MF PE Recent Returns
Just saw the most recent PE returns report published by an LP, and was frankly shocked by some of the numbers. Permira / Thoma Bravo / Apax each have recent fund vintages below the 8% IRR hurdle rate, while H&F / KKR / Carlyle / Blackstone are at merely high single-digit IRRs. CVC's 2023 fund is marked at a negative 8.1% IRR. There were a few bright spots on the PE side for firms in the $8-12Bn fund size range, but essentially none of the traditional MFs have posted an IRR above 11% for recent vintages.
Is single-digit IRR the norm now for MF PE?? Or are some of these funds still considered too early in their life-cycle?
Here are the numbers below, curious to hear what people think.
As of March 31st, 2025:
Blackstone Capital Partners VIII LP (2019 Vintage): 8.7% IRR, 1.22x MOIC
Carlyle Partners VIII (2021 Vintage): 8.9% IRR, 1.15x MOIC
Carlyle Partners VII (2017 Vintage): 7.6% IRR, 1.33x MOIC
Hellman & Friedman Capital Partners X (2021 Vintage): 8.1% IRR, 1.21x MOIC
KKR North America Fund XIII (2021 Vintage): 8.9% IRR, 1.16x MOIC
Permira VIII (2022 Vintage): 3.5% IRR, 1.05x MOIC
Permira VII (2019 Vintage): 5.5% IRR, 1.21x MOIC
Thoma Bravo Fund XIV (2020 Vintage): 7.7% IRR, 1.26x MOIC
Apax XI (2022 Vintage): 6.9% IRR, 1.03x MOIC
CVC Capital Partners IX (2023 Vintage): -8.1% IRR, 0.97x MOIC
Advent International GPE X (2022 Vintage): 10.9% IRR, 1.16x MOIC
thoughts on working at Advent long term? I know it's early to judge their latest fund but seems like they've been killing it
Imagine working 100 hr weeks to post an 8% IRR...
These guys used to clown HFs for doing that
Seriously. PE was always just levered beta in the end. Institutionalized looting and extraction of value from the economy.
post DPI this is meaningless
DPI is 0.0x for Advent and Apax, and close to 0.0x for most of the others as you would expect
so it's even more meaningless. these marks mean nothing for such recent vintages.
Even more disappointing if you're looking at older vintages available in the report:
Carlyle (2017 Vintage) is at 0.3x DPI
Silver Lake (2017 Vintage) is at 0.6x DPI
TPG (2018 Vintage) is at 0.3x DPI
Warburg (2018 Vintage) is at 0.4x DPI
H&F (2018 Vintage) is at 0.1x DPI
For even older ones, Blackstone (2015 Vintage) / and KKR (2016 Vintage) are both near the end of their fund life-cycle of ~10 years and are currently sitting underwater at less than 0.9x DPI. So that means they've distributed to LPs less than what the LPs contributed to the funds over the past ~10 years, is that right?
Who cares about returns? Top MFs are playing the AuM game now.
Everyone with carry probably
AUM eventually stops coming when you’re posting 8% IRRs for a highly levered product after a decade…
yeah lol wtf
And when it stops you stop mattering. The flashing logo on that little typed Word Doc turned PDF resume is just that if there’s nothing behind it.
I criticize pe returns too but this is nuts these are brand new vintages. Returns meaningful after 7 years so only look at 2017 and older
exactly the point i was trying to make before.
But IRR maths means it is very hard to increase IRR after so many years. You would need big write ups. Plus they will have already use credit lines etc to lift the IRR early in the fund life.
No the IRR is on deployed capital which for these very new vintages is probably less than 20% and it’s not meaningful
It happens. A good amount of PE exits get a large writeup at exit because the PE firms were either conservative with how they marked their investments during their hold, or because they had a great outcome in the sale process.
These are even more damning tbh, comp these funds doing 12% IRR when public markets have ripped signficantly more since 2017.
