others. Then see if that scenario could work in your math.
Heck could make it easier look up Apollo O&G fund performance from 2014-2018 and 2018-2022 and let us know if you think both cohorts easily retired today.

Lastly, majority of these dudes have told their “direct path” is for more the risk averse, the risk averse aint going to tell you everyone will be Jon Gray.

 

Any organization which has  many outright psychopaths with serious personality disorders, and completely lacks any restraints or checks on such people, with absolutely zero accountability, can only have one type of "culture". There is another grotesque psychopath at one of the offices whose mental illness and personality disorder is such that his obscene conduct and temperament would mean a life span of about 5 minutes on the street....yet that coward knows that he can get away with unlimited abuse within his work domain...thanks to the "culture" and values of his employer.

 

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