Which large-cap funds are actually performing well, at least relatively speaking, in this environment? At the $8Bn+ latest fund size level
Based on the available reports as of last quarter, here are the $8Bn+ latest fund size firms with recent vintages in the top quartile:
LGP, Hg Capital, Nordic Capital, Veritas Capital
That makes sense. Looks like despite also investing at the large-cap level, they are primarily
(1) Pure-play LBO-focused funds as opposed to diversified MFs
(2) Sector specialists or have a highly differentiated edge at what they do:
Would imagine the incentive to drive superior returns can be low when traditional PE is only 15% of overall AUM at the traditional MFs (e.g. BX, KKR, APO), and will continue to shrink.
The pure-play LBO firms will likely gain PE AUM share from the old MFs over time, while the MFs continue to focus on credit / infra / RE / secondaries where the AUM game is easier. You just can't justify allocating PE capital to MFs as opposed large-cap pure-play buyout funds when the MFs are consistently generating returns well below their cost of capital.
Advent, CD&R, Apollo, TA (big fund, but not really a large-cap strategy)
Always thought Apollo has great returns historically, but just recently realized they have multiple older vintages (e.g. 2013) that sits at ~8% IRR. They are more of a credit fund / insurance company these days so they probably care less about how the PE fund performs, though at the expense of (zero) carried interest for their IPs.
Saw that CD&R's Fund XI (2020 vintage) is sitting at 4.9% IRR, 1.1x MOIC. They are also dealing with multiple distressed portcos / restructurings recently.
And yes, TA operates under a very different strategy compared to the traditional LBO guys.
The reality is large cap PE isn't going to outperform the overall PE industry most of the time so many of the large players aren't going to impress you from a returns standpoint and I think it is the norm, it isn't that the fund is too early in its investment period. The large cap space is very difficult to chase 20%+ IRR on all investments and overall portfolio since most of the assets that they are purchasing are already discoverable and may have already been owned by a sponsor prior to their ownership. Big companies that are considered great PE investments are going to be known by everyone in the industry as a good asset and actively targeted, this drives purchase price in an auction process since the PE firm who submits the highest bid will win the auction and will make it harder to drive returns from a MOIC perspective. The massive growth in PE over the past couple decades has also meant that there are more PE firms than ever and most play in the mid-cap space so they are purchasing great businesses first and will professionalize and extract value during their ownership period before monetizing and selling to a large cap investor, sometimes the large cap PE firm is the second or even third institutional investor. Large cap firms are trying to extract value with whatever is left which sometimes isn't much and their path to exit is more difficult since the buyer universe is limited as assets get larger. Sometimes these firms have to IPO the business to get out and they have to sell their stake in pieces which ultimately results in less returns than a clean full sale at once.
As these firms also scale, they start to have liquidity issues themselves and succession planning which leads to an eventual IPO of their own business. Only a handful of the MFs are public currently but many more are considering filing for an IPO or already have. Once these firms are public, the strategy tends to shift. With how the PE firms are structured, shareholders are primarily reaping upside of management fees. Carry does not really matriculate down to public shareholders. Therefore, public shareholders place an emphasis on PE firms to raise more capital and increase AUM so they get value through an increased management fee pool and measure performance on this. All of the public MFs these days are hyper focused on fundraising and this mentality shift does not help with keeping the strategy on quality returns over everything.
Obviously fund returns would help with fundraising but it doesn't seem that imperative with how the public MFs have grown. They've just decided to leverage their brand and reputation to continually raise buyout funds and then diversify their firm by chasing other investing strategies with good whitespace hence the rise of credit and real asset adjacencies. Large LPs will for the most part back good brands as it's easy for them to commit to less funds but commit a larger chunk of capital instead of committing to more funds but less commitments since it takes a lot of time and effort to research and analyze a bunch of funds and the smaller funds can't take on a $500 million commitment since that may end up being their whole fund underwritten by one LP.
The lackluster returns have been starting to catch up with some of these legacy players. Blackstone recently and quietly closed their latest flagship fund at around $21 billion when they set a $30 billion target. Apollo, Carlyle, and TPG are a few others who closed their latest fund at lower than its initial targets over the past few years. You are starting to see more and more funds across the large/mid/small cap space struggle to hit or exceed targets and that trend will probably continue so it's not a unique phenomenon that only the big players will deal with. For the established players, it's less of a concern since they'll lean on their brand and track record. Large LPs need a home for their capital and as mentioned above, it's easier to focus on less funds and get capital committed quickly since they aren't getting returns with capital on the sidelines.
If you are looking for consistent 20%+ IRR funds, it's probably best to search the mid and small cap investors. The universe of assets is massive so they can really scour the earth to find quality investments that many haven't heard of and there is more price disparity as you delve into smaller companies. Small companies don't really know what they are worth sometimes and family-run businesses may not even realize how to value their business or how to even approach that exercise. Not to mention there are a lot more operational improvement opportunities for a family-run business who has a stigma against basic operational initiatives because "if it ain't broke, then don't fix it". The small PE firms may not be the most prestigious but this is where you can actually make some good money if you work at a place that has consistent stellar returns and you have meaningful carry in the funds.
It has always been true in my opinion but never moreso than now that this is a financial engineering game.
It is genuinely a privilege to be able to invest in this asset class. You have every financial tool in the universe from infinite refis as you scream at your private credit lender over the phone, continuation vehicles which have somehow not been flagged as a regulatory conflict of interest, recapping yourself a dividend on the investments that do go well, LME / debt exchanges to screw your lenders and move yourself up the capital structure, etc etc
It's actually crazy that we are doing all of this and STILL yielding 1.0x DPI and an IRR that the average person could outperform if they took a quarter or two to get smart on a dozen OTC names.
To be clear it is not that working in modern PE means you can't be smart about businesses or have great investor qualities imo, but rather that the activity of what we do itself is contradictory to improving businesses, a 'growth trajectory' and whatever other platitudes that are on every fund's website.
No one will hesitate to leverage a business up another turn if they have the optionality to even when the CFO flags that they have NWC volatility with their suppliers in a downturn and can't afford to spend 90% of their EBITDA on debt service if the macro environment changes. Everything is about pulling levers to juice returns, and how do you get out when shit hits the fan (genuinely identical to being a credit investor, except we are worse at it because most of us don't actually understand credit instruments or restructuring).
All of that said, shouldn't that mean the takeaway is that, actually, it's a very positive time to be a junior in this space?
Could be that we're all overreacting, but if you're downside case is that the industry will undergo significant strategic (and regulatory) change, then you can build all the robot skills in the traditional programs now and look to jump ship to more interesting spots when they appear. Also given the fact that is self-selected to be one of the least risk-averse / most-cookie cutter / prestige path following group of people (worse places to be than following the blue print perfectly at 24, I'm just noting for the sake of making a point), should allow for plenty of opportunity for those that have a differentiated view about the future / use case of the asset class. In a sentence, if the 'system' is working perfectly and you're at the junior level, hard to be more than a cog in a machine, whereas if shit is hitting the fan, it's better to cash in your junior years to get the skillset and then jump ship when the landscape is ripe with opportunity
THIS
But would juniors still have chances to jump ship rather than sinking with it like GFC when shit hits the fan ?
I certainly think so. The GFC was a blow up that was realized / 'happened' in a moment. As a function of PE not marking to market, it's insulated from having something like a 'moment' at all. What's more likely imo is a gradual departure / reallocation of funding from LPs who realize that the 0% interest rate era strategy of PE simply isn't going to work in a new rate / macro environment.
Partners / MDs that have a 30-year tenure of big-dogging their lender group while adding zero operational value are not going to be natural recipients of that reallocation, but the market will identify a certain set of performers that are, who will need juniors to support them.
Also just given the way the world operates, it's likely that the MFs who are the biggest offenders of 0% rate / non-value add PE will also be the first to poach and throw money bags at strategies / leaders that are seen as more desirable / investable.
If that weren't the case, that would actually be quite an impressive feat of meritocracy for our asset class. I feel like in virtually every other industry you're downside protected by just being at the big player as a result of M&A prospects regardless of whether or not you're the one doing interesting shit. I.e the corporate SWE at google probably is never going to be remotely as innovative as the best start ups, but without doubt most of those start ups are going to end up under the google umbrella via buy-out, so sitting in the google SWE seat is like a perpetual ebb and flow of going obsolete and then buying the people obsoleting you. I feel like we're seeing that playout in real time in our world with all the MFs moving into private credit via M&A, purchasing of talent, etc.
Im shocked by the honesty in these marks. These investments have to be performing horribly if they are marked this low at this point in the fund life (and with no exits and virtually no DPI)
Kinda makes me question the data integrity cause idk a single fund who is marking anything like that unless it has really hit the fan and gotten upside down.
Also assume these are gross not net?
Great thread. What's even more damning about these returns is that the S&P 500 returned 16.5% over the last five years. Essentially by investing in these funds, LPs have given these GPs millions of dollars in management fees per year to underperform by half, an index that they can invest in for almost free. And that's after the PE funds have used literally every trick of the trade to artificially juice returns - subscription credit line outstanding for a year plus, transfers to CVs, NAV loans etc. Unfortunately, this is PE at its worst - a transfer of wealth from teachers, firefighters, universities, foundations to a small subset of extremely well-off people for no added value of any kind.
I see a lot of comments saying that the MF don't care about PE returns, that they have diversified into other strategies, that some LPs will always back them due to brand name etc. There is some truth to this but I am not sure this reasoning will continue to hold water if they keep underperforming public markets. After all, the entire reason LPs invest in PE is to outperform over what they can generate investing in stocks.
Also LPs giving up liquidity. Bearing in mind you could give up the same liquidity and open a high yield bank savings account for 5% without any risks + no leverage risk
Agree to some degree but it’s also simply a function of how leverage works
I’d also say it’s easy talking that PE are the bandits here. Lots of these LPs are FULL of very mediocre people pulling incredible cash pay to underperform the managers even further with very limited career risk and great work life balance. Especially if your argument is that PE is so bad that carry won’t pay out anyway (in which case PE is undercomped meaningfully at almost all levels vs these massive pension funds)
Hard disagree. I will give you that there is more skill variability in LP seats but the view that all or even most LPs are filled with mediocre people is just plain outdated. Fund of funds, endowments, foundations have very strong people in their funds division now. Even most larger state public pensions have very qualified people these days. And by the way, you could say the same thing about GPs as well. The people working at these firms may have gone to better schools but at least in my interactions with them, the vast majority don't exactly exude genius.
On your second point on carry, disagree there as well. This is an industry that pays nearly a quarter of a million dollars to people in their early 20s who don't have any particular business knowledge other than how to model and write memos. By the time they are in their 30's, most are pulling in well above half a million dollars. That's basically what the CIOs of large US public pensions make. PE is simply not undercomped at all relative to LPs, even without carry.
Smart LPs who have the foresight and ability (i.e. not major pension plans who have to feed BX/KKR/etc. due to size) have been running from funds above $1-2b for a decade plus now.
People saying that these are new vintages and so should be given time - this isn't an accurate assessment, like-for-like vintages were significantly above on DPI stats
What’s the source for this, looks like they have good info and I’d like to learn more. Thanks!
Financial times (paywall): Subscribe to read
I don't think people are saying low DPI should be excused just because they're new, they're saying low DPI is meaningless because of a historically shitty DPI market and quartiles being defined by like 0.05x differences.
ahh yes, that DPI market will just turn right now and DPI will rocket ship for every firm!
From the view of someone in public markets the IPO market is wide open both in the US and Europe. The spx remains very close to all time highs, the equal weight spw also very close, the ftse and sx5E are both up 8% year to date and the Dax is up a whopping 18%. All these conditions also make acquisitions highly attractive to strategies - who have access to both equity markets and IG bond markets at a time when IG spreads are extraordinarily low. High yield spreads are at close to all time lows and the leveraged loan markets are buoyant. Finally both the EU and the US have softened their anti trust policies (Trump more friendly vs Biden, etc).
So whenever I hear that exits/DPI are challenged because of exogenous factors, I am stunned people drink the cool aid. It is a complete lie that obfuscates the issue, which is the horrible, idiosyncratic losses PE firms have made. They have simply picked and overpaid for the wrong stocks. They have mis allocated capital and destroyed LP capital.
The evidence for this is obvious but found in an atypical place — from the rating agencies that rate the debt used to finance acquisitions by large sponsors. These reports make clear that on their main kpis, top line, and earnings growth, PE owned companies are way below top public companies like Amazon or Microsoft or Meta. And Amazon and Meta trade at 12-14x forward EBITDA which is a lower valuation than many PE take privates I’ve recently seen.
Some firms also compound the losses via their failing “operational improvements” which are really just aggressive cost cuts that sacrifice long term earnings for short term margins and cash flow. So even the poor results generated today by many PE owned companies are in fact over-earnings and will trend down in the future.
So to those of you in PE, pull up Meta or Amazon 10-K and pull up estimates in CapIQ. Think honestly to yourself thereafter. Do you a single company in your portfolio that is higher quality? And if not, think hard and long about whether the multiples / discount rates used to mark your portfolio are realistic.
Not sure who said dpi should be ignored think people said IRR is misleading this early
In general, for 4 year funds i'd agree, yes, it can be misleading. For the plethora of 2017 funds that have IRRs in the 8% range, clearly no.
The question is, if the 8 year old funds are returning single digits, even if we wait for another 4 years for the 2021 funds to mature, are you really telling me that these funds will show much better IRR? Remember, the 2017 funds had the opportunity to exit in 2021/2022 which were red hot, for the 2021 funds no such opportunity exists. My bet is that these funds that you say are showing "misleading" IRRs are actually cooked
What's really hilarious is that there have been pretty popular threads in the last 18-24 months about, individually, each of BX, Carlyle, and H&F's returns being surprisingly blase. For the Permira commentary you have to dig more into comment threads but it's been pretty negative and not hard to find. KKR and TPG are also public and have been discussed somewhat. But all discussion has been either "2.X is paradise for LP's, it's all in the AUM bruh, 2>20" or "PC > PE, no one has ever made any money in the industry, get off the Titanic now." And of course there's the influence of prospects and prestige fanboys not grasping any of this and being shocked when they see the numbers.
It's a winner-loser market, a lot of powder is about to cull over the next 3-5 years before the survivors feast on valuations again. Or maybe rates will stay high enough forever for stagflation to muddle along forever. Who the hell knows.
It’s been a ~15% net irr industry for 15 years now. Of course a bunch of funds are going to be in the single digit IRR range. Nothing new here.
More like ~12% and we’re being generous..
Apax hurdle rate is 6% cuz they charge 1% mgmt fees
its interesting as i have college friends who are at VP/Principal at SL TPG WP KKR and Apax and though some of them are carrying early signs of stress (who doesn't at age ~30 working hard though), none of them even plan on leaving and are still happy and full of life outside of work... I guess the annual pay keeps them happy so they don't think long long term?
I mean, at the end of the day you’re still making enough money to save and invest while still traveling and indulging your hobbies in what free time you have.
Depressing all round
To make things sadder - look at some of the 2013/2014 vintages - I work in London so have been looking at some of those (e.g., Bridgepoint, Cinven, Montagu etc.) - horrible returns
I'm not terribly bullish on PE as an asset class, but to be fair, you are looking at some young vintages. Wait until 5-7 years before you really start criticizing. J curve is a real thing.
Moreover, these are large funds so the deal teams most likely underwrote them to like a ~2.0-2.25x MOIC anyway. LPs and GPs are not seriously expecting 3x+ these days on deals that are this big. Only LMM funds are underwriting that.
These vintages you posted might end up being mid when all is said and done, but I think that this is more so due to all the PE firms that lost the plot during the COVID frenzy and and paid high multiples on some deals that didn't deserve it. It doesn't necessarily mean anything negative about PE as a whole (in my opinion).
The issue s the predecessor funds to the ones OP showed are basically the same...way below 1.0x DPI with no line of sight for distributions, meaning IRR is dropping like a brick and probably ends up in the single digits...
5 years into a fund is life is still fairly unseasoned. If there’s a 4 year investment period, that means by year 2, only half the fund is deployed. By year 4 100% is deployed, with half being in years 2-4 of their hold and half being 0-2. It’s really in years 4-5 you’d see it accreting into a decent return.
Go look at fund MOICs through GFC, they’re all 2x. Provided they had to stretch those holds longer, so a decent PE return in that vintage was like 10%. But points being: (1) it’s really hard to lose money in PE, (2) it’s hard to pick a moment in time in the beginning or middle of a fund and think that’s emblematic of where it will end up.
I’m at a MF. I think a 2x gross is a very reasonable base case, but when I value my carry for personal planning, I assume a 1.5x gross bc I think that’s a pretty good bet at like a 95%+ confidence interval.
So 10% IRR is considered acceptable as long as you hit 2.0x MOIC?
If it’s what you return on a fund invested as the financial markets were hurtling towards the abyss, it’s not bad.
I don’t think people realize how fucked up the GFC was. It wasn’t like COVID. In COVID everyone was fucked and so in some ways no one is fucked — as long as you didn’t, you know, die.
During GFC, the economy and markets were on the brink of complete failure and collapse the likes of which hadn’t been seen since the Great Depression (which was a full decade of economic blight and poverty across the country).
If a GFC vintage fund returned 10% — yeah that’s acceptable and you’re probably still humming along.
Keep in mind, if you put $100 in the S&P 500 in Jan 2007, you would have gotten a 1.5x MOIC across the next 10 years. Maybe its closer to 2x with dividends. That would be like 7% total return.
Maybe a 7% vs 10% doesn’t sound like much, but if you compound each of those across 25 years it’s the difference between a 5x and 10x on invested capital.
I just popped in to say just how funny it is that you can be better than the $1mm/yr salaried / $10mm+ carry MD at a major PE firm by simply pressing buy on SPY
Bankers and PE "professionals" are the dumbest motherfuckers you'll ever meet. They are professional grifters who are good at marketing and have ridden the largest bull run in the history of finance. The game is up going forward. It's no longer a viable asset class when markets don't trend upwards ad infinitum. It's a Ponzi scheme as Buffett says.
Sorry you didn’t get the VP promote.
It's no longer worth anything...
I bought some PTY shares in the recent downturn yielding 10.5% lmao my junk bonds are performing better than PE
any insight as to how have returns for cerberus pe and kps been?
i know they focus more on distressed, so curious how they ended up, thx!
This is an unnecessary pile on... IRRs mean nothing for the first 3-4 years in any fund. You invest in the first 3-4 years and then look to exit the next 3-4 years.
Most funds dont mark up new investments for the first year and its remarkably rare to be able to sell an asset in 2-3 years. You could pull it off in crazy bull years like 2021 where tech assets were trading around every 2-3 years and leverage was near free so we were re-capping everything we could..
DPI is usually sub 0.25x first 5-6 years in large cap PE and then picks up. All said, this is a tough vintage (21/22/23) because of high prices paid off the bat, but things normalise. This is a cyclical business, important to not forget that fundamental reality.
This is some excellent copium. Vintages from 2017 to 2022 are extremely challenged to the point it will be an existential threat to many firms. Things won't normalize for these, they are just done plain and simple (similar to the pre-GFC vintages).
DPI for these vintages is materially subdued vs historical years, see chart above in this thread.
This
